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Neoliberal restructuring in Mexico drove a considerable mortgage expansion and a 
housing production boom, arguably with the intention of increasing housing access for 
lower-middle income formal workers. During the 2000s, numerous households acquired 
mortgages to buy houses in the fringes of Mexican cities, where local governments have 
struggled to provide adequate infrastructure and services. Many such families have seen 
their mortgages and monthly payments swell through the years while their debt remains 
virtually unchanged, forcing many of them to leave their dwellings behind and return to 
renting or to living with other relatives closer to the urban core. Numerous newly built 
developments have thus exhibited alarmingly high housing vacancy rates. By 2010, 
Mexico had over five million vacant housing units and a 14 percent vacancy rate. 
Paradoxically, however, about a third of Mexicans still live in poor housing conditions.  
This research analyzes the influence of recent federal housing finance policy, and 
urban development practices at the state and local levels, in promoting housing production 
and vacancy. It also discusses some of the spatial and socioeconomic implications of these 
development patterns for residents, government and financing institutions, and developers. 
In particular, this research examines the experiences of two cases: Tijuana, Baja California 
and Huehuetoca, State of Mexico, chosen for (1) the severity of their vacancy and housing 
 vi 
conditions, (2) the amount of housing investment they received in the 2000s, and (3) their 
contrasting institutional capacity at the local and metropolitan levels.  
Drawing upon mixed methods and extensive field research, I argue that the 
coexistence of a housing oversupply and a shortage exposes the tensions between the 
commodification and the right to housing, and the extent to which the former has trumped 
the latter. Given the flourishing of construction and real estate interests through state 
support, Mexican housing policy has served as a politically guided intensification of market 
rule, rather than as an apolitical and technocratic framework, as neoliberal advocates have 
often argued. Contrary to the rhetoric of autonomous market-led efficiency, the Mexican 
government has played a key role in mitigating risks for the construction and financial 
sectors – and not households. By doing so, housing reforms have lacked a critical analysis 
of the socioeconomic and political implications of implementing strategies that have 
backed private interests in the name of expanding home ownership for the poor while in 
reality many low-income households remain locked out of adequate and affordable homes.  
The present research has implications for theories regarding how governing 
regimes operate to facilitate growth. The interactions and relationships between different 
government levels and private actors and interests since the implementation of a new 
housing finance and development model in Mexico have stemmed elaborate power 
structures and a multi-level regime and complex system of governance, distinct from that 
described by regime theorists whose focus has generally been on local governance (Stone 
1989). Furthermore, this research exemplifies the ways in which this multi-level regime 
has reproduced and intensified socioeconomic and political (decision-making) inequities, 
ultimately fracturing the housing model itself.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2010, the Mexican Census counted over five million vacant housing units nation-wide.1 
Mexico’s 14 percent vacancy rate is the highest among current member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2015). That same year, 
about a third of Mexicans lived in overcrowded or poor housing conditions (SHF 2011). 
Over the last couple of decades, Mexican housing policies and institutions have sought to 
expand access to credit to lower-middle income households within the formal economy 
with the intention of allowing an increasing number of families to own their own homes. 
While this goal has partially been achieved, and the 2000s saw an unprecedented 
construction boom, a number of problems have rapidly emerged.  
During the 2000s, countless households acquired mortgages to buy houses in the 
fringe of Mexican cities where they have had limited access to their daily needs. 
Furthermore, many families have seen their mortgages and monthly payments swell 
through the years while their debt remains virtually unchanged.2 Many of them have had no 
choice but to leave their dwellings behind and return to renting or to living with other 
relatives closer to the urban core. In the wake of this housing boom, numerous newly built 
developments have thus exhibited alarmingly high housing vacancy rates, and the degree to 
which recent housing strategies have raised the standard of living of lower and middle 
income Mexican households is up to heated debate. 
                                                          
1 The Mexican Census did not publish disaggregated 2015 data on vacancy. 
2 Until 2015, low-income households only had access to mortgages in Investment Units (UDIS) or Minimum 
Salaries, rather than Mexican Pesos (MxP). The Minimum Salary in 1995 was at $15 MxP per day and it 
currently stands a bit above $80. Similarly, UDIS were used to protect lenders from the potential default of 
low-income groups. Indexed to inflation, the value of UDIS has also increased more than fivefold since the 
1990s. Furthermore, many mortgages were long-term 30-year loans for which people had to pay mostly only 







1.1 MEXICO’S RECENT HOUSING POLICIES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Around the mid-twentieth century, urbanization processes and rapid population growth in 
Mexico were largely fueled by State investment and Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI)3 policies that significantly accelerated national economic growth. Since the 1970s, 
however, the country has battled with economic crises, inflation and an increasing foreign 
debt that have the government increasingly ill-equipped to adequately address housing 
pressures, among other issues (Eckstein 1977, Ward 1990).  
After the 1982 debt crisis, and following the Washington Consensus, Mexico 
underwent a series of neoliberal reforms meant to limit state presence in a number of 
arenas.4 Housing reforms sought to increase private sector participation in affordable 
housing production and limit the role of public institutions to stimulating access to housing 
finance and the expansion of mortgage lending. Yet, an economic crisis shut down private 
housing finance and one of the conditions to enter the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) was the expansion of construction lending. Thus, the government 
introduced Sofoles,5 financing institutions that specialized in single-purpose lending and 
                                                          
3 ISI was a trade and economic policy, which advocated replacing foreign imports with domestic production; 
it was based on the premise that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through the local 
production of industrialized products. ISI and Latin American structuralism shared a basic common belief in a 
State-directed, centrally planned form of economic development and were most successful in countries with 
large populations and income levels, such as Mexico, which allowed for the consumption of locally produced 
products (Ward, 1990).   
4 The Washington Consensus was established in the 1980s as a set of economic policy prescriptions for 
developing countries undergoing severe financial crisis and promoted by the US Treasury Department and 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. They argued that only through the 
application of neoliberal reforms, such as the opening of markets, the privatization of state enterprises, and the 
reduction of the state’s directive role in the economy, would ‘Third World’ countries overcome their 
development challenges.  






raised funds through capital markets. Many of these financing institutions specialized in 
mortgage and housing construction lending (Coulomb and Schteingart 2006).6  
In parallel, INFONAVIT,7 a housing institute originally established to produce 
housing for formal workers, became solely a financing institution to expand mortgage 
lending. Although this is currently changing, INFONAVIT became the largest housing 
finance institution in the country and drove a significant acceleration in housing 
production.8 This institute also absorbed much of the risk away from developers by 
guaranteeing a credit flow that financed the quick and mass production of housing. 
Furthermore, a secondary market of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities also helped 
expand mortgage access and by 2008, Mexico became the largest market for RMBS in 
Latin America. Parallel reforms also pushed for the relaxation of development regulations 
at the state and local levels and the dissolution of the communal tenure system (ejido) to 
allow for the privatization and development of low-cost rural land surrounding Mexican 
cities (IMF 2008, BMI 2011). 
At least according to the political discourse, an important goal of this housing 
finance and development model was to tackle housing shortages9 by increasing access to 
housing finance. Yet, housing finance – and adequate housing – continue to be inaccessible 
                                                          
6 Largely through bridge loans, short-term construction loans used until a company secures permanent 
financing or removes an existing obligation. This type of financing allows the user to meet current obligations 
by providing immediate cash flow. In the case of housing construction, they allow developers to cover 
building costs until they sell their units.  
7 The National Housing Fund for Workers (Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores 
in Spanish), is a tripartite institution governed by business, government and labor representatives. 
8 Mortgages issued by INFONAVIT jumped from 70 thousand a year in the 1980s to over 200 thousand in 
2001, over 400 thousand by 2006 and topped at 500 thousand in 2011 (Eulich 2013). 
9 Officially, housing shortages are defined as the number and/or percentage of households living in 
overcrowded conditions or on very poor quality housing. Overcrowding is defined as more than 2.5 
inhabitants per room. Poor quality housing includes that which does not have sewage, or is built with 
precarious materials: waste, cardboard, perishable/untreated wood, palm leaves, mud, metal sheets, asbestos, 






to a significant proportion of the population, most notably very low-income, informal, and 
rural populations.10 Although diverse housing strategies (e.g. rehabilitation) are likely 
required to address detrimental housing conditions in Mexico, there has been a persistent 
emphasis on financing new construction. Thus, during the 2000s, the six largest housing 
developers,11 listed on the national stock exchange, produced around 50 percent of the 
national housing market and operated in 80 percent of the country’s states. They primarily 
specialized in the construction of lower-middle income housing, and most of them reached 
their peak between 2007 and 2008, when they were each selling around 50 thousand units a 
year (SHF 2007). 
Although the housing supply increased significantly in the 2000s, most construction 
took place in sprawling housing developments that have offered limited access to jobs and 
urban amenities, and for which local governments have struggled to provide adequate 
infrastructure and services. Arguably, this pattern is the result of this transformed system, in 
which developers see INFONAVIT, rather than residents, as their main client. Particularly 
in the 2000s, developers aligned their production to INFONAVIT’s potential demand (the 
number of affiliated workers who at a certain point in time qualify for a mortgage). Almost 
all of INFONAVIT’s income stems from worker contributions and loan recovery; the 
institute collects 5 percent of the earnings of affiliated members (Eibenschutz and Goya 
Escobedo 2009). Yet, the private sector was able to produce housing for this market and 
shape urban development with little local regulation, planning or civic participation. 
Seeking to maximize profits, developers produced housing primarily in peri-urban locations 
                                                          
10 Only about 20 percent of the Mexican population has access to housing credit (SHF 2015). 






where land is very cheap but where residents have had to endure issues of mobility and 
access to services and economic opportunity. 
Despite de jure administrative autonomy, local governments have lacked the 
resources and capabilities to aptly regulate urban development and monitor construction 
standards.12 Most municipalities hold poor property tax collection records and, particularly 
in the past, had little incentive to do long-term planning given their short, 3-year and term-
limited administrations. Thus, especially during the 2000s housing boom, construction 
licenses and permits constituted the bulk of many local revenue streams. This gave large 
private developers substantial power to influence local policymaking. Furthermore, state 
and federal institutions frequently backed development projects that were aligned with their 
finance and economic development plans and policies. 
An increasingly pressing issue in many of these new peripheral developments has 
been the concentrations of vacant or abandoned housing. Although there is some regional 
variation, and it is challenging to isolate and determine the precise causes and consequences 
of this phenomenon, there is increasing consensus that location and deficient access to 
infrastructure and services have strongly influenced it (INFONAVIT 2016). The problems 
associated with recent housing development patterns in Mexico have had wide-ranging 
effects, including impacts on finance institutions facing the deterioration and depreciation 
of their abandoned or delinquent portfolio, housing and quality of life issues faced by 
households who reside in remote or largely vacant housing developments and financial 
instability faced by those who have decided to abandon their dwellings.  
                                                          
12 Structural damage, flooding, landslides, and overcrowding, among other issues, have been documented in 






Nonetheless, responses have started to emerge at a variety of levels. At the 
neighborhood scale, residents have resorted to informal strategies to cope with their 
inadequate access to services and opportunities. When they are able to afford it, they resort 
to hiring private and generally more expensive services. They also establish informal 
businesses in their homes or streets. In some cases, they have also resorted to more extreme 
forms of organizing to confront organized crime through vigilante type groups. At a higher 
level, social organizations have provided legal support to some residents facing possible 
foreclosure and eviction. In contrast, INFONAVIT’s current priority is to ensure its 
financial stability. Thus, an important institutional strategy in the last couple of years has 
been to recover a portion of its delinquent portfolio and auction it to the private sector (at a 
fraction of its original cost) to rehabilitate and resell it. Partly in response to the fiscal risk 
associated with peripheral development, the federal government – with INFONAVIT – Is 
starting to promote densification policies. Arguably, however, these strategies have failed 
to incorporate fiscal or regulatory mechanisms to make land more accessible to effectively 
promote low-income housing production in well-located areas. Instead, new policies 
continue to subsidize landowners and speculators and have led to the production of more 
expensive housing. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The present research suggests that recent housing strategies have fostered unregulated 
housing development without effectively ensuring adequate housing access in Mexico. The 
coexistence of high housing vacancy rates and a shortage of adequate housing for low-
income households, exposes the tension between two seemingly conflicting housing policy 






housing – and the extent to which the former has trumped the latter. Given the flourishing 
of construction and real estate interests through State support, I argue that Mexican housing 
policy has served as a politically guided intensification of market rule, rather than an 
apolitical and technocratic framework, as neoliberal advocates have often argued (Peck and 
Theodore 2007). Contrary to the rhetoric of autonomous market-led efficiency, the 
Mexican government has played a key role in mitigating risks for the construction and 
financial sectors. By doing so, housing policy reforms have lacked a critical analysis of the 
socioeconomic and political implications of implementing strategies that have backed 
private interests in the name of expanding home ownership while in reality many low-
income households remain locked out of adequate and affordable homes (Soederberg 
2015). In short, housing finance policies have offered Mexican workers very limited 
housing options and control over their living situation.  
Although the constitutional right to housing in Mexico should provide substantial 
weight to the use value of housing, exchange value rationales have dominated Mexico’s 
housing policy, finance, and production over the last couple of decades. The country’s 
housing development model, commonly called a ‘housing train’, exemplifies the 
importance that has been given to housing production as an economic engine, which should 
move forward as quickly as possible. Given the difficult economic conditions that most 
Mexicans face, this seems to be in direct conflict with the goal of effectively improving 
housing access and living conditions for the average Mexican. Thus, what seems necessary 
is a more fundamental reformulation of housing and development strategies, at different 
levels, which move away from the narrow focus on new construction, recognize the still 
limited access to housing finance of a majority of the population, and promote the 






strategies will also be the inclusion of use value considerations upon which the right to 
housing and to the city are predicated. Given the current scenario, both normative and 
pragmatic motivations would support this shift in Mexican housing policy (Lefebvre 1974, 
Harvey 2008, Soederberg 2015).  
At a more global scale, it is important to consider the implications of the 
troublesome development paths that countries in the global South, such as Mexico, have 
continued to follow after the recent subprime crisis by marketizing housing rights and 
linking housing production to global financial flows (Sassen 2009). The Mexican urban 
poor are certainly not the only ones to endure displacement to the fringes of their cities; 
‘urban crises’ have emerged from the current stage of financial capitalism, speculation, and 
inadequate government intervention all around the world (Maricato 2001, Harvey 2008, 
Immergluck 2011, Galster 2012). In parallel, it is important to acknowledge that land and 
housing markets have perhaps never functioned solely on abstract market principles. 
Rather, they are tied up with processes of distribution and politics. In other words, 
institutional factors and decisions have a profound effect upon the behavior of markets 
(Eckstein 1977, Ward and Jones 1994). Thus, through this research, I will attempt to bridge 
the theoretical gaps that exist between closely interrelated fields, namely planning and 
political economy, and their influence on urban and housing development, particularly in 
developing countries such as Mexico. Part of the success of this study will also rest on its 
ability to shed light on the serious negative socioeconomic consequences of recent Mexican 
housing finance policy, which have severely affected vulnerable populations and the 







1.3 SUMMARY REVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 The following chapter will begin by discussing the context in which the new housing 
policy and development model was implemented.  Mexico’s 1982 oil crisis was largely 
responsible for the neoliberal reforms that would follow nationally and in the region. With 
it, a series of policies that would directly affect the housing sector were implemented, such 
as the privatization of ejido (communal-tenure) land, the liberalization of credit, and the 
privatization of housing production. These changes helped put housing at the center of 
economic development considerations and promote its development as paramount to the 
stability and well-being of the entire country. As it will be narrated below, this ideal was 
largely achieved through mortgage expansion for lower-income populations that would 
later suffer the consequences of subprime-type lending and poor quality housing 
development. Yet, the private sector – developers and financiers – was able to reap 
tremendous profits in the process. The theoretical and political-economic justifications for 
Mexico’s development model will be presented in this chapter, as well as the contradictions 
that have emerged from expecting and encouraging the fulfillment of the use-value of 
housing to be delivered by a system that prioritizes its exchange-value. Lastly, this chapter 
will present a theoretical overview of relevant international research on the issue of housing 
vacancy in Mexico, as well as their implications and significance at different scales.  
A short overview of Mexico’s Housing Paradox will help transition into the actual 
research queries of this dissertation in “Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods”. This 
chapter will also discuss the research design, mixed methods and comparative and 
embedded analysis used to study the topic in hand. Given the complexity of the 
phenomenon under scrutiny, a mixed-methods approach was used to triangulate and 






the breadth and depth of findings and interpretations. The preliminary findings and 
objectives of a pilot study will also be discussed in this chapter. Conducted between 2014 
and 2015, it served, primarily, to test a number of data collection strategies and research 
methods. Yet, it also provided valuable lessons, not only for the final research design and 
field procedures and protocols, but to uncover important trends, such as the fact that 
housing growth rates far surpassed population growth rates, the location of high vacancy 
concentrations and their housing typologies. Case selection and research limitations and 
significance will also be discussed in this chapter.  
“Chapter 4: Housing Finance and Credit Expansion in Mexico’s Neoliberal Era” is 
the first that discusses findings related to Mexico’s new development model, based largely 
on mortgage expansion and valuing housing production as a chief economic engine. The 
role of INFONAVIT (and federal housing finance policy), as well as that of state and local 
governments in implementing and supporting this development model are also discussed at 
length in this chapter, as well as the benefits reaped by the private sector in this attractive 
business venture that initially posed few financial risks to developers and financiers. 
Nonetheless, and despite the significant leverage that they gained to influence housing and 
urban development patterns, they would later face significant financial turmoil, and even 
bankruptcy, due to debt and unsustainable business practices.  
The following chapter “Emerging Issues of Housing Inaccessibility and Vacancy” 
then focuses on the analysis of some of the issues that resulted from this development 
model. Although mortgage access was expanded, it will become clear that policies were not 
directed to those with the most urgent housing needs. Furthermore, the lower and middle-
income residents that were benefited by such mortgage expansion, were quickly confronted 






isolation of living in remote peripheral areas with very limited or deficient access to basic 
infrastructure and services. One of the main goals of Chapter 5 will be to juxtapose the 
main two themes of this dissertation: housing vacancy and access. While housing 
construction exhibited exponential growth, particularly in metropolitan regions, it was often 
poorly aligned with population growth and actual housing demands, needs and pressures. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, housing vacancy became an increasing issue in new housing 
developments, and was associated with problems based in the terms associated with loans, 
and inadequate urban infrastructure, services, economic opportunities and even housing 
quality. Arguably, the supply of housing produced was altogether inadequate, and lead to 
frequent housing abandonment. Vacancy clusters or concentrations have been particularly 
problematic in peri-urban areas of large metropolitan regions. This has had implications at 
multiple scales, affecting mortgage institutions, local governments and homebuyers.  
“Chapter 6: Financial versus Civic Responses to the Housing Paradox” is the last 
findings chapter, which describes the responses at different levels and from different 
sectors to the issues discussed on Chapter 5. At the smallest scale, residents of these 
developments have had to resort to a variety of strategies to cope with their difficult living 
situations, from hiring private services, when they can afford them, to mobilizations and 
negotiations to ensure adequate service and infrastructure provision. The latter, have been 
particularly strong in the State of Mexico, giving rise to the formation of El Frente 
Mexiquense. This organization has now undertaken important legal battles against public 
and private figures responsible for the construction of deficient housing and development 
projects. They, along other organizations such as El Barzón, have also helped residents 
avoid foreclosure or eviction through legal means or by helping them restructure their debt 






financial stability and implementing strategies to deal with its delinquent portfolio, such as 
by strengthening its repossession efforts and auctioning off housing units. Since these 
houses are sold at discounted prices to the private sector, however, social organizations 
have questioned the fairness of these processes. This tension between residents and 
mortgage institutions seems to reflect a long-standing tension in Mexican housing policy 
between the use and exchange value of housing, and possibly be at the center of the 
paradoxical coexistence of a housing oversupply and a shortage. 
This tension is still evident in the drafting and implementation of new densification 
policies promoted at the federal level. Federally drawn urban growth boundaries across the 
country have been pursued to limit the continuous sprawl of Mexican cities. Yet, critics 
have contested the drawing and effectiveness of such boundaries and highlighted the 
difficulty of producing affordable housing in most inner city areas were land is most 
expensive, particularly since recent policies have not incorporated the necessary legal or 
fiscal mechanisms to prevent landowners and speculators from appropriating public 
subsidies and resulting gains produced by densification strategies. Thus, the final chapter, 
“The Marketization of Housing Rights in Mexico” will provide a theoretical and practical 
discussion of recent Mexican housing policy and its implications. Besides synthesizing the 
main takeaways of the dissertation, Chapter 7 will also discuss Mexico City’s experience 
and lessons learned after implementing densification policies, contrast the case studies and 









Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framing 
 
2.1 MEXICO’S POLITICAL ECONOMY AND HOUSING POLICY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
Until the 1930s, Mexico had a development model based on agricultural exports and 
experienced slow growth. The so-called Mexican miracle roughly refers to the period 
between 1940 and 1970, when the Mexican economy grew at more than six percent 
annually. Manufacturing growth rates were spurred by Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) policies and State investment that supported the development of basic industries and 
infrastructure and the production of exporting goods port to increase productivity and 
accelerate growth. These processes generated fundamental changes in the national 
economic structure. Between 1940 and 1980, the proportion of the economically active 
population engaged in agriculture declined from 65 to 29 percent. Industry, on the other 
hand, raised its share from 15 to 28 percent, and services rose from 19 to 43 percent. The 
population also increased rapidly from just under 20 million in 1940 to an estimated 77.4 
million in 1985, with most of this growth shifting toward urban areas.  
The government increasingly struggled to adequately respond to the needs of 
rapidly swelling urban populations, which contributed to social unrest during the late 
1960s. This forced the State to increase its expenditures on social welfare, implement tax 
reforms, and create a number of new social development agencies in the 1970s. Real wages 
increased and the economy continued to grow at an average rate of six percent during this 
decade. Yet, economic depressions, high inflation, and an increasing foreign debt also 
followed (Ward 1990, Alvarez Enriquez 1998). The party in power during this period, the 
PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party or Partido Revolucionario Institucional), had 






PRI lost its first state election in Baja California, followed by its loss of an absolute 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, and in the Senate and the presidency in 2000. 
 
2.1.1 Housing Development: State and Self-Help Responses 
In regards to housing, public production was persistently unable to keep up with the 
burgeoning need of the lowest-income populations, which resulted in an increasing backlog 
of inadequate and substandard housing. In 1970, a study estimated an accumulated housing 
need of 3.6 million housing units to house 1.9 million families without a dwelling and 1.7 
million living in extremely precarious conditions. Deficits of residential water supply and 
drainage affected 5.1 and 4.9 million households, respectively, and in the field of 
rehabilitation, around 4.8 million ‘actions’ or interventions were required. Conditions 
improved somewhat in the following decade, with the decline of population densities per 
dwelling, and of dwellings without water and drainage, among other factors. Yet, in 
absolute terms, housing deficits continued to grow.  
Largely, the very low incomes of most Mexican families explained this. In 1980 
approximated 77 percent of the economically active population earned less than 2.5 times 
the minimum salary, a minimum subsistence wage. These incomes were too low for 
workers to afford loans at commercial or even ‘social-interest rates’. Thus, self-help 
housing dominated housing production. Poor households usually acquired un-serviced and 
untitled land through low-cost purchases from landlords, unscrupulous real estate 
developers, or peasants who held land distributed as part of the post-revolutionary land 
reforms. With somewhat less frequency, the squatting of vacant land also took place. The 
formation and growth of these kinds of irregular or informal settlements was especially 






natural growth rates and rural-urban migration. In Mexico City, for instance, they housed 
14 percent of the population in 1952, a proportion that grew to over 50 percent by the end 
of the 1980s. Eventually, the government implemented policies to service and regularize 
some of these areas (Gilbert and Ward 1985, Ward 1990). 
As in other developing countries, housing informality and shelter deprivation in 
Mexico emerged as a result of rapid urbanization processes, inadequate institutional 
responses, unequal wealth distribution, and the unaffordability of housing markets in cities 
(Roy 2005, UN Human Settlement Programme 2010). Over the decades, responses to 
housing informality have ranged from condemnation to praise. Marginality theory gained 
prominence in the 1960s with Oscar Lewis’s (1959) seminal work on five Mexican 
families, through which he argued that the living conditions of deprivation experienced in 
informal slums fostered the development of a ‘culture of poverty’ adapted to those 
conditions and characterized by pervasive marginality, dependency, and powerlessness 
(Lewis 1959 & 1966).  
Subsequently, modernization or functionalist scholars argued that social change and 
the adoption of modern practices could help tackle poverty, while another set of scholars 
emphasized the role of state policies and market forces in maintaining and controlling 
urban poverty (Perlman 1976, Eckstein 1977). In contrast, some highlighted the 
opportunities available in informal low-income settlements, such as the solid equity of low-
income housing or the ability of residents to generate income through renting or sharing 
(Turner 1965 & 1967). This latter work redirected public policy from the eradication of 
settlements towards their recognition as an alternative given the overwhelming demand for 






essential infrastructure and, in some cases, to implement regularization policies to provide 
legal titles to residents (Gilbert and Ward 1982, Ward 2005 & 2015). 
Yet, labor informality, weak state intervention through planning and zoning, and 
unequal wealth distribution and property ownership continued to promote informal housing 
production. Informality became a rational and viable response as countries like Mexico 
were rapidly converting from rural to urban societies. Some communities were able to 
improve their living conditions through self-help and incremental strategies, and some 
organizations were formed to affect policy agendas and push for implementation of slum 
upgrading. Eventually, however, rising unemployment and insecurity, declining 
opportunities, and the increasing isolation of peri-urban informal settlements, led to further 
marginalization and social exclusion (Roy 2005, Ward 2004 & 2009). Generally, the 
poorest urban residents have been most negatively affected by the unaffordability of the 
housing market. Arguably, moreover, a high incidence of urban poverty creates a vicious 
cycle of informality because it limits municipal revenue generation and public investment 
in servicing land (UN Human Settlement Programme 2010). 
Despite the concentration of need among informal workers, access to Mexican 
housing programs depends on social insurance and formal employment. Thus, only a 
fraction of the population, comprised of middle and lower-middle income workers and 
employees in strategic industries or the government sector, could potentially access it. 
Public housing production began to be significant in scale and directed towards lower 
income populations in the 1970s, arguably to address the intense social unrest that had 
emerged in response to economic inequality and inadequate living conditions, and which 
had begun to threaten political stability. Between 1973 and 1976, INFONAVIT generated 






period, INFONAVIT engaged directly in housing construction and allocated it through a 
lottery system to blue-collar workers. Yet, in subsequent years the powerful Mexican 
Workers’ Confederation syndicate (CTM) began to win control of INFONAVIT’s 
financing and assigned it to affiliated worker groups. FOVISSSTE13 carried similar housing 
strategies directed towards lower-income state employees. However, INFONAVIT and 
FOVISSSTE-affiliated programs together were only able to meet 11.3 percent of the 
estimated total demand between 1973 and 1980 (Ward 1990).  
In 1981, FONHAPO was created as a low-income housing fund designed to support 
housing production for people earning up to or around 2.5 times the minimum salary, and 
who were ineligible for INFONAVIT funding. Some of its main housing actions included 
service provision, credits for land regularization, and assistance for self-builders to 
construct, complete or improve their dwellings. Public housing production rose 
significantly between 1986 and 1987 due to reconstruction programs implemented after the 
1985 earthquake. In a period of 19 months, over 42,000 new dwellings were built and 
almost 7,000 were renovated under these programs. The World Bank provided almost half 
of the financing for reconstruction efforts, and, although such efforts were highly 
subsidized, they were considered to be fairly successful and to have higher levels of cost 
recovery than previous programs. Indeed, funds were recycled from FONHAPO loan funds 
to finance other housing programs outside of metropolitan areas (Ward 1990). In 
subsequent years, particularly since 1988, FONHAPO redirected most of its resources to 
support rural housing (FONHAPO 2014). 
                                                          







 Housing policy and production shifted significantly throughout the 20th century in 
response to changing ideologies, processes of capital accumulation, social unrest and labor 
pressure. Governmental actions “shifted away from a ‘laissez faire’ approach that had 
favored capital accumulation for illegal land developers and industrial employers at the 
expense of low wages and acute deprivation in people’s residential living conditions” 
(Ward 1990), and towards a policy that PRI national governments called ‘shared 
development’. Yet, despite the scale of housing production and state intervention achieved 
in the 1970s, many agencies were established with inadequate budgets for their 
responsibilities. Furthermore, and with the particular exception of reconstruction after the 
1985 earthquake, the economic crash of 1982 and the period of austerity that followed 
would significantly shift housing management at a time of intense social hardship. 
 
2.1.2 Decentralization and Governance 
After the 1980s debt crisis, one of the conditions for Latin American countries to compete 
for international financial assistance and capital was to loosen the reigns of centralized state 
power and control. The transferring of administrative and fiscal control to local 
governments represented a very significant shift that meant to drive governance 
innovations, competitiveness and increased levels of accountability. Decentralization 
reforms thus gave many local governments more authority over local services and 
infrastructure and revenue transfers. Yet, most local governments were not able to achieve 
all that decentralization promised. Emerging challenges included inadequate political 
control, intergovernmental coordination and policy implementation, among others. Many 
decentralization policies and reforms were not coupled with the necessary financial support 






dampened decentralization efforts as policymakers and international agencies were most 
preoccupied with macroeconomic stability (Campbell 2003). 
 Despite the absence of pluralism, Mexico was a pioneer in decentralization reforms. 
Student demonstrations had discredited the country’s highly centralized leadership in 
previous decades. Furthermore, northern and border cities began to consolidate their 
comparative advantage in economic production and export markets and the PRI lost key 
elections in urban centers in 1988. One result was that then president, Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari, began to share power in an effort to win back popular support. A new balance of 
power with states evolved, giving them more say in how public investments were made in 
their jurisdictions. Municipalities also gained responsibility over the provision of urban 
infrastructure and services, land use and development, and revenues from the taxation of 
property (Ward and Rodriguez 1999, Campbell 2003). 
 The argument for decentralization is built around a bottom-up governance structure 
predicated upon the principle of subsidiarity.14 Yet, the evolution of federalism in Mexico 
and many other Latin American countries has been limited by partisan issues, lack of 
political commitment, weak linkages with civil society and public participation channels, 
inadequate local government capacity, lack of financial resources, the complexities of co-
governance and the ability of local elites to sustain their power over the needs of more 
vulnerable groups. Furthermore, large Mexican and Latin American metropolitan regions 
with many municipalities have recurrently been confronted with disparities in tax base, 
natural resources and service provision, and with fragmented urban management and 
planning (Roberts and Wilson 2009, Ward, Wilson and Spink 2010, Wilson et al. 2012). In 
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addition, a rolled-back and more decentralized state has also led to the creation of a sort of 
intermediate third sector of Non-Governmental Organizations that have absorbed the 
responsibility for the delivery of some social goods and more individualized forms of 
organization – role previously held by unions. At the same time, a new and more intense 
level of marginalization emerged (Roberts 1995, Ward 2004). 
 
2.2 HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
“As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it is folly to hope for an 
isolated solution of the housing question or of any other social question affecting the fate of 
workers” (Engels 1935, p. 77). 
Beyond its sociopolitical role, housing is a critical economic sector, fueling others such as 
the construction, real estate and financial sectors. Thus, housing has increasingly been 
appreciated for its ability to circulate capital. Value, under capitalism has to be stored, and 
housing is a perfect vehicle of such storage. Housing booms and boosts for instance, are 
generally produced – and politically facilitated – through periods of overinvestment and by 
extracting surplus capital from other sectors of the economy (Aalbers and Christophers 
2014). Saskia Sassen (2009) similarly argues that the securization of mortgages has been 
used as a new channel to extract household income – worldwide. Without regard to the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, the emphasis has been on crossing a threshold in numbers of 
mortgages sold to – and often pushed onto – households as a form of primitive 
accumulation.  
This expansion of mortgage lending through securitization, Sassen argues, has 
created a massive distortion in the housing finance market, as most investors are able to 






Mortgage lenders succeeded in developing a whole industry and persuading homeowners to 
take a secondary mortgage even when they did not need the loan. Since modest-income 
households worldwide will be too good a market to relinquish, she cautions that it will be 
necessary for lawmakers and civic organizations to be alert and refine the regulation of 
financial instruments to prevent banks and financial firms from simply moving from one 
market to the next. Finally, while highlighting the effects of the recent foreclosure crisis on 
households, neighborhoods, entire cities and regions, and municipal governments, Sassen 
questions the rationale of countries in the Global South that are following the troublesome 
development path of using housing mortgages as yet another mechanisms to extract value 
from low-income individuals (Sassen 2009). 
Globally, it seems that housing policies increasingly reflect capitalist ideology 
because of the privilege given to private property ownership, market allocation mechanisms 
and accumulation strategies. Private property, however, is importantly protected by the 
state and confers a power over public resources, rendering the public-private dichotomy 
problematic (Aalbers and Christopers 2014). Furthermore, although economists might 
assume a purity in markets, other social scientists highlight the ways that markets are 
sociopolitical creations. The expansion of the market (e.g. through globalized finance) into 
the spheres of land and housing is an increasingly central feature of modern capitalism. “In 
more recent history, housing has gone from being a simple commodity to being a complex 
financial technology that showed the capacity to bring nearly the entire world economy to 
its knees” (Patillo 2013, p. 512). Housing is implicated in the contemporary capitalist 
political economy in numerous critical but also conflicting ways, such as the tension that 
arises from expecting or encouraging the fulfillment of the use value of housing to be 






such contradictions “represents a vital step in figuring different [housing] futures…it is no 
longer justifiable – if it ever was – for political economists to cede housing analysis to 
economists who ignore or reduce the importance of power, politics and the state” (Aalbers 
and Christophers 2014, p. 389).  
Mexico’s neoliberal housing reforms, characterized by mortgage expansion and the 
privatization of production, I argue, embody such tensions between housing 
commodification and the right to housing – its exchange versus use values. In the words of 
Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008, p. 238) “home equity and social equity are often at odds”. 
The convergence of high housing vacancies with the shortage of adequate housing is 
evidence of the contradictions that exist between the roles of housing in capitalist 
economies, based on the circulation of capital (Aalbers and Christophers 2014). The 
commodification of housing simply conflicts with the country’s constitutional right to 
adequate housing. Ultimately, housing as investment serves as a chief vehicle for the 
exacerbation of social inequality. Thus, to effectively address Mexico’s housing deficit, and 
secure housing access for its most marginalized populations, policies would need to operate 
outside of the market system. Even practical considerations, given the societal costs of 
millions of people living in inadequate conditions, support an argument for the right to 
housing and proposals for social ownership. Arguably, to make this a reality, sociopolitical 
mobilization will likely be required. The prospects for mobilization, however, are poor 
since working-class homeownership has been promoted alongside suburbanization that has 
tied people down to mortgages and isolated them from urban social life and participation 







2.2.1 Urban and Housing Development under Neoliberal Governance 
Socioeconomic conditions in Mexico became particularly dire after the 1982 economic 
crash. The Washington Consensus and neoliberal reforms were framed at that time as the 
only viable development path for Mexico, along other countries also affected by severe 
crisis and debt. A number of scholars have studied the changes endured by Latin American 
countries as a consequence of this neoliberal turn, which in Mexico was consolidated and 
deepened with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994. Particular attention has been given to labor markets, which became increasingly 
affected by informality given the decline in formal industrial and public employment. 
Austerity measures required the reduction of State programs and intervention while 
encouraging greater private sector participation in various economic sectors. Governments 
had to walk a fine line between appealing to international investors while practicing 
brokerage politics at home by implementing popular and politically necessary programs. 
Yet, even with the continuous expansion of domestic debt, economic restructuring placed a 
significant strain on social programs and economic conditions. In addition, recurring crises 
and a decline in real wages eroded the capacity of individuals to access goods and services, 
such as adequate housing (Portes and Roberts 2005, Pérez Sáinz 2005, Ward 2005, 
Coulomb and Schteingart 2006, UN-Habitat 2010, Soederberg 2015).   
Rather than for its social significance (and use value), housing development in 
Mexico has increasingly been valued for its role as a critical economic engine that fuels the 
construction and financial sectors. Arguably, therefore, Mexico’s recent housing finance 
policy has supported a monopolistic and speculative real estate sector, dominated by a 
handful of large housing developers, instead of effectively promoting increased housing 






processes seem reminiscent of David Harvey’s (2008) accounts of global and historical 
processes of capitalist housing production which have had the primary goal of finding 
profitable terrains for capital-surplus absorption through debt finance.  
Harvey notes, for instance, how after World War II suburbanization and highway 
construction radically transformed cities and metropolitan regions across the U.S. 
Similarly, he argues that over the last several decades a global neoliberal system of 
governance has been able to shape urbanization and housing development processes around 
the world with the main aim of maximizing private profit. To paraphrase Harvey, the right 
of private developers and speculative actors to increase their profits and accumulate 
massive amounts of wealth seems to be trumping any other conception of inalienable rights. 
Finally, he has also discussed how processes of liberalization and housing marketization 
have tended to recreate monopolies that invariably reinforce inequalities and injustices 
(Harvey 2003). 
Slow and unstable economic growth and the emergence of new dimensions of 
marginalization have been increasingly linked to the neoliberal model. Yet, the 
marketization of housing (a sort of right to ownership – for some – rather than a right to be 
housed) continues to expand worldwide to facilitate global financial flows without much 
social or political discussion in many contexts (Wood and Roberts 2005, Sassen 2009, 
Soederberg 2015). Nonetheless, and despite the opposition of influential international 
actors, some Latin American countries have begun to pull back from such economic 
orthodoxy and towards more humane and less socially destructive paths for national 
development. In doing so, they have attempted to establish a new equilibrium between 
state, society, and the market. Cardoso (2009), for instance, has described some South 






which, without abandoning their market economies, have corrected for neoliberal excesses 
through vigorous social policies.15 Other scholars (Kohli 2009) have made similar 
arguments about some Asian countries, which have showed lower rates of economic 
inequality and higher rates of economic growth due to their relative autonomy from global 
constraints and their ability to pursue social democratic policies. 
Countries that have followed neoliberal prescriptions, on the other hand, have 
generally become more dependent on the global economy and foreign capital. This has 
been the case of some Latin American countries, which, like Mexico, Cardoso argues, have 
followed a regime of asymmetric integration into the global economy (Cardoso 2009). 
Thus, reforms in Mexico arguably lacked a critical analysis of the social implications and 
power dimensions of implementing allegedly technical and apolitical neoliberal strategies. 
Concerning housing policy, for instance, strategies such as mortgage securitization were 
implemented with the aim of expanding home ownership for the poor. Yet, in reality, many 
low-income households remain unable to access adequate housing while the financial and 
construction sectors have reaped the benefits of the country’s housing finance policy 
(Soederberg 2015). Developers have internalized profits by producing cheap peripheral 
housing financed by a fund created through a 5 percent compulsory contribution of workers 
earnings. Simultaneously, they have externalized the costs and negative consequences of 
their developments, such as the fiscal burden of service provision for local governments, 
among other concerns.  
Furthermore, as in other contexts (Wood and Roberts 2005, Portes and Roberts 
2006), the powerful finance and construction sectors have often been able to overshadow 
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the needs and concerns of other and often more vulnerable sectors of society. Through a 
neoliberal logic, market and private interests have heavily influenced how cities in Mexico 
(and arguably in many other contexts) grow, and have thus guided the organization of 
social life, public investment and resource allocation. The supremacy of this logic has also 
prevented the inclusion of other rationalities in the shaping of urban form. Thus, as housing 
deficiencies continue to affect over a third of the population in Mexico well after the above 
housing finance strategies were put in place, it seems important to question why and who 
benefits from their implementation. A prominent conclusion is that the financial and 
construction sectors have had the most to gain (Soederberg 2015).  
 
2.2.2 Regime Theory: Development Interests and Political Power 
Scholars that have studied the ways in which development policy agendas favor privileged 
interest have done so primarily at the local level (Stone 1989, Forester 1989, Imbroscio 
1997, Flyvbjerg 2002 & 2003). Arguably, the Mexican context calls for this analysis at a 
higher state or even national level. Nonetheless, regime theory offers valuable lessons. 
Clarence N. Stone (1989) was perhaps among the first to note that business coalitions and 
similar powerful groups are uniquely able to influence local governance and maintain a 
regime that protects its prerogatives. The central concept of a regime is that of an informal 
arrangement by which public bodies and private interests function and carry out governing 
decisions. Regimes form, and give special privileges to business interests, largely due to the 
weakness and lack of power and public resources available to local governments. Thus, 
governmental functions are the product of a governing coalition located not within 






The Atlanta case, which Stone studies in depth, also suggests that the more uneven 
the distribution of resources, the greater the tendency of the regime to become concerned 
with protecting privilege. In other words, an unequal distribution of goods and resources 
substantially modifies majority rule; votes count but resources decide. These imbalances 
may be partly explained due to the already weak nature of local government. Yet, they lead 
to biases in policy and governance, and are thus clearly problematic. An important 
conclusion from Stone’s analysis is that weak governments weaken democracy because 
they hand governance power to the investor class. Therefore, Stone argues that strong city 
governments are a precondition for a strong democracy – or at least for somewhat greater 
attention to the interests of lower classes. Otherwise, inequality is perpetuated.   
 A few years earlier, Paul E. Peterson (1981), from the University of Chicago, was 
making significantly different claims on the same topic. He argued that local governments 
simply draft and implement the policies and programs that are in their city’s best interest. 
Such policies, according to Peterson, are those that maintain or enhance a city’s economic 
position. He argues, therefore, that redistributive policies are usually at odds with the 
economic interests and developmental objectives of cities. Regressive local taxes, for 
instance, help a city retain wealthier populations and taxpayers who will do a cost-benefit 
analysis of how their tax dollars are being used. He does admit that few cities, such as New 
York, which are wealthy and have an unusual system of competitive politics, have been 
able to pursue redistributive policies at the expense of its economic interests. Yet Peterson 
disregards the notion put forth later by Stone, which claims that the influence of local ruling 
elites in local politics is detrimental to the implementation of policies that are of interest to 






 Other scholars, however, have continued to put forth arguments that resonate with 
those of Stone. Bent Flyvbjerg (2002), for instance, used his case study of central city 
planning in Aalborg, Denmark, to exemplify how regulations are often rearranged without a 
clear logic and in favor of certain interests, a practice which to him representa a clear 
deviation from democratic standards. By analyzing hidden power relations, and the 
relationship between rationality, power, and politics, Flyvbjerg concludes that power is 
used to define reality, and that the greater the concentration of power, the greater its ability 
to define reality. In other words, knowledge and rationality often carry little weight in 
confrontation with powerful interests.  
Flyvbjerg argues that this inequality between rationality and power is a general 
weakness of modern democracy and politics, and of fields that operate within this 
framework, such as planning. The story of modernity and democracy in practice, Flyvbjerg 
(2003) argues, is one in which powerful actors constantly determine what counts as 
knowledge, and ignore or suppress that knowledge which does not serve them. Meanwhile, 
practices such as planning continue to underplay the importance of issues of power, the 
state, and political economy, and have thus remained blind to, or even aligned with, the 
relationships and processes that have generated the hierarchies that allow only those in 
power to articulate and voice their ideological and value precepts. Thus, Flyvbjerg, Forester 
(1989), and others have argued that it is paramount that planners counter the efforts of 
interests that threaten to make a mockery of democratic planning processes.  
Flyvbjerg (2003) also notes that social context and history will profoundly condition 
the effectiveness of institutions and the possibilities of democratic change, given that 
rationality is a constructed concept, produced by actors in specific settings. Thus, it seems 






Mexican State, capitalist interests, and society. Some decades ago, Susan Eckstein (1977) 
carried out intensive research on three low-income areas: an inner-city slum, a squatter 
settlement, and a low-cost housing development. She argued that housing strategies then, 
such as low-cost government financed housing, government-enforced rent control, and the 
legalization of squatter settlements, provided a modicum of security and helped cushion the 
impact of economic crises. Yet, at the same time, she noted that the government often failed 
to enforce minimum wage and social security legislation, which significantly hindered the 
prospects of the urban poor.  
Eckstein also argued that the State’s role in facilitating access to land and housing, 
gave recipients a stake in the status quo. Thus, by distributing land and housing to the poor, 
the government entwined them in the political patronage system and rendered them less 
able to make subsequent demands. The Mexican poor, she argued, were coopted in favor of 
capitalist interests through a sophisticated and indirect social control network embedded in 
the Mexican political system. The government and party in power (PRI), often used a 
revolutionary rhetoric to legitimize itself, even when industrial and commercial capitalist 
interests were favored over workers through tactics such as worker cooptation, periodic 
labor concessions, and occasionally even violent repression. Better-off groups, such as 
working and lower-middle classes, were favored given their better relations with various 
functionaries. Indeed, most formal groups, such as unions, the church, and community 
associations were often affiliated in some way with the PRI or government-linked 
organizations, which served to regulate demand-making (Eckstein 1977). 
Arguably, since that time, the social and political platforms which civil society 
requires to monitor and scrutinize the various processes that drive the growth and 






Scholars who have recently studied the diffusion of collective action and organizing to 
address the structural forces driving precarious living conditions, have often explained it 
through the decreasing emphasis on universalistic social policies and the weakening of the 
working class and labor unions as a consequence of neoliberal reforms. Particularly in 
developing countries, the rise of the informal proletariat and the self-employed (without 
much capital) as the largest social class atomized and dispersed throughout cities also 
seems to have fragmented class solidarity and perpetuated power and resource disparities 
(Wood and Roberts 2005, Portes and Roberts 2006, Harvey 2008).  
Bridging the theoretical gaps between fields such as planning and political economy 
may thus help construct a more critical lens that highlights the importance of reformulating 
current development and policy frameworks, particularly given their apparent unjust and 
unsustainable implications. This research thus examines the hegemonic logic or rationale 
that has shaped recent Mexican housing finance policy and subsequent urban development 
patterns, as well as their implications for social justice. Borrowing from Foucault (1980) 
Flyvberg (1998), highlights the importance of studying the tactics of domination through 
which modern institutions work, the realpolitik, or what Machiavelli called the effectual 
truth - verita effettuale (Flyvbjerg 1998 & 2003). In the face of a neoliberal system of 
governance that favors corporate capital and private interests, an alternative conception of 
urban justice would need to, first and foremost, expose these hidden practices to public 
scrutiny and radical democratization, so as to then foster the inclusive right to appropriate 







2.3 HOUSING VACANCY: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
As previously mentioned, Mexico has accumulated one of the highest vacancy rates among 
OECD countries, an issue which seems to be structural rather than cyclical (OECD 2015). 
The 2010 Census counted around five million uninhabited housing units nation-wide, 14 
percent of the total housing stock. The analysis of housing vacancy in Mexico and other 
developing countries has received little attention. In Mexico, the issue becomes particularly 
perplexing given its coupling with a persistent and significant housing need. This section 
will therefore present an overview of some of the scholarly work on housing vacancy and 
focus on presenting some of the most relevant examples for the Mexican case. 
 
Scholars have framed the issue of housing vacancy in multiple ways but have paid 
particular attention to the conditions that drive it and the scales (e.g. neighborhood, local, 
national) which it affects. Housing vacancy was perhaps first and most extensively 
analyzed by economists. These accounts, for the most part, have been devoted to describing 
and measuring the phenomenon through abstract models (Rosen and Smith 1983, Wheaton 
1990, Rabianski 2002, Couch and Cocks 2013). More recently, however, analyses of 
shrinking cities, mostly in the U.S., have gained prominence, particularly among urban and 
planning scholars. These studies have largely focused on policy responses to the issue of 
population loss, economic decline, and resulting vacancy. Generally, although arguably 
somewhat superficially, they have also outlined some of the historical factors that have 
driven these phenomena (Cohe 2001, Beauregard 2009).  In contrast, some works have also 
analyzed the political economy surrounding the issue of housing vacancy and the structural 






institutional powers (Glock and Hausserman 2004, Immergluck 2011, Hollander et al. 
2010, Sun et al. 2011, Galster 2012, Silverman et al. 2012, Holway et al. 2014). 
 Economic studies have been particularly successful at defining, although at times 
rather abstractly, the issue of housing vacancy; by being among the first to study this topic, 
they pioneered a language to discuss it. In the simplest terms, vacancy is excess supply at a 
given price in a given market (Rabianski 2002). Yet, vacancy rates vary widely across the 
globe and even within countries, regions and localities. This, according to economists, 
largely depends on the efficiency and attractiveness of a given housing market. Thus, the 
field of economics has also categorized vacancy to indicate its level of impact or 
importance. Frictional, short-term, equilibrium, transaction or natural vacancy—to cite 
several synonymous terms borrowed from labor economics—usually refers to dwellings 
awaiting occupation or purchase, and is not considered to be problematic. This vacancy 
type allows the market to work efficiently by allowing people to easily move from one 
place to another. Often, housing vacancy in the best performing market in a country (with 
the lowest housing vacancy),16 is taken as an approximate indicator of frictional vacancy, 
given that local variations in frictional vacancy are generally hard to measure (Couch and 
Cocks 2013). 
 Problematic, structural, or longer-term vacancy, on the other hand, is often related 
to a deficiency in demand, often due to a trend in population or economic decline (e.g. 
deindustrialization), or supply, due to a mismatch between the attributes of the market (e.g. 
deficient housing) and the needs of users (which may also be related to a change in housing 
preferences). Some have argued that cyclical vacancy, which refers to the excess supply 
                                                          
16 In the case of Mexico, for instance, this would be its capital, Mexico City as a whole, with a 7.7 percent 






that occurs as demand declines due to economic and financial cycles of booms and busts, 
fits between the two terms just described (Rabianski 2002, Couch and Cocks 2013). Yet, 
such cycles may well lead to the definite abandonment and decay of housing, as has 
occurred, for instance, after the recent mortgage and foreclosure crisis in the U.S. In these 
cases public action is generally required because owners cease to be able to take active 
steps to bring this housing (often no longer theirs) back into the market (Cohen 2001). 
 Traditional economic and housing market analyses have also ascribed a close 
connection between excess demand, as reflected in the deviation from a natural vacancy 
rate, and changes in the price of housing. The argument has followed that because vacancy 
levels relate to the operational efficiency of the market, they can be useful in highlighting 
the need for development (or lack thereof) and in adjusting the cost of housing, and in turn 
the vacancy rate (Rosen and Smith 1983, Wheaton 1990). Yet, because housing is an 
extremely durable good, it contributes to an asymmetrical behavior in housing markets. 
During the growth phase of a city, for instance, prices grow slowly and the housing stock 
increases greatly, whereas during the decline phase, the housing stock persists and prices 
collapse precipitously (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). Market self-equilibrium is an overly 
simplistic assumption and abstraction of reality, thus, another notable market failure often 
occurs because, relative to other goods, land and property are not as easily divisible. 
Therefore, demand and supply shifts are not as precise as with other goods, making it 
harder to eliminate excess supply.  
Furthermore, although it has been argued that the supply of a product is generally 
restricted in order to maximize total revenue (by preventing excess supply which drives 






levels by increasing rents and creating intended vacancies.17 Less of the product is sold, due 
in part to its high and inaccessible price, but profits are still maximized (Rabianski 2002). 
This is particularly common in monopolistic markets and interferes with the alleged 
equilibrating forces of the market, which are expected to eliminate vacancy and the excess 
supply of housing or space. These speculative processes and inflated housing prices have 
also been known to create simultaneous housing vacancy and accessibility issues. 
Similarly, they can nurture housing bubbles, particularly when they are accompanied by a 
lack of regulation in this and other related arenas. The recent U.S. sub-prime mortgage 
crisis has actually shed light on many of the facets of unregulated market behavior at a 
massive scale as high-risk loan markets and predatory lending practices fueled foreclosures 
and allowed housing vacancies to become widespread (Immergluck 2011, Sun et al. 2011).  
 Scholars from different disciplines have provided detailed accounts of housing 
vacancy at different scales. Although structural approaches are often recognized for their 
macro-level focus, some have successfully studied this phenomenon both locally and 
globally, often linking both levels. Furthermore, they have challenged notions of self-
equilibrating markets, and highlighted the interaction between the market and institutional 
actors in reproducing the issue of housing vacancy. Arguably, by doing so, they have more 
comprehensively addressed the most fundamental and pressing drivers of housing vacancy. 
 
2.3.1 Unregulated Development, Speculation and Crisis: U.S. Examples 
George Galster (2012) has meticulously analyzed the underlying institutional and 
macroeconomic drivers of housing vacancy. He notes that in contexts such as that of 
                                                          
17 In the U.S., which arguably does not suffer from a monopolistic housing market, there are currently over 7 






Detroit, the production of new suburban housing during the second half of the twentieth 
century significantly exceeded the number of new households in the entire metropolitan 
area of the city. State laws that allowed unrestricted development at the urban fringe of this 
and many other metropolitan areas throughout the U.S., resulted in an excess of suburban 
housing which in turn devalued and facilitated the abandonment of property in the city, a 
process that Galster explains through the concept of the regional disassembly line. He 
argues that the Greater Detroit area (along with a number of other U.S. metropolitan 
regions) perfected the Fordist style of mass production for housing, and not just for 
automobiles, for which the region became famous. The region’s easily buildable 
topography, unfettered development rules, fragmented local government, and weak civil 
society enabled the development of a continuous disassembly line stretching from urban 
core to suburban fringe. Each time a new house was added to the suburban fringe, all older 
houses built on the line dropped in value a bit more. The least valuable units, usually 
located at the urban core, have been falling off the line because they are no longer worth 
owning.  
 The result has been abandoned houses, and the increasing decay of the social, fiscal, 
and physical conditions of its surrounding neighborhoods, and indeed the entire core urban 
community. This in turn creates a demand for new housing while the conveyor belt keeps 
moving. Meanwhile, each house already on the line, and the community in which it is 
located, inch a little closer to the precipice. The debris left by the disassembly line is 
painfully visible. Yet, the city is in no position to do anything fundamental about it, since it 
does not have the economic or political power. All it can try to do is clean up the never-
ending mess produced by the disassembly line with progressively fewer resources at its 






discussed by scholars such as David Harvey (2008), such as the socioeconomic and 
localized hardship that they generate in order to maximize profit accumulation through 
urban development processes.  
Galster also importantly notes that the establishment of this disassembly line 
preceded population loss and economic decline in the U.S. Rust Belt. Similarly, there are 
currently some states in the Intermountain West, which are experiencing vacancy coupled 
with unregulated growth, speculation, and excess development entitlements. Some 
researchers have started to study these local practices and their link to a number of issues. 
They have in turn uncovered a significant increase of vacant or partially occupied 
subdivisions, which have increasingly skewed development patterns and real estate markets 
and diminished the fiscal health of communities by, for instance, requiring the delivery of 
public services to remote neighborhoods that generate very little tax revenue (Holway et al., 
2014).  
This phenomenon has been particularly prominent in states such as Colorado, 
Arizona, and Idaho, where land is abundant and cities are growing relatively rapidly. 
Certain jurisdictions have allowed lots to be sold before infrastructure is completed and 
even well in advance of market demand for housing. The issue has become particularly 
hard to address once construction – and partial occupation – begins without existing growth 
management and development regulations (Holway et al. 2014). It is important to note that 
although boom and bust cycles have exacerbated these issues, population or economic 
decline has not generally accompanied it. Indeed, the contrary has actually been true in 
many cases. Thus, the underlying causes of vacancy in this instance seem to be, again, lack 







2.3.2 Political and Economic Restructuring: The Case of Eastern Germany 
Outside of the U.S., the issue of housing vacancy have been studied and have taken place at 
larger, regional and even national scales. Perhaps one of the most notable cases is that of 
eastern Germany after reunification in 1990. In this setting, high rates of vacancy have been 
linked to the political and economic restructuring of the region. This State-led transition, 
from socialism to capitalism, involved, among other factors, the devolution of the socialist 
welfare state, and an intense process of deindustrialization and economic decline. This, in 
turn, resulted in very high unemployment rates, depopulation, and ultimately an issue of 
housing vacancy (Glock and Hausserman 2004).  
 During socialism, housing development was largely planned and produced through 
State-organized investment. Large-scale prefabricated housing estates were built on the 
fringes of cities, while historical multi-story dwellings in the inner city were left to decay. 
Thus, even before unification vacancy was already an issue. After 1990, however, the issue 
intensified as several schemes, such as tax relief, low interest loans, and subsidies, were 
implemented to increase the supply of ‘modernized’ housing units. Public housing policies 
drove a massive growth in new construction and contributed to the decoupling of housing 
investment from demand. To correct this, over the next decade housing investments were 
restricted to ‘safe’ locations only, where there were solid expectations of sufficient demand. 
Conversely, high vacancy areas, usually with decaying properties and infrastructure, were 
considered ‘unsafe’ for investment. Low-income neighborhoods, in particular, which were 
already affected by high vacancy rates, became additionally disadvantaged and condemned 
to a self-perpetuating process of increasingly inadequate living conditions, most notably in 






encouraged more people to flee these areas. It is important to note that both inner-city and 
peripheral areas have been written-off by investors (Glock and Hausserman 2004).   
 Beyond the significant transformation of the housing market, general trends of 
deindustrialization and depopulation in Eastern Germany since unification are very likely to 
have also contributed to the vacant housing problem. Yet, problematic vacancy rates have 
more widely been blamed on the housing market and on government intervention. 
Importantly, however, it has been highlighted that once vacancies become problematic, the 
market is usually unable to reverse them. Furthermore, the important weakening of local 
fiscal capacity brought upon by vacancies has created a powerful case for public policy to 
address the issue at a higher government level (Glock and Hausserman 2004). 
 
2.3.3 Casas sin Gente, Gente sin Casas: The Spanish Real Estate Model 
Before the bursting of the housing bubble in Spain, its finance and real estate development 
model, based on the creation and appropriation of urban rents, had been touted as 
exemplary. Some countries in Latin America, for instance, arguably appropriated the 
Spanish model to confront their housing deficits by financing massive housing 
construction. Admittedly, some of the commonalities across contexts that made this 
possible included institutional weakness in relation to private entities, lax finance and 
development regulations, and access to international capital (Jiménez and Fernández 2014, 
Gutiérrez and Domenech 2017).  
Since the 1960s, publicly-financed housing became a lucrative business in Spain. 
State actions guaranteed optimal conditions that allowed the construction sector to grow 






been used as a fundamental engine to fuel economic growth in the country. After its 1970s 
crisis, the Spanish economy also experienced a housing bubble in the late 1980s. Yet, the 
hegemonic model of property-based debt arguably consolidated in the 1980s following the 
country’s entry into the European Union. At the time, there was a lot of pressure for the 
country to grow economically and to attract capital investment; much of this was achieved 
through urban development and housing construction.  
Public policies also promoted owner-occupied housing and helped propel the 
property boom from the late 1990s to the late 2000s. A series of deregulations in the 1980s 
and 1990s authorized commercial banks to expand the length of mortgages and introduced 
the possibility of turning them into marketable securities. Furthermore, the maximum legal 
loan-to-value percentage increased as well. Since then, mortgage securitization boomed, as 
did the mortgage debt to GDP ratio. From 1994 to 2007, Spain’s mortgage debt multiplied 
by twelve. In parallel, from 1998 to 2008, housing prices increased by more than 180 
percent, compared to 104 percent in the U.S., another financialized market. In the late 
2000s, the country reached the highest levels of residential development in its history, 
accounting for 11 percent of the GDP and almost 18 percent combining the real estate and 
financial sectors (Palomera 2014, Gutiérrez and Delclos 2017, Gutiérrez and Domenech 
2017).  
At the local level, governments had very limited resources, thus, housing 
construction and urban growth provided them with an important fiscal opportunity, which 
made them compete for large projects to foster economic growth. Public financial entities, 
called Cajas de Ahorro, also backed these kinds of projects without assessing their 
profitability. Financial entities expanded credit access for buyers and simultaneously 






leverage issues in the real estate sector, the over-indebtedness of households, the granting 
of high-risk mortgages, and fraudulent practices such as offering finance for the total cost, 
or even more, of a housing unit, blindly hoping for its revaluation (Jiménez and Fernández 
2014).  
Simultaneously, Spain endured a persistent downward pressure on wages. During 
the housing boom, the average wage in the private sector increased by less than 1 percent 
whereas capital gains surged by 73 percent. It is also important to note that highly 
dispossessed populations in Spain were at the center of this housing boom; between 2003 
and 2007, when prices were peaking, around one million migrants from the global South 
were granted mortgages to buy homes. Some better-off households were able to sell their 
properties at inflated values to migrant buyers, but given the subsequent stagnation of 
wages and the rocketing of mortgage payments, families often resorted to overcrowding 
and informal subletting. The working classes in Spain had virtually no housing alternatives 
as a series of policies increasingly moved towards the privatization of housing production 
and the promotion of home-ownership over rental housing. An increasing percentage of 
State housing investment went to tax deductions for the purchase of a property, from 50 
percent in the early 1990s to 80 percent in the early 2000s. Furthermore, Spain has 
practically no public housing; State-subsidized housing only amounts to 1.5 percent of the 
total stock, compared to 20 percent in England or 17 percent in France. Thus, in the 2000s 
finance capital penetrated virtually all social sectors, even some of the most vulnerable ones 
(Palomera 2014, Gutiérrez and Delclos 2017). 
As 4 million housing units were built between 2001 and 2008 – far surpassing 
household formation – the housing boom did not serve the purpose of satisfying the 






housing production at various points in Spain’s history. Families were only able to access 
housing to the extent that they could increase their debt through longer mortgages. 
Although interest rates dropped in the mid-2000s, in 2008 they then rose significantly, as 
did mortgage payments. Thus, following the bursting of the property bubble there has been 
a massive proliferation of evictions. Unemployment growth following the economic crisis 
made it impossible for an increasing number of families to meet the cost of their mortgage 
payments. Aided by mortgage legislation, this situation has led to an avalanche of 
foreclosures and to thousands of families losing their homes. In 2010, delinquency rates 
were at 2.6 percent for buyers, and around 11 percent for real estate developers. Yet, in 
2013, real estate debt rose to 1.1 billion euros, 103.4 percent of the GDP, 61.8 percent 
corresponding to buyers and 38.2 percent to real estate developers. As a result anywhere 
from 200 to 400 thousand families have lost their housing since 2008, and many still carry 
mortgage debt. As a result, between 3 and 6 million housing units are vacant (Jiménez and 
Fernández 2014, Gutiérrez and Domenech 2017).  
Today, Spain sustains a similar paradox to that of a country like Mexico, an 
oversized housing stock coexisting with a large unmet housing demand. Spain has indeed 
been one of the countries most hard hit by the recent global financial crisis, and arguably 
largely due to its property-based debt. Housing issues in Spain have been so profound that 
they have generated the most important currentcivic mobilizations in the country and 
possibly beyond. The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform for Mortgage-
affected People) has blocked evictions and occupied empty bank-owned housing. Their 
mission is to disrupt the core dynamics of urban capital accumulation and to contest 
financial rent-extraction mechanisms (Palomera 2014, Jiménez and Fernández 2014, 







2.3.4 Implications and Significance at Different Scales 
 Although other, additional research has focused on the issue of housing vacancy, the 
previous examples have been presented due to their relevance to the present study. Similar 
to some local contexts in the U.S. (Holway et al. 2014), speculative, unregulated and excess 
development entitlements in the Mexican context seem to be imposing significant 
socioeconomic impacts and resulting in a significant increase in vacant housing units. 
Furthermore, as in Spain (Jiménez and Fernández 2014) and U.S. Rustbelt cities in the past 
(Galster 2012), fragmented local governments in a number of Mexican metropolitan 
regions have also allowed the production of new suburban housing to exceed the number of 
new households, thus facilitating an increase in vacant property. At a larger scale, as seen in 
eastern Germany (Glock and Hausserman 2004), high rates of vacancy may also be linked 
to the political and economic restructuring of the country. Arguably, with the aim of 
providing ‘modernized’ housing (in both contexts), public policies and investment have 
partially decoupled housing production or supply from demand.  
Generally, and in relation to housing vacancy, economists have been mostly 
interested in the underlying causes of market failure, and the requirements for efficient 
market operation or market equilibrium when markets are unable to resolve high levels of 
vacancy. Yet, very rarely have they tried to incorporate the social or use value of housing 
into their abstract models (Wheaton 1990). Nonetheless, increasingly scholars, frequently 
from other disciplines, have recognized and studied the host of negative externalities 
brought by housing vacancy.  
 Some research has focused on the neighborhood and community-level consequences 






them. When properties remain vacant for prolonged periods, they tend to fall into disrepair, 
become neglected, and eventually abandoned, which may pose safety hazards, attract 
vandalism or generate criminal activity. This can also generate a ripple effect by lowering 
adjacent property values and by driving the decline of entire neighborhoods in terms of 
infrastructure and service provision, physical fragmentation, and lack of social cohesion 
(Cohen 2001, Culhane and Hillier 2001, Glock and Haussermann 2004, Sage 2009, 
Hollander et al. 2010). 
 Other scholars have highlighted the burdens of housing vacancy at broader 
community or city levels. When issues of vacancy extend to multiple communities within a 
city or metropolitan region, the impacts can be particularly significant for local 
governments and jurisdictions due primarily to a decline in revenue and an increase in 
maintenance and even service costs (because of diseconomies of scale). Thus, while it is in 
their best interest to promote the redevelopment of abandoned properties, localities are 
often unable to do so. In turn, the local economy and social institutions are also hurt. 
Furthermore, high vacancy rates, particularly when coupled with sprawling and speculative 
development patterns, tend to reduce economic productivity. Consequently, ever more 
vacant, dilapidated, and dangerous areas become progressively less attractive locations for 
current and potential households and businesses (Cohen 2001, Sage 2009, Galster 2012, 
Silverman et al. 2012). 
 Although more structural approaches have focused on analyzing macro-level drivers 
of housing vacancy, they have often also been interested in their local implications. They 
have highlighted, for instance, that global capital markets, coupled with federal actions, 
such as deregulation, have imposed profoundly localized costs on neighborhoods and local 






to deal with the scale of foreclosed or vacant property, especially when compared to the 
vast sums allocated to rescuing financial institutions, while local governments are left to 
pick up the pieces (Immergluck 2011, Galster 2012).  
 Particularly in the United States, housing dislocation and vacancy have often 
occurred due to racial segregation and marginalization, particularly in so-called ‘shrinking 
cities’ along the U.S. rustbelt and most notably in Detroit. Other discussions have centered 
on the effect of rampant financialization and speculation on vacancy, such as in the Spanish 
context, and recently after the U.S. foreclosure crisis. In the former cases, housing is often 
dilapidated or no longer habitable, while in the latter vacancy is often newly created and 
housing in good condition but inaccessible or no longer valuable as an investment. In the 
Mexican case, vacancy emerged at a period when the national government was supporting 
the expansion of credit and production of new housing to meet the housing needs of low 
and moderate-income households. One may have assumed that, if successful, this would 
have occurred as assisted households left behind poor quality housing for better, new 
housing, if we take the purported goal of this approach at face value – to use the exchange 
value of mortgage-backed securities to foster better quality use-value for residents who 
need better housing. While this may have occurred to an extent, fueling inner-city vacancy, 
due to the usual high value and service of such land, this has not emerged as a matter for 
concern. The chapters below will discuss the actual relationship between such mortgage 
expansion and rising levels of vacancy, as well as socioeconomic and localized issues 









Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
Housing research in Mexico and other developing countries has centered on enormous 
unmet housing needs. Less attention has been given to the more recent and massive 
production of ‘affordable’ housing which remains inadequate, primarily in terms of its 
location and access to jobs, amenities, infrastructure and services. Very little research has 
also focused on the issue of housing vacancy in developing countries, which when above 
the natural level,18 points to market inefficiencies and signals a definite waste of a country’s 
scarce capital resources (Struyk 1988). Thus, my core and supporting research questions 
may be summarized as follows:  
What has produced the high rates of vacancy and poor conditions in housing produced 
under Mexico’s current housing finance and development model? 
 What has been the role of national housing finance policy, as well as state and local 
governments, in promoting housing production, access and vacancy since the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s? 
 In what ways have private interests influenced national housing finance policy and 
state and local urban policy implementation? 
 What have been some of the spatial and localized implications of recent housing 
and development policies and trends, particularly in relation to housing vacancy 
and access? 
                                                          
18 Short-term or natural vacancies refer to dwellings awaiting occupation or purchase, and are not considered 






 What have been some of the socioeconomic implications for, and the responses of, 
low and middle-income residents, government and financing institutions, and 
developers? 
The matrix below serves the purpose of clarifying and summarizing the relationship 
of the above research questions to the outlined theoretical framework and research design, 
all of which are central aspects of the dissertation proposal. The broad theory questions are 
linked to different authors and theoretical frameworks. In parallel, a further subset of 
questions is tied to specific research methods which will be discussed in this chapter in 
further detail.  
 
Central Research Question: 
What has produced the high rates of vacancy and poor conditions in housing produced under 




Theory/Literature & Authors Research Methods 
 
What has been the role of 
national housing finance 
policy in stimulating housing 
production, access, and 
vacancy since the 
implementation of neoliberal 
reforms in the 1990s? 
 
 
Regime Theory  
 





 Mexican/national context: 
Eckstein 
 
Capitalist Housing Production  
 
 Global context: Harvey, 
Roy, Sassen, Immergluck, 
Glock and Hausserman 
 
 Content analysis of 
interviews and supporting 
documents 





To what extent have local and 
state governments promoted 
housing production, access, 




 Content analysis of 
interviews and supporting 
documents 




                                                          







In what ways have private 
interests influenced national 
housing finance policy, and 
state and local urban policy 
implementation? 
 
 Latin American context: 
Cardoso, Portes, Kohli, 
Roberts, Wood  
 Mexican context: 
Soederberg 
 
Unregulated and Excess 
Development Entitlements  
 
 US context: Galster, 
Holway et al. 
 
 Content analysis of 
interviews and supporting 
documents 





What have been some of the 
spatial and localized 
implications of recent 
housing and development 
policies and trends, 
particularly in relation to 
housing vacancy and access? 
 
 
Issues of Access and 
Governance since Neoliberal 
Reform  
 
 Latin American focus: 
Ward, Wilson, Portes, 
Roberts, Wood 
 
Housing Vacancy Implications 
at Different Scales  
 
 Primarily US Literature: 
Galster, Immergluck, 
Cohen, Culhane and 
Hillier, Sage, Hollander, 
Silverman et al., Holway, 
Glock and Hausserman 
 
 Content analysis of 
interviews and supporting 
documents 
 Spatial analyses 
 Windshield surveying 
 
What have been some of the 
socioeconomic implications 
for, and the responses of, low 
and middle-income residents, 
government and financing 
institutions, and developers? 
 
 
 Content analysis of 
interviews and supporting 
documents 
 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1: Matrix of Questions, Supporting Literature and Methods. 
This research draws upon mixed methods that include semi-structured interviews 
with public officials, housing developers, and civic groups; the content analysis of relevant 
government documents, policy reports, and public opinion sources; field visits and 
windshield surveys in neighborhoods with particularly high numbers of vacant homes; and 
spatial and statistical analyses. Furthermore, these analyses focus on the cases of two states, 
Baja California and the state of Mexico, chosen for the severity of their vacancy and 






local governments and other metropolitan institutions. Within these states, an important 
focus is also placed on the municipalities of Tijuana and Huehuetoca, respectively.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN: MIXED METHODS, COMPARATIVE AND EMBEDDED ANALYSIS 
As previously noted, this study means to analyze the origins and socioeconomic 
implications of simultaneous high housing vacancy levels and shortages throughout some 
Mexican regions. The roles of the public and private sectors in shaping this paradoxical 
condition and the influence of recent housing finance and production in the country’s 
development patterns are of particular interest for this study. Researchers in fields such as 
planning, generally benefit from an interdisciplinary approach to understanding highly 
complex problems and settings. Similarly in this case, multiple variables need to be 
analyzed from different vantage points to adequately address the above research query. 
Thus, a mixed-methods approach will be used to triangulate and corroborate different types 
of data and to increase the validity of constructs and results and the breadth and depth of 
findings and interpretations.   
Triangulation, which refers to the establishment of a robust fact through evidence 
from multiple sources that coincide, allows an investigator to address a broader range of 
issues and contributes to a holistic understanding of a particular phenomenon (Gaber 1993, 
Newman and Benz 1998, Yin 1998 & 2003, Creswell 2003, Flyvbjerg 2004). The use of 
the quantitative methods outlined below will allow me to test relationships and, to a certain 
degree, construct generalizations. This is important given the research goal of 
comprehensively evaluating the outcomes of recent national housing policy. Yet, since 






heavily on qualitative strategies to more adequately analyze the issue of concurrent housing 
vacancy and shortages in particular local contexts (Weiss 1999, Shadish et al. 2002, Guba 
and Lincoln 2005).  
3.2.1 Pilot Study: Goals and Preliminary Findings 
 A pilot study conducted between 2014 and 2015 served to test a number of data 
collection strategies and research methods. This pilot study provided valuable lessons for 
both my subsequent research design and field procedures and protocols; it served the 
purpose of highlighting validity issues and strategies for addressing them. This small-scale 
study centered on one state, Zacatecas, which had the third highest vacancy rate (18.2 
percent) in Mexico in 2010. Around that time, Zacatecas ranked fourth among states with 
the largest share of its populations living in overcrowded or poor housing conditions. Yet 
the state’s housing budget per inhabitant between 2000 and 2010 was among the lowest. 
The in-depth analysis of its capital city and metropolitan region was also important given 








Figure 3.1: Housing Vacancy Rates in Mexico by State in 2010. 
I conducted interviews with pertinent state and local government officials and 
housing developers to better theorize the phenomenon under study and identify the relevant 
variables for analysis. I also visited neighborhoods in different municipalities with 
particularly high vacancy rates to document their condition. Furthermore, I carried out a 
series of spatial and statistical analyses with municipal and census tract-level data from this 
state and its capital city to analyze population and housing change, locate statistically 
significant concentrations of vacant housing,20 and study the correlation between vacancy 
rates and a number of factors, most importantly the effect of public housing finance on 
vacancy rates. 
                                                          






 Through this initial data analysis, I uncovered important trends, such as the 
impressive housing growth in some municipalities during the 2000s, which was not 
necessarily justified by population growth. Figure 3.2 shows many more municipalities in 
dark blue on the right hand map, which represents housing change, than on the population 
change map to the left, suggesting perhaps an overproduction of housing. 21 Zooming in to 
the metropolitan region of the state’s capital, Guadalupe-Zacatecas, we see relatively high 
vacancy rates throughout the city (Figure 3.3). Furthermore “rural localities”, which do not 
cross a 2,500 population threshold and are thus not incorporated as urban census tracts, 
were also incorporated to show that some of these areas surrounding the metropolitan 
region also exhibit high vacancy rates, and some of them are actually new suburban 
housing developments. On Figure 3.4, a hot spot statistical analysis shows in red high-
vacancy concentrations – census tracts that are surrounded by other census tracts with high 
vacancy rates – all of which are in peripheral areas of the city with limited access to certain 
services. Lastly, Figure 3.5 shows the housing typologies in these areas, mostly inhabited 
by lower-middle income households: newly built INFONAVIT-financed housing, 
incremental housing financed by the state government, and relatively consolidated informal 
settlements built several decades ago. Thus, the weak nature of local and metropolitan 
governance, and the influence of state programs and the private sector in housing 
production were also important preliminary findings that guided my overall study.  
 
                                                          
21 In the case of this state, due to its historical migration trends, rural municipalities also exhibited important 















*Rural localities are defined as those with less than 2,500 inhabitants 








Figure 3.4: Clustering of High Vacancy (Hot Spot Analysis and Service Access).22 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Housing Typologies in Areas with High Concentrations of Vacant Housing. 
                                                          






Based on the limited literature and on interviews conducted as part of this study, I 
also constructed a statistical model that performed well despite the relatively small data set 
I used, of the 58 municipalities in the state, and which explained a significant proportion of 
the variation in vacancy rates. The regression model variables are: 
Vacancy Rates as a function of: 
1. Housing Growth to Population Growth Ratio, 2005-2010 – positive effect 
2. Number of Public Loans for New Housing, 2005-2010 – positive effect 
3. Loans/Housing Units in 2005 – negative effect (unexpected sign)* 
4. Housing Growth Rate, 2005-2010 – negative effect 
5. Household Size – negative effect 
6. Number of Housing Units – negative effect 
7. Density (hab/km2) – positive effect (unexpected sign) 
8. Composite Poverty Rate (per capita income, educational attainment, access to healthcare and 
social services, quality of housing, nourishment level, and inequality) – positive effect 
9. Percentage of population with income above 2 minimum wages – negative effect 
10. Migration Intensity Index (0-100) – positive effect 
11. Homicides per 10,000 people, 2005-2010 – positive effect 
* Variable 3, in addition to variable 2, was used as a measure of loan penetration.  
The following section will discuss further the performance of this model and the data 
limitations and circumstances that prevented me from extending this portion of my study.  
Besides providing an important point of reference for analytical purposes and 
preliminary research findings, this pilot study allowed me to fine-tune a number of my data 
collection strategies and instruments. For instance, I was able to clearly identify the most 
important actors to interview at different levels (Table 3.2). I also significantly modified my 








State Level Local/Municipal Level 
 
 INFONAVIT delegates 
 SEDATU delegates23 
 Urban Development Officials 
 Housing Department Officials 
 Major regional developers 
 
 
 Planning Officials 
 City Services and Infrastructure 
Officials 
 Social/Economic Development  




(El Barzón, Frente Mexiquense, Movimiento Urbano Popular, TECHO, Habitat International Coalition) 
 
Table 3.2: Interviewees. 
 
3.2.2 Research Methods and Limitations 
Given that vacancy rates are present throughout the country, and to increase the 
robustness of my findings, I selected two other Mexican states with significant housing 
vacancies and shortages for further study. After carefully analyzing a variety of statistics 
and conditions, Baja California and the State of Mexico (Estado de México) were selected 
for their critical and strategic importance in relation to the problem under study. The 
heaviest emphasis was placed on absolute and relative measures of housing vacancy, 
housing shortages, and public housing finance. Such information-oriented selection, or 
strategic sampling, was used to maximize the utility of the field research and acquired data, 
and to provide greater weight to the research’s generalizations. Yet, this study proposes 
analytical, rather than statistical, generalization, through the analysis of comparable cases 
(Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1998, Campbell 2003, Flyvbjerg 2004, Small 2009).  
                                                          






I proposed the analysis of these states in relation to the broader (e.g. national and 
global) social forces shaping the conditions under study, which allowed me to formulate 
more compelling empirical statements (Small 2009). To begin with a state-level analysis 
was important because states have federal housing (INFONAVIT) and urban development 
(SEDATU - Urban and Regional Development Ministry) offices. Similarly, housing and 
urban development departments exist at this level, usually as an under secretariat of an 
infrastructure or similar department. Developers also often operate at a regional or state 
level. Thus, development decisions are arguably largely influenced by state actors, which 
will be interviewed in each state, whereas municipal governments are often weak and, in 
the case of metropolitan regions, highly fragmented (Ward et al. 2010, Wilson et al. 2012). 
Nonetheless, municipal level authorities were also interviewed. Furthermore, a state level 
analysis also allowed me to uncover rural-urban disparities, which are important to 
highlight, particularly in reference to national housing policy.   
Baja California, in the northwest corner of the country, may be regarded as an 
extreme case given that it had the highest vacancy rate in 2010 (18.8 percent), the second 
highest percentage of its population living in poor or overcrowding conditions, and the 
fourth highest public finance level (budget/population) for new housing between 2000 and 
2010.24 Extreme cases are useful because they often challenge existing analytical 
assumptions, and present pioneering paradigms (Campbell 2003). Within Baja California, 
special attention was also placed on Tijuana (1,559,683 inhabitants and 20.3 percent 
                                                          
24 Baja California used 95 percent of its housing budget from 2000 to 2010 for new housing construction, 3 






vacancy rate in 2010),25 where local authorities and actors were also be interviewed, and 
where further data gathering and analysis (outlined below) took place.  
 
 Municipality Population Vacancy Rate 
Huehuetoca 100,023 0.4495 
Zumpango 159,647 0.3995 
Tecámac 364,579 0.2581 
Cuautitlán 140,059 0.2257 
Chalco 310,130 0.2058 
Chicoloapan 175,053 0.2018 
Ixtapaluca 467,361 0.1864 
Almoloya de Juárez* 147,653 0.1714 
Coacalco de Berriozábal 278,064 0.1663 
Tultepec 131,567 0.1583 
Acolman 136,558 0.1505 
*All municipalities, except Almoloya de Juárez, are in Mexico City’s metropolitan region. Almoloya is, 
however, part of the metropolitan region of Toluca, capital of the state and site of a maximum security prison. 
Table 3.3: State of Mexico Municipalities with over 100,000 Inhabitants and above 
National Average Vacancy Rates. 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). 
The State of Mexico, which surrounds Mexico City, is a very heavily populated 
state, and arguably for that reason it does not perform as poorly as other states in the most 
important metrics under scrutiny (e.g. 12 percent vacancy rate). In absolute terms, however, 
the state had the largest number of vacant housing units in 2010, the second largest housing 
budget for new housing construction from 2000 to 2010,26 and the third highest number of 
households living in overcrowded or poor housing conditions. Furthermore, when looking 
                                                          
25 Tijuana’s metropolitan region is the sixth most populated in the country (in 2010 it had a population of 
1,751,430) and it is composed by three municipalities: Tijuana, Tecate, and Playas de Rosarito. Yet, most of 
the region’s economic units (87.5%), employed population (90.6%), and total gross production (90.8%) is in 
the core municipality of Tijuana.  
26 Estado de Mexico used 93 percent of its housing budget from 2000 to 2010 for new housing construction, 1 






at municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants, the state has eleven with above (national) 
average vacancy rates, ten of which form part of Mexico City’s metropolitan region. 
Huehuetoca (100,023 inhabitants and 45 percent vacancy rate in 2010) was thus chosen for 
further embedded local-level analysis.   
As briefly outlined before, a central portion of this study is qualitative and has been 
largely based on a series of semi-structured interviews (in each state and municipality) with 
pertinent state and local public officials, housing developers, and members of civil society 
either affected by or involved in addressing the housing conditions under study. The 
qualitative data collected from these interviews served to deepen my understanding of the 
phenomenon under study significantly, and to uncover some of the implications of high 
levels of housing vacancy and shortages of adequate housing felt by different levels of 
government, financing institutions, developers, and residents. Appendix B provides both 
the interview questions for public officials and housing developers used in the pilot study 
and in the research reported here on Baja California and the State of Mexico. Most 
interviews were audio recorded (when participants agreed, only one refused) and 
transcribed for subsequent analysis. This analysis has been complemented with content 
analysis of pertinent documents, such as urban development plans and housing programs, 
mostly existing at the state and federal levels,27 housing and development reports (typically 
                                                          
27 In Baja California, for instance, the most important document to review are the state’s urban development 
law, Ley de Desarrollo Urbano del Estado de Baja California, published in 1994, and the real estate and 
housing regulatory estatutes, Reglamento Interno del Instituto para el Desarrollo Inmobiliario y de la 
Vivienda del Estado de Baja California,updated in 2010. As mentioned before, however, Tijuana’s 
metropolitan region does have a guiding urban development institute and plan, Programa de Desarrollo 
Urbano del Centro de Poblacion Tijuana, B.C. 2008-2030 (IMPLAN). Estado de Mexico also has an urban 
development plan, Plan Estatal de Desarrollo Urbano, from 2008, and a regional plan for its urban share of 
Mexico City’s metropolitan región, what they call the Cuautitlan-Texcoco Valley, from 2005, Plan Regional 
de Desarrollo Urbano Cdel Valle Cuautitlan-Texcoco. Large municipalities also often have zoning, land use, 
and other relevant documents and plans. Federal level documents such as the Housing Law of 2006 and 
reformed in 2015 for the last time, the National Urban Development plan (2014-2018), and INFONAVIT’s 






drafted by international organizations or financial institutions), and public opinion sources 
(e.g. newspaper accounts). 
The quantitative portion of this study includes different units of analysis. Census 
and government data have been analyzed through descriptive statistics and spatial analyses 
to begin to illustrate relevant information at different scales, such as socioeconomic 
conditions throughout a state, housing shortages and vacancy rates. The Federal Mortgage 
Association defines Mexico’s housing shortage as the number of households living in 
overcrowded (two or more households per unit) or poor housing conditions (due to 
precarious construction materials such as dirt floors and other nondurable materials). 
Contrasting population and housing unit changes helped to reveal a likely housing 
oversupply, as found in the pilot study as well. Similarly, the spatial concentration of 
housing vacancy was assessed through spatial statistics. A more sophisticated analysis was 
also used to spot statistically significant clusters of high housing vacancy in Tijuana and 
Huehuetoca to determine the locations and typologies of such housing, as well as the 
relative isolation, marginalization, and infrastructure and services access levels of these 
areas. The previous section includes selected maps from Zacatecas’ pilot study that 
illustrate some of the spatial analyses that informed these research methods (i.e. hot spot 
analysis). 
 A statistically significant and fit OLS regression model (R2 = 0.825) was 
constructed during the pilot study phase to predict the effect of a number of factors (11 
variables outlined in the previous section) on explaining vacancy rates. The scale of public 
housing financing available (variable ‘Loans 05-10’ on Figure 3.6) proved to be positively 
correlated with vacancy at a statistically significant level (p<0.001). The 58 municipalities 






data are most complete. It was clear, however, that increasing the sample size of this study 
would be beneficial for a variety of reasons, including to extend the scope of the analysis 
and to better support making generalizations based on the results.28 Thus, I intended to 
increase the sample size by including municipalities from the other states under analysis 
(Figures 3.6-3.7).29 Yet, besides significant data limitations, this proved unnecessary since 
INFONAVIT published a statistical analysis very similar to this one at the national level in 
2016. I will summarize and make use of these data below, particularly in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Statistical Significance and Fitness of Results. 
                                                          
28 By reducing the standard error. 
29 The model performs well despite the use of a fairly small data set (n=58), and is thus able to explain a 
significant proportion of the variation in vacancy rates. The model does not present serious OLS problems, 
but it is affected by the presence of outliers (Appendix I), which given the small sample size is problematic 
and may lead to problems of inference. Yet, a larger sample size could normalize the residuals of the model 
and yield fairly significant results. Similarly, the inclusion of the municipalities of Estado de Mexico, which 
has a more normal distribution of municipalities (given that it has many heavily populated municipalities, as 
well as several smaller ones), is likely to address the two main issues present in the model: outliers and non-









Figure 3.7: Statistical Significance of Results after Correcting for Heteroscedasticity with 
White’s Robust Standard Errors. 
The simplicity of the present model had many benefits, such as the ease through 
which one may interpret results. Yet, and potentially beyond the scope of this analysis, the 
phenomenon under study lends itself for much further inquiry. More complex simultaneous 
equation models, for instance, may substantiate some of the implications of current housing 
vacancy rates in Mexico, given that they could uncover not only the influences, but also the 
consequences of vacancy rates on other given variables. Furthermore, hierarchical models 
may perhaps also allow for the incorporation of a more disaggregated unit of analysis, such 
as census tracts, to distinguish, for instance, the role that housing location (e.g. in peri-
urban areas) may be playing on vacancy rates. Finally, a housing market model could also 






analyze the range of supply side factors (e.g. public policy, financial mechanisms, etc.) that 
could be tied to this.  
However, data availability poses significant limitations to adequately test these 
models. Perhaps the most worrisome data constraint was that the Mexican census did not 
publish vacancy rates for 2015, as it had done previously for the 2010 census and the 2005 
population count. I requested access to such data but I was only able to obtain aggregated 
data at the state level and these data combined information on vacant units with temporary 
housing.30 I sent a formal petition making use of the Federal Law of Transparency and 
Access to Public Information to request disaggregated data at the municipal, and census 
tract levels, but was informed that such data were not produced given the changes in the 
collection procedures for 2015 data. Thus, I conducted windshield surveys to approximate 
vacancy rates in selected neighborhoods within the chosen municipalities. The data 
gathered is thus not comparable to census data but this strategy did prove to be very 
illuminating and allowed me to document current conditions along with other qualitative 
information which will be discussed throughout the dissertation.  
 
3.3 THE CASE STUDIES 
Before introducing the final case studies more fully, this section provides a more detailed 
discussion of some of the other housing, demographic, economic, social and political 
factors taken into account in my case selection process. Table 3.4 includes information on 
five of the states that I initially considered given their performance on housing investment 
and production, access and vacancy. Jalisco in particular, for instance, offers an interesting 
                                                          
30 The aggregated percentage of vacant and temporary housing is 24.4 percent at the national level, given that 






analytical case because although it had high housing investment in the 2000s and high 
vacancy rates in 2010, it had relatively low housing shortages. Thus, it could have offered a 
good opportunity for comparison. Michoacán, on the other hand, had a very high Housing 
to Population Growth ratio, indicating perhaps a particularly significant overproduction in 
that state. Yet, both Jalisco and Michoacán, as can be seen below, are states where 
migration is very intense, a factor that has been correlated with housing vacancy in the 
Mexican context but that is not a main focus of this study. One would think that Baja 
California, a border state, would also have that characteristic, but although it has an 
important itinerant population and has an important level of integration with the U.S. state 
of California, the mobility of its population is arguably more dynamic.  
 
 
Shortage Change (Relative) 
2008-2012 
Housing to Population Growth 
Ratio 2005-2010 
2006 Governors and Party 
Alternation since 1989 
  National -0.01 
10 México -0.03 
12 Baja California -0.02 
22 Jalisco 0.03 
25 Quintana Roo 0.04 
26 Michoacán  0.05 
 
  National 4.30 
2 Michoacán  7.34 
16 Jalisco 4.18 
18 México 4.02 
20 Baja California 3.88 
31 Quintana Roo 2.45 
 
 
Baja California PAN 1 
Jalisco PAN 2 
México PRI 0 
Quintana Roo PRI 0 
Michoacán PRD 2 
 
 
Percentage of National GDP  
2003-11 
Migration Intensity Ranking 
2010 
Average Yearly Murder Rate  
2000-10 (per 100,000) 
 
2 México 9.33 
4 Jalisco 6.68 
12 Baja California 3.02 
15 Michoacán  2.45 





18 Baja California 
24 México 
30 Quintana Roo 
 
  National 11.28 
4 Baja California 21.81 
7 Michoacán  15.61 
10 México 12.06 
15 Quintana Roo 8.35 
17 Jalisco 7.40 
 






The chosen case studies have other notable features that were well suited to my 
purpose. Notably, they both have a similar housing to population growth ratio of around 
four, meaning that the number of housing units in these states grew four times faster than 
their populations in the late 2000s during the peak of the country’s housing boom, as 
occurred at the national level. They also represent an important percentage of the national 
GDP; in the case of the State of Mexico, this is largely driven by its large population size. 
Their actual growth, however, in both economic and demographic terms (particularly that 
of Tijuana, Baja California), was much more significant in the 1990s than in the 2000s 
(Table 3.5). Furthermore, while they seem to attract investment and perform relatively well 
in economic terms, they both confront very significant social ills. While housing is at the 
center of this study, both cases have severe issues related to insecurity and violence, for 
example. These contrasts are particularly stimulating and related to the queries that this 
research aims to address, as are the local and state politics that the selected case studies 
embody. The State of Mexico is one of the few states that only been governed by the PRI. 
This lack of political pluralism has arguably contributed to weak institutional development 
and to profound governance issues. In contrast, since 1989 Baja California has consistently 
elected to state government representatives of the PAN – a right-wing and pro-development 
party. These political and social factors have definitely played a role in recent housing and 
urban development in the regions under study. 
 
Metropolitan Area State(s) 










ZM de Tijuana Baja California 5.4 2.5  4 422.7  85.0 
ZM del Valle de México D.F.-Hidalgo-México 1.7 0.9  7 866.1  160.1 







3.3.1 Tijuana, Baja California 
As previously mentioned, Baja California had the highest vacancy rate in 2010 
(18.8 percent), the second highest share of households enduring poor housing conditions, 
and the fourth largest allocation of financing per capita for new housing construction from 
2000 to 2010. This state embodies a particularly unique case because 98 percent of its 
population is urban. Urban areas generally attract industry and house a greater percentage 
of formal workers who are more likely to qualify for a housing mortgage. This partly 
explains the relatively large amount of housing credits attracted by the state in the 2000s. 
Although only about 20 percent of Mexicans can access housing credits, this percentage 
increases to 35 in Baja California. Furthermore, the state was governed by the same party 
lines with the federal government in the 2000s, and has been characterized by its strong 
pro-development stance. The high expectations for growth in the maquila industry after the 
signing of NAFTA might also have incentivized housing construction in the 2000s.  
Within this state, an important focus of this study is placed on Tijuana (20.3 percent 
vacancy rate), which is the state’s largest city and has historically absorbed a majority of 
Baja California’s housing funds. Tijuana borders the city of San Diego, California and it is 
the largest metropolitan area along the U.S.-Mexico border.31 The city grew particularly 
fast during the 1980s. Although the government built some low-income housing in the 
1990s, rapid population growth contributed to the formation of numerous informal 
settlements. Service provision, therefore, and in particular water access, has been very 
limited in various areas of the city. In the 2000s, the city’s urban growth was highly 
                                                          
31 Including the municipalities of Playas de Rosarito and Tecate, it has a population of 1.75 million 






expansive; its annual housing growth more than doubled its population growth and in the 
early 2000s the city grew an average of 10 acres (4 hectares) a day. During this decade, 
INFONAVIT granted around 30,000 housing credits a year (INFONAVIT delegate 2016: 
personal interview).   
Given its size and economic importance, Tijuana’s local government is also 
relatively strong when compared to other Mexican municipalities, although the private 
sector has considerable influence in development matters in the city and state. Notably, the 
city opened one of the first metropolitan governing institutions (IMPLAN) in the country. 
Nonetheless, the local government also faces important revenue and service and 
infrastructure provision challenges, most notably related to water access. Furthermore, only 
38 percent of its income came from its own revenue sources (property taxes and service 
provision) in the 2000s. Furthermore, compared to past decades and other major Mexican 
cities, Tijuana is losing its competitive advantage (IMCO 2011).  
Its proximity to the U.S. and the availability of a cheap labor force promoted the 
growth of the maquila industry in Tijuana, particularly during the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Yet, this employment boom arguably failed to provide stable, long-term and well-
paying jobs. Instead, over 62 percent of its economically active population is employed in 
the service sector. Furthermore, although it has an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent, 22.6 
percent of its population earns less than two minimum salaries (about 8.5 USD/day), a 
standard metric used to indicate a very low-income in Mexico. The 2008 economic crisis 
hit Tijuana and other border cities especially hard (ONU-Habitat 2016). Shortly thereafter, 
some of the largest housing developers in the country, with a strong presence in the region, 
started to experience financial troubles and left thousands of unfinished housing units in the 







3.3.2 Huehuetoca, Estado de Mexico 
The state of Mexico had the largest number of vacant housing units in the country in 
2010 (11 percent of the national share), received the second largest amount of housing 
finance for new construction from 2000 to 2010 (9.2 percent of the national share), and had 
the third highest number of households enduring poor housing conditions. Since the 1980s, 
97 percent of the population growth in Mexico City’s metropolitan region has occurred in 
this state; during this time, the metropolis expanded its territory 3.6 times. In the 2000s, the 
annual housing growth rate of the metropolitan region was of 5.4 percent, whereas its 
annual population growth was only 2.2 percent. Most of the Mexico City metropolitan 
area’s housing growth occurred in the State of Mexico in a sprawling and unplanned 
manner. Services and infrastructure have generally been particularly deficient in the state of 
Mexico. In terms of public transit in the region (subway, light rail and BRT systems), for 
instance, 83 percent of the coverage is found in Mexico City and only 17 percent in the 
state of Mexico. Yet, 56 percent of the metropolitan population lives in an area that is 4 
times bigger than that of Mexico City (Medina Ramírez 2017).  
Although the Mexican president and former governor of the state of Mexico, 
Enrique Peña Nieto, has recently criticized the housing policy of his presidential 
predecessors, his own state policy at the time was very much aligned to theirs. During his 
administration (2005-2011), he launched a project called Bicentennial Cities that included 
six largely rural municipalities32 in the state to promote the modernization of their real 
estate and construction industries. These municipalities were chosen for their strategic 
location surrounding the Mexico City and Toluca metropolitan regions, and their proximity 
                                                          






to national highways that connect the country from east to west. This project was presented 
in a series of comprehensive development plans, with economic and infrastructure 
components. Yet, when offered cheap and vast amounts of land, some of the country’s 
major developers built dormitory suburbs for low-income residents. Although they were 
arguably envisioned as self-sustaining satellite cities, today they face several issues 
regarding mobility, service access, economic development and housing vacancy and 
abandonment. Housing construction in these municipalities has slowed down but continues, 
particularly in areas that have been able to attract some industry (Villamil 2010, Alcántara 
2013).  
One of these municipalities – Huehuetoca (45 percent vacancy rate) – experienced 
very significant housing development in the 2000s and is located on the northern portion of 
Mexico City’s metropolitan region. It was selected for further local-level analysis. In the 
2000s, Huehuetoca experienced the highest population and housing growth rates in the 
metropolitan region, 10 and 20.8 percent, respectively, through the development of large 
housing complexes on previously agricultural lands. During the 2000s, Huehuetoca’s 
population grew from 38,458 inhabitants to 110,02333 and its housing stock from 7,958 to 
52,841. Currently, the municipality has 33 housing developments and 85 thousand 
authorized housing units. Some of these new lower-middle income housing developments 
have high concentrations of vacant and abandoned housing (Huehuetoca Urban 
Development official 2016: personal interview). 
Given their small size and economic performance, municipal governments like 
Huehuetoca tend to have very limited resources and a weak institutional capacity. 
Furthermore, metropolitan governance is highly fragmented with different regional plans 
                                                          






drafted by Mexico City and the state of Mexico. Yet, for its size, Huehuetoca has a 
relatively high 40 percentage of its budget stemming from its own income (IMCO 2011). 
Of its economically active population, 57.8 percent works in the service sector, 34 in the 
manufacturing sector, and 5.7 percent in the primary sector (e.g. agriculture). 
Economically, however, the municipality is strongly dependent on employment from 
Mexico City and the urban agglomeration of Tula-Tepeji in the state of Hidalgo. This 
increases commuting times and expenses considerably for many residents. Housing 
development also produced very significant land use changes in this municipality, as well 
as changes in the local economy, which only a few years ago was primarily based on 
farming. While the unemployment rate in Huehuetoca is only 4.9 percent, almost 32 
percent of the population earns less than two minimum salaries (ONU-Habitat 2016b). 
 
The three graphs below (Figures 3.8-3.10) paint a very interesting picture. Particularly at 
the national and state levels, population growth rates were not the drivers of the impressive 
upticks in housing growth since around the turn of the millennium. Thus, this 
unprecedented housing push was not sustainable, although Huehuetoca has sustained it 
somewhat longer than Tijuana. These contrasts support the case for studying the housing 
and development patterns of such different municipalities. Although their different sizes 
and natures make their analytical assessment complex, their analysis will yield a richer 
level of understanding of how higher level housing and development policies operate in 
diverse local and sociopolitical settings. While studying Baja California and Tijuana allows 
understanding of a case paralleling national trends, the Huehuetoca case allows for more 






would not be feasible, both in terms of data availability and institutional complexity in the 
Mexican context.34 
 The main objective of this research is to analyze the influence of various public and 
private agents, at different levels, on housing development, access, and vacancy since the 
implementation of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. In parallel, it examines some of the 
socioeconomic implications for low and middle-income residents, government and 
financing institutions, and developers, as well as their more recent social and institutional 
responses. Thus, the present study intends to fill an important gap in the understanding of 
the relationship between market-driven housing policies and their implications at the local 
level, particularly as they have manifested in the Mexican context. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: National Population and Housing Growth Rates. 
                                                          


















Figure 3.9: Tijuana and Baja California Population and Housing Growth Rates. 
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Chapter 4: Housing Finance and Credit Expansion in Mexico’s 
Neoliberal Era 
 
This chapter discusses a major shift in Mexico’s housing policy and development model. 
Starting in the 1990s, the national government, driven largely by macroeconomic forces, 
implemented a series of neoliberal housing reforms to promote credit liberalization and 
mortgage expansion. These policies accelerated housing production and facilitated the rise 
of private capital and development companies. Yet, this new housing remained inaccessible 
to very low-income, informal and rural populations, typically enduring the most detrimental 
living conditions. Furthermore, despite parallel decentralization efforts, local governments 
had very limited fiscal and institutional capacity to manage new housing development, 
which lead to the construction of poor quality housing in remote areas with limited access 
to adequate infrastructure and services. Similarly, housing development occurred with no 
civic involvement or consultation. The largest housing developers in the country eventually 
faced significant financial troubles due to leverage issues and a supply-demand imbalance, 
among other issues. The following chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the significant 
implications that arose at different scales due to this latter downturn. I first introduce the 
chapter’s main themes, which are then discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. 
As a product of economic crises and the Washington Consensus, housing reforms in 
the 1990s and early 2000s sought to restrict public involvement in housing production and 
liberalize Mexico’s housing market. Since 1972, when INFONAVIT was founded, the 
institute was directly involved in housing construction and development.35 Yet, in 1990 
INFONAVIT began its transformation into a fiscally autonomous mortgage agency, 
                                                          







primarily to finance the purchase of new dwellings.36 To improve efficiency and increase 
its returns on investment, the institute passed its management to professionals recruited 
from the financial sector, established more rigid sanctions against delinquent mortgages, 
increased its lending volume, and instituted longer loan terms, higher credit caps and 
interest rates indexed to inflation (Coulomb and Schteingart 2006).  
Additional reforms fostered the expansion of the private construction and real estate 
industries, which had suffered during the 1994 crisis when banks ceased lending, by 
facilitating access to loans for participating developers, offering construction loans 
connected to mortgages, and assisting builders with state and local permitting processes as 
well as with land acquisition. The communal ejido tenure system, created during the 
Mexican revolution with the purpose of land redistribution, was also dissolved to allow for 
the privatization and development of rural land surrounding Mexican cities. International 
institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, along with the 
federal governments of the 1990s and 2000s, argued that liberalization and credit 
expansion, as well as mass and private housing production would help Mexico address its 
extreme housing shortages (IMF 2008). 
INFONAVIT became the largest housing finance institution in the country and 
drove a significant acceleration in housing production. Despite the 1994 economic crisis, 
the institute more than doubled the number of mortgages it granted per year during the 
1990s and then again in the 2000s.37 In 2001, when Victor Manuel Borrás Setién became 
INFONAVIT’s managing director, the institute started to allow workers who earned more 
                                                          
36 Nonetheless, INFONAVIT took it upon itself to develop and, in theory, implement dwelling construction 
rules and building codes. 
37 From under 90 thousand in 1990, to 250 thousand in 2000. During this decade, this number continued to 






than four minimum salaries38 to obtain mortgages with private banks or Sofoles39 while 
using their INFONAVIT savings as financial guarantee. In 2004, INFONAVIT also entered 
the stock market to expand its income sources and launched co-financing mechanisms with 
numerous financial entities.40 By 2005, about 10 percent of INFONAVIT mortgages were 
co-financed with 16 Sofoles and 6 banks, a percentage that doubled by 2010 (INFONAVIT 
2017).  
 Prior to these reforms, most Mexican households built their homes through 
incremental and informal processes using their own resources. By 2005, however, a 
majority of households bought homes built by private developers through mortgages 
financed by INFONAVIT, along with other financing institutions (OECD 2015), and in 
2011, INFONAVIT reported that 22 percent of Mexicans lived in a house financed by them 
(INFONAVIT 2017). Yet, although there was a definite housing boom in the 2000s, only 
around 20 to 30 percent of Mexicans are mortgage-eligible and around a third of Mexican 
households still live in poor housing conditions (UN-Habitat 2011; SHF 2015).41 
Furthermore, while there is increasing consensus that a majority of the detrimental housing 
conditions in Mexico could be addressed through rehabilitation, in the 2000s over 92 
percent of INFONAVIT mortgages went to new construction (Eibenschutz and Goya 
Escobedo, 2009; SHF 2011; IDB, 2011 Ponce Sernicharo 2011; Ward et al., 2015).  
                                                          
38 Lower-middle income and above. A minimum salary in 2001 was around 40 MxP a day. 
39 Financing institutions that specialized in single-purpose lending and raised funds through capital markets,  
40 This allowed INFONAVIT to collect over 50 million MxP by 2010 from foreign investment to finance over 
260 thousand mortgages. Hipotecaria nacional, Su Casita, Patrimonio, Metrofinanciera, Banorte, Scotiabank, 
BBVA Bancomer, Santander, Hipotecaria Crédito y Casa, e ING Hipotecaria were among the most prominent 
partners (INFONAVIT 2017). 
41 Officially, housing shortages are defined as the number and/or percentage of households living in 
overcrowded conditions or on very poor quality housing. Overcrowding is defined as more than 2.5 
inhabitants per room. Poor quality housing includes that which does not have sewage, or is built with 
precarious materials: waste, cardboard, perishable/untreated wood, palm leaves, mud, metal sheets, asbestos, 






Additionally, while INFONAVIT collects funds through mandatory contributions 
from formal private sector workers, developers had the most power to guide housing 
development (Eibenschutz and Goya Escobedo 2009; Isunza Vizuet and Méndez Bahena 
2011). Particularly in the 2000s, homebuyers had to conform to the supply of developers 
who saw in the investment capital of INFONAVIT their main client and partner. This 
allowed the private sector to focus on production levels rather than the quality of their 
product, and seeking to maximize profits, to develop housing in urban peripheries where 
land was cheap.  
Many state governments also frequently backed development projects aligned with 
their economic development plans – even when they imposed severe fiscal burdens on local 
governments and limited residents’ access to jobs, amenities, infrastructure and services. 
Although the decentralization of government functions was also an important feature of 
neoliberal reforms in Mexico, local governments have generally lacked the resources and 
capabilities to plan and regulate housing and urban development. During the housing boom, 
short-term administrations and weak finances gave municipal governments little 
negotiating power in front of large developers with, in many instances, a larger institutional 
capacity.  
While in the 2000s Mexico’s housing market was seen as an attractive investment 
for private equity funds eager to capitalize on the returns associated with the inexpensive 
housing sector, an overdependence on debt and speculative real estate practices eventually 
became signs of alarm for investors (BMI 2011; Soederberg 2015).42 In 2014, 
INFONAVIT cut almost in half the amount of mortgages granted with respect to the 
                                                          







previous year (INFONAVIT 2017). Developers saw this and densification strategies at the 
federal level (which devalued their peri-urban territorial reserves) as pivotal factors in the 
weakening of the construction sector.43 By 2014, three of the six major housing developers 
saw their market value reduced between 30 and 40 times and a crisis in the housing sector 
detonated their debt 667 percent with respect to their best trimesters in 2007 and 2008. 
ARA, which survived the crisis, has declared that around 2010 it recognized that the market 
had changed so it adjusted its products and entered new markets.44 When some companies 
faced bankruptcy, they were unable to pay millions of Mexican pesos in infrastructure and 
service fees to municipal governments. Furthermore, some developments were also left 
partially unfinished or occupied and residents were left in a legal limbo in which neither 
developers nor local governments were made responsible for their living situation (SHF 
2012; Alcántara 2014; Arteaga 2015; Chávez et al. 2015; Valle 2015). 
 
4.1 EL TREN DE VIVIENDA: MEXICO’S NEW HOUSING MODEL AND THE POLITICS OF 
HOUSING PRODUCTION 
Housing construction still constitutes one of the most important economic activities in 
Mexico and government officials and business leaders continue to envision housing 
production as a chief economic engine for the country. An INFONAVIT delegate from 
Baja California (2016) asserts that “housing [construction] impacts dozens of economic 
sectors, so it is not up for discussion, it is necessary to keep fomenting housing 
                                                          
43 Demand also fell significantly around this time, particularly in regions that had previously experienced 
housing booms, such as Baja California and the state of Mexico. With a lag of a couple of years, the 2008 
subprime crisis affected Mexico’s housing sector at a rate 2.4 times greater than the rest of the economy. This 
also generated uncertainty among investors and liquidity shortfalls (SHF 2012, 2014). 
44 During the 2000s, the six major developers dominated over 50 percent of the market. Currently, a larger 







production”. This was particularly the mindset in the 2000s, when production expanded 
very quickly and around 7 million units were built. INFONAVIT played a key role in the 
acceleration of housing production through its expansion of mortgage lending. 
INFONAVIT was able to provide a continuous stream of housing finance based largely on 
a compulsory 5 percent payroll tax on affiliated formal workers, loan payments and 
interests on financial products (Figure 4.1). This effectively shifted much of the risk of new 
construction away from housing developers.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: INFONAVIT’s Financing Scheme. 
Graphic by the author. 
Furthermore, Sofoles, non-depository financial institutions that raise funds through 
capital markets (e.g. pension funds) rather than people’s savings and specialize in single-
purpose lending, were also created in the 1990s to expand mortgage and construction 
lending through bridge loans and securitized mortgages, among other financial products. 






accelerating the scale and pace of housing development (Figures 4.2 & 4.3). Although by 
2013 Sofoles were extinct, a select number of real-estate companies grew significantly and 
very rapidly as a result of this investment.45 
 
 
Figure 4.2: INFONAVIT Mortgage Securities per Year (in Millions of 2014 MxP). 
Graphic by the Author. Source: SHF 2015. 
 
                                                          
45 Since the 1990s, Sofoles and INFONAVIT have granted about three quarters of the mortgages in Mexico. 


















Figure 4.3: Mortgage Securities by Sofoles & Sofomes (in 2011 MxP). 
Graphic by the Author. Source: Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV). 
 
4.1.1 INFONAVIT Steers the Way through Mortgage Expansion 
Housing reforms and mortgage expansion were based largely on recommendations from 
international institutions who had an amplified voice in the policies of debtor countries. 
With the advent of the 1982 debt crisis, the ‘Washington Consensus’ established that only 
through the application of neoliberal policies could ‘Third World’ countries overcome their 
development challenges. Thus, a number of Latin American countries, including Mexico, 
shifted from a policy framework of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) to a 
neoliberal one with an emphasis on market-led growth and private as opposed to public 
means of production. The opening of markets, the privatization of state enterprises, and the 
reduction of the state’s directive role in the economy was pursued with strong guidance 
from global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 













In Mexico, this neoliberal turn was consolidated and deepened with the signing of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Scholars have focused on 
the impact of this agreement on labor markets, where informal employment has expanded 
as formal industrial and public employment declined. Since then, the Mexican government 
has had to walk a fine line between appealing to international investors while practicing 
brokerage politics at home by implementing popular and politically necessary programs. 
Yet, even with the continuous expansion of domestic debt, economic restructuring placed a 
significant strain on social programs. In addition, recurring crises and a decline in real 
wages eroded the capacity of individuals to access goods and services, such as adequate 
housing (Portes and Roberts 2005; Pérez Sáinz 2005; Ward 2005). 
The shift away from state-led housing production also had the effect of transforming 
INFONAVIT and other housing institutions into mortgage providers to promote private 
production. Before, INFONAVIT, along with labor unions and other government agencies, 
had a more direct involvement in the construction and placement of housing. Reforms, 
however, transformed this and other housing institutes into autonomous financing 
institutions with the chief goal of earning returns on investment. Although labor union 
leaders and government officials are still part of the governing structure of INFONAVIT, 
private organizations, such as housing chambers composed largely of housing developers, 
became a central part of the institutional framework as well (Figure 4.4). Efficiency was 
sought by reducing subsidies, instituting higher loan caps and interest rates indexed to 
inflation, and ensuring the payment of loans that had become delinquent. In the early 2000s 
reforms continued to ‘modernize’ INFONAVIT by passing its management to professionals 
recruited from the financial sector with the ultimate goal of significantly increasing its 








Figure 4.4: INFONAVIT’s Institutional Framework. 
Graphic by the author. 
Reforms also fostered the expansion of the private construction industry, which had 
suffered during the 1994 crisis when banks ceased lending. They facilitated access to loans 
for participating developers, offered construction loans connected to mortgages, and 
assisted builders with state and local permitting processes and land acquisition. An 
additional and relevant reform was the legalization of the privatization of land governed by 
the communal ejido tenure system created during the Mexican revolution with the purpose 
of redistribution, and where a large share of housing has been built over the last couple of 
decades. Overall, the reforms to INFONAVIT and Mexican housing policy46 should be 
                                                          
46 Although INFONAVIT is the largest and most important housing finance institution in Mexico, others 
merit mention. FOVISSSTE provides loans for government employees. CFE and PEMEX, the two largest 
state-controlled companies, also offer housing finance for employees. A National Fund for Popular Housing, 
FONHAPO, provides a small amount of subsidized loans for low-income households, largely in rural settings. 
Importantly, the SHF (Federal Mortgage Association), is a trust fund of the Central Bank of Mexico which 
provides loans for social interest housing with the primary goal of developing a secondary mortgage Market, 






understood as part of broader governmental reforms following market notions, such as the 
reduction of state intervention and regulation (Coulomb and Schteingart 2006; IMF 2008).  
Over the last decade or so, the private sector has considerably increased its role in 
housing finance, and developers have had substantial leverage to influence housing and 
urban development in the country. Yet, and particularly since 2000, INFONAVIT has come 
to be regarded as a central agent guiding Mexico’s housing development and policies. This 
has been possible due to its financial capacity, stemming largely from workers’ 
contributions, and resulting stability (PROVIVE 2016: personal interview).47 Mortgages 
issued by INFONAVIT jumped from 70 thousand a year in the 1980s to over 200 thousand 
in 2001, over 400 thousand by 2006 and peaked at almost half a million in 2008. From 
1998 to 2014, INFONAVIT thus granted around 5.4 million housing mortgages (Eulich 
2013; INFONAVIT 2014).  
INFONAVIT expanded mortgage lending, along with parallel agencies, for first-
time buyers with modest incomes and little savings, a sector that had been seen as too risky 
before by private banks. Although the INFONAVIT is increasingly serving higher income 
households, since the late 1990s about three quarters of INFONAVIT mortgages have been 
granted to lower-middle households earning between two and seven minimum salaries. 
Thus, although housing finance has remained inaccessible to many, and particularly to very 
low-income, informal and rural populations, INFONAVIT opened up the Mexican 
mortgage market and allowed others to envision in it an attractive investment opportunity. 
                                                          
Bank, U.S. non-bank financial institutions and Canadian investment societies; they were intended to 
increasingly obtain funds through mortgage-backed securities traded on the Mexican stock exchange, but after 
the global financial crisis Sofoles collapsed. 
47 INFONAVIT’s income is composed almost in 60 percent by worker contributions, in over 37 percent by 
loan recovery (principal and interest payments on mortgages), and only in about 2 percent by financial 






Global investors, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, Wall 
Street investment banks and U.S. pension funds also poured billions of dollars into 
Mexico’s housing sector.48 This investment and a pipeline of pre-qualified customers gave 
developers a magnificent business opportunity to build and sell homes. The largest 
developers in the country thus eventually “claimed to have perfected the mass production 
of affordable housing priced from $15,000 to $35,000. Executives boasted that construction 
crews could put up an entire house in one day” (Marosi 2017).  
INFONAVIT is Mexico’s most prominent housing agency, accompanied at a much 
smaller scale by FOVISSSTE, which serves public employees. Thus, as can be seen on 
Figure 4.5, INFONAVIT increased its housing investment quite significantly since the 
1990s. Other financial institutions followed but with a lag of several years and are just 
starting to converge. It is important to note that most of these financial institutions belong, 
strictly speaking, to the private sector, but that Mexico’s central bank also created a trust 
fund, the Federal Mortgage Association, which has accounted for more than half of the 
housing finance coming from this sector.49 Although federal subsidies have increased a bit 
since the late 2000s, their contribution to housing finance and that of other state agencies 
remains marginal. 
 
                                                          
48 To augment public efforts, the WB and the IDB invested close to $3 billion USD in Mexican housing, 
providing funds for the country’s development bank and taking equity stakes in mortgage lenders and 
construction companies (Marosi 2017). 







Figure 4.5: National Housing Finance per Sector (MxP). 50 
Graphic by the author. Source: SNIIV. 
There are some regional variations that are worth mentioning, particularly relating 
to the areas that experienced notable housing booms. There are evidently both similarities 
and differences, but interesting shifts occur particularly at smaller scales. If we look at the 
State of Mexico, for instance, we observe a relatively similar growth in housing finance that 
started with national agencies, of which the most prominent is INFONAVIT, and was 
followed by other financial institutions (Figure 4.6). Yet, the same is not true of 
municipalities within the state that have experienced some of the most significant housing 
construction, such as Huehuetoca. As can be seen on Figure 4.7, almost the totality of the 
housing finance increase in this municipality has come from national agencies. In 2010, for 
instance, at the peak of housing finance in Huehuetoca, INFONAVIT granted over 77 
                                                          
50 As outlined in the text, National Agencies include INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE whereas financial 
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percent of the housing finance in the municipality. FOVISSSTE was second place with 
almost 21 percent, which is also a relatively high percent in comparison to the rest of the 
country. Perhaps given the low economic productivity of Huehuetoca, local government 
employees compose a significant segment of the economically active population. 
INFONAVIT financing most likely corresponds to workers from other parts of Mexico 
City’s metropolitan region purchasing affordable housing in this peripheral municipality. 
Lastly, it is also notable that although the increase in housing finance did stagnate at the 
national level after 2010, both the State of Mexico and Huehuetoca saw a more precipitous 
decline in housing finance.  
In the case of Tijuana, Baja California, both at the local and state levels, financing 
institutions increased their participation in the housing sector quite significantly in the early 
2000s. Yet, they were not able to sustain it in the latter part of the decade and are just now 
getting closer to the housing finance provided by national agencies such as INFONAVIT. 
Border towns and states tend to be much more susceptible to global economic booms and 
boosts and are particularly affected by U.S. economic trends such as the 2008 financial 
crisis. Across the board, the interplay between INFONAVIT and other financial institutions 
is evident, and in the latter example, we can see almost mirroring behaviors between 
national agencies and financial institutions. This again points to the economic stabilizer 









Figure 4.6: Housing Finance per Sector in the State of Mexico (MxP). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Housing Finance per Sector in Huehuetoca, State of Mexico (MxP). 
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Figure 4.8: Housing Finance per Sector in Baja California (MxP). 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Housing Finance per Sector in Tijuana, Baja California (MxP). 
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4.1.2 State Governments’ Support and Incentives  
In Mexico, state governments are generally in charge of drafting urban development laws, 
comprehensive plans, and guidelines to provide technical support to local or municipal 
governments as they determine future infrastructure and service needs and the 
environmental impacts of projected development. Housing institutes also generally exist at 
the state level, although they generally have very limited resources to promote housing 
production. Furthermore, in most instances, these institutes focus mostly on regularizing 
informal settlements and granting housing tenure to residents of these settlements 
 The analysis of the politics and practices of state governments on development 
matters sheds light on the incentives and support they generally provide to the private 
sector and to private actors and interests, as has been the case in both of the case studies 
examined in this research. Baja California’s geographical and historic isolation and 
confrontation with the federal government led to the establishment of a right wing and pro-
development government since the 1990s, when the Partido Acción Nacional (National 
Action Party - PAN) won the state elections. In subsequent years, the state experienced a 
significant development boom and a state housing council was formed with the active 
participation of the private sector, the governor, and various public entities, such as the 
ministries of finance, infrastructure and urban development.  
These public institutions began promoting key infrastructure projects, such as the 
Tijuana-Rosarito 2000 freeway to expand access to undeveloped land, and water 
infrastructure projects to serve new peri-urban areas. Public-private negotiations also led to 
the divestment of government land for the private sector to produce low and middle-income 
housing projects. In addition, governors have been very active in lobbying for federal 






INFONAVIT credits, particularly during the 2000s housing boom, when the federal 
administrations were also from the PAN. Most of these credits went to its two biggest 
cities, Tijuana and Mexicali – particularly the former.  
 Similarly, the government of the State of Mexico played a very important role in the 
housing boom of the 2000s. A chief urban development strategy during the administration 
(2005-2011) of then governor and now president of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, was the 
promotion of development in designated Ciudades Bicentenario (Bicentennial Cities). This 
effort included six largely rural municipalities in the State of Mexico chosen for their 
strategic location on the edges of Mexico City and Toluca metropolitan regions, and their 
proximity to national highways which connect the country from east to west. Development 
plans incorporated economic and infrastructure components and proposed the construction 
of half a million homes by 2020 (Table 4.1). The main developers involved were GEO, 
ARA, SADASI, URBI, Hogares Unión and SARE, and the most important finance sources 
for construction were the Inter-American Development bank and the federal government 
through its program for Sustainable Urban Developments, or DUIS (for its acronym in 
Spanish). The financial sector, both banks and non-depository Sofoles were also central 
























Tecámac 6,095 87,700 155,300   
Huehuetoca* 4,203 30,800 104,100 132,000 447,700 
Zumpango 7,832 47,500 111,000   
Jilotepec 6,018 20,200 26,600   
Almoloya de Juárez 4,518 37,800 58,600   
Atlacomulco 2,787 24,200 38,400   
Total 31,453 248,200 494,000   
* Special focus of study     
Table 4.1: Growth Projections of Ciudades Bicentenario. 
Source: Espinosa Castillo 2014. 
Through this initiative, the state government sought to attract private investment by 
ensuring land use and development certainty through intergovernmental coordination and 
facilitation in the provision of construction permits, fiscal incentives, and public 
infrastructure investment. The hope was that the private sector would then continue to 
purchase land to develop more housing, industry, commerce and other services. Although 
these projects were envisioned as self-sustaining satellite cities, they were ultimately 
developed as dormitory suburbs for low-income residents. Some infrastructure projects also 
never materialized, such as light rail and other transportation and highway nodes that would 
connect these areas (Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano del Estado de México 2007 & 2008; 
Alcántara 2014). 
An important issue during the development of Ciudades Bicentenario was also the 
possibly corrupt behavior of a number public officials. Perhaps the most emblematic case 
was that of Marcela Velasco, Secretary of Urban Development when Peña Nieto was 
governor. She was accused by several social organizations of covering up for URBI, one of 






Tecámac. URBI was accused of installing low quality water pipes, which led to water 
leaks, damage, and shortages. Allegedly, they also did not comply with state codes that 
mandate the construction of sewage and water catchment infrastructure for large 
development projects. Additionally, residents have endured construction or structural issues 
within their homes, flooding, and constant blackouts. This has likely been made worse by 
the passage of a state law in 2002, when Arturo Montiel Rojas was governor, that promoted 
incremental development by allowing developers to sell housing units before the entire 
development was complete and before service provision was secured (Pensamiento 2010; 
Eulich 2013). Notably, the State of Mexico is one of the few states in the country that has 
only been governed by the PRI, or Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Thus, although 
civic society in the state, similar to the Mexico City context, has a strong history of 
organizing, it has remained largely unable to affect change locally in the face of its weak 
democratic context.   
 
4.1.3 Local and Intergovernmental Crises 
Reforms in the early 1990s were also intended to push for the decentralization of 
government to make it less bureaucratic and more democratic and efficient. In 1993, the 
Mexican Constitution was amended to allow local governments to define how to use their 
resources and plan their development, among other capabilities. Article 115 was drafted as 
an amendment to the General Law of Human Settlements to give municipal governments 
the power to guide urban development. Specifically concerning housing development, local 
governments are thus responsible for assessing its feasibility, primarily in terms of 
infrastructure and service provision. Yet, although their responsibilities have increased, 






facto, local governments have had limited capacity and resources to effectively draft, 
implement and regulate their plans and programs.51  
The housing boom of the 2000s, therefore, made it very hard for most Mexican 
cities to manage urban development. Although this was also true at the state level in many 
instances, local development plans and construction regulations, among other norms and 
documents, were commonly out of date and obsolete. Furthermore, the short 3-year period 
of office for local administrations created a disincentive for long-term planning and overall 
accountability. Many local governments, for instance, were compelled to attract housing 
investment and development without fully assessing future service and infrastructure needs 
and costs. Thus, they have routinely fallen short on construction and development oversight 
tasks, which has resulted in the careless execution of development projects and poor 
construction quality standards. Some ‘formal’ housing has even been developed on 
environmentally sensitive or structurally compromised areas (SHF 2013; WRI 2016: 
personal interview; Urbano 2017). 
A significant issue has also been the unsustainability of local government finance 
given their insufficient revenue streams, based largely on their limited collection capacities. 
The property tax is one of the main instruments that local governments have to strengthen 
their finances. Yet, Mexican municipalities generally hold very poor property tax collection 
records – making them even less capable of fulfilling their responsibilities.52 The Urban 
                                                          
51 During the first half of the 2000s, only about 3 percent of the national budget was distributed to municipal 
budgets. Furthermore, in 2007 (SHF) less than half of urban municipalities had zoning and land use 
regulations.  
52 On average, in OCDE countries property taxes contribute in 3.9 percent to the GDP of their nations, 
compared to 0.2 percent in Mexico. Only about a third of the municipalities in the country collect more than 
60 percent of the property tax they should. Some of the main issues that enable this poor record are the 
absence of sanctions and cadastral updates, private tax evasion, technological lags in the collection systems, 
and tax exemptions to private activities, such as mining, airports, seaports, and railway terminals, along with 






Development director of the State of Mexico (2016) claims that municipal governments 
“base their finances on state and federal contributions that barely cover their administrative 
expenses and do not allow them to adequately provide, improve or expand services”. 
During the 2000s, property taxes collected by most municipalities constituted less than 40 
percent of their budget. In the municipality of Tijuana, property tax collection constituted 
only 16.8 percentage of its budget during the second half of that decade. In the same state 
of Baja California, its capital, Mexicali, went bankrupt in 2017 and yet still decided to 
forgive a portion of the municipality’s property tax debt. While this will benefit some 
residents, this has been criticized as a political and financially unsustainable decision in the 
long-term for the municipality (Morales 2011; Hernández 2017; Cuéllar 2017).  
Particularly during the 2000s housing boom, construction permits therefore 
constituted the bulk of municipal revenue.53 This has allowed large developers with 
significant lobbying capacity to bend and modify land uses and development rules or even 
directly draft or finance urban development plans and projects. A former IMPLAN 
(Municipal Planning Institute) official from Tijuana (2016) narrates how developers have 
been  
“very involved in developing urban development plans and programs. One of the 
first programs they financed, which then became a common practice, was the 
Programa de Crecimiento Urbano de Rosario, which included all of the Santa Fe 
area. Private consultants Carlos Mora and Daniel Rubio, one of whom later became 
the IMPLAN’s director, drafted that program. They also financed the Programa de 
Mejoramiento Urbano de Valle de las Palmas, a DUIS, and Ciudad Natura, among 
other DUIS… Nowadays the private sector has the most influence through its 
associations such as CANADEVI, CANACINTRA, professional associations, you 
just have to look at who makes up the governing board of directors, there’s a couple 
                                                          






of scholars and representatives of other guilds, but mostly it’s just developers, 
construction chambers and similar groups that can influence and change things to 
their convenience. Workers only have the power to choose their living situation 
according to their salaries.”54 
Furthermore, development companies are often larger and have more institutional capacity 
than small local governments. Land use changes, for instance, commonly respond to impact 
analysis performed by the private sector. Similarly, developers were able to influence local 
legislation to build houses as small as 26 square meters (INFONAVIT delegate 2016: 
personal interview).  
 Lacking their own resources and under pressure from development interests, local 
governments have frequently engaged in practices that, at the very least, have exhibited 
significant conflicts of interest and distorted development processes. Large and established 
developers, for instance, tend to have close relationships with local authorities. This often 
inhibits competition and the participation of smaller or new development and construction 
companies. Perhaps more worrisome is that in 2015 municipalities in Mexico had 
accumulated 215 thousand 456 million MxP in spending they could not justify, of which a 
major area of concern has been infrastructure spending. Recurring inconsistencies come up 
in this department year after year and across municipalities (Paladin 2016, SEDATU 
official 2016: personal interviews).   
Conflicts of interest and financial improprieties have been noted and challenged by 
civic organizations. Residents in Tecámac, State of Mexico, for instance, recently initiated 
a lawsuit against one of their former majors, Aarón Urbina, for holding a public act in the 
                                                          
54 CANADEVI: Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Desarrollo y Promoción de Vivienda (National Chamber 
of the Housing Development and Promotion Industry). 







2000s in which he falsely claimed that a number of housing development projects had been 
finished and that a 30 million MxP guarantee had been received by the municipality as 
construction insurance of urban infrastructure projects. However, the development had not 
been finished and the electric, water and sewage installation had not been completed in 
these developments (Méndez et al. 2017).  
The Director of Urban Development in Huehuetoca (2016), State of Mexico, 
another Ciudad Bicentenario, argues that local administrations rarely follow plans or have a 
long-term vision and that they even commit legal transgressions.  
“Real estate companies did not fulfill their obligations, public authorities showed no 
commitment, we are still building housing units and do not have a prompt solution, 
and we are drowning… The private sector always seeks to invest little and win a lot, 
and housing was a profitable business... Once the state government gave the OK to a 
development project we really could not deny them the permits, but these problems 
came back to us, by accepting deficient infrastructure projects, for instance, we had 
to then repair them or fund their upkeep… There are developers that do the 
feasibility studies and we just sign them.”  
In Baja California, Governor Francisco Vega de Lamadrid, started his career in the 
private sector and then moved into politics in the 1990s as the director of the state’s 
housing institute. He then became Mayor of Tijuana in 1998, at which time he 
unincorporated public lands that were then sold to family members or associates. These 
lands also appreciated significantly afterwards. In addition, he promoted the construction of 
a road where he later built a private residential complex. This exemplifies the recurring 
level of impunity of elected officials acting to enrich themselves and their private partners 






Although reformers hoped that decentralization would come with greater 
coordination among localities and regional governance, this has not happened. 
Intergovernmental and institutional cooperation has proven a difficult task, contingent on 
administrative priorities, political alignments and electoral cycles. In 2011, only 40 percent 
of the 400 most important municipalities in Mexico had some type of agreement with state 
or other municipal governments in relation to urban affairs, of which only half had more 
than one agreement (IMCO 2011). This has led to the lack of articulation between different 
local governments in a variety of matters, such as water and public transportation systems, 
among other important infrastructure and services. An important attempt to address these 
issues has been the creation of IMPLANs (Municipal Planning Institutes), to promote 
metropolitan coordination. Tijuana actually had one of the first IMPLANs in the country. 
Yet, it has proved to be a weak institution often influenced by politics, rather than the 
autonomous agency that it was set up to be. The division of special projects, for instance, is 
informally nicknamed the ‘bomberazos’ unit, slang for last minute urgent projects pushed 
forward by the municipal president. A prominent example of this was the vigorous 
promotion of the satellite city Valle de las Palmas around 2000 (Former IMPLAN official 
2016: personal interview). 
In larger and more fragmented metropolitan regions, multi-level governance is even 
more difficult and complex. The most extreme example of this is the Mexico City 
metropolitan region composed of dozens of municipalities and three different state 
governments. Multiple (non-binding) comprehensive plans have been drafted for this 
metropolitan area, some by members of the academic community, as well as by different 
state governments to assess the major metropolitan issues and propose guidelines and 






adequately monitor government actions. Aside from water and waste management, the 
governments of Mexico City and the State of Mexico have virtually no collaboration on 
urban and housing development matters. Arguably, federal, state and local governments 
follow different legal frameworks for urban development that are not always aligned with 
each other, the Mexican Constitution, the General Law of Human Settlements, state 
constitutions, and municipal laws. They all aim to influence overlapping territories but very 
often have different priorities. On top of this, each government level houses ministries and 
offices with conflicting interests that draft different plans and programs (Urban 
Development Ministry of the State of Mexico 2016: personal interview). 
 
4.2 THE MODEL CRUMBLES 
“Housing construction skyrocketed and these super big developers were born, Geo, Ara, 
Urbi, Homex, and they had an incredible bonanza period… They started building, building, 
building, and people buying, buying, buying, offhandedly, and frequently, it was not the 
right product for that person. In extreme cases, you arrived with your INFONAVIT credit 
to buy a house because you qualified and the developer would tell you: ‘I have this house 
for you, it is the one I have in production’, without considering the client’s needs, the size 
of its family, its income, the location. Clients adapted to the developers’ production 
systems. It got to a point where the three largest companies produced around 50 thousand 
units a year, each, they were listed in the Stock Exchange, they were the stars of the market, 
but then the system started to fail because it had structural issues. They had to produce 
more and more units and keep growing to give positive reports to their investors” (Paladin 







4.2.1 Questions of Supply and Demand 
Particularly in the 2000s, developers sought to produce at a scale commensurate with the 
number of INFONAVIT affiliated workers who qualify for a mortgage at a given moment. 
In a way, the client really has been INFONAVIT rather than residents and demand has 
conformed to the developers’ production system. As a former Tijuana IMPLAN official 
(2016) put it:  
“Developers produce housing of a certain price and for a certain income sector, but 
the client for them is INFONAVIT and the credits it will offer, they [developers] will 
compete to get those mortgages… INFONAVIT has a lot of weight in this, if it grants 
x number of credits, developers will produce x number of units, who cares if people 
will inhabit them or not… It did not matter if people had a house or not, production 
had nothing to do with the [housing] deficit, it was directed to people who were 
mortgage-eligible and had a formal job”.  
An official from the National Housing Commission also notes that “in some places, 
this mass production logic generated market distortions in terms of the supply and demand 
balance” (CONAVI official 2016: personal interview). We can see this clearly at the state 
level. In one extreme, we have the state of Oaxaca, which received 27.9 percent of the 
housing credits it would have required in 2007 to fulfill its housing demand, while Baja 
California received 184.9 percent of the credits its demand would have justified (SHF 
2007). Not surprisingly, and given that most of Baja California’s credits go to the city of 
Tijuana, this is one of the cities that is experiencing one of the highest vacancy rates in the 
country. These distortions have been fueled by a variety of factors. As previously noted, 
workers can only access an INFONAVIT loan if they are part of the formal sector, thus, 
eligible workers are concentrated in large and industrial cities. Furthermore, during the 
housing boom, many developers established a close relationship with INFONAVIT, a bond 






from the actual housing demand (SHF 2014). Similarly, good relationships between 
different government levels and INFONAVIT may have also influenced mortgage 
allocation. 
These practices have also proven to be problematic for homebuyers in a number of 
ways. First, while workers might qualify for a credit given the time they have been 
employed, their ability to pay a mortgage varies. This is because the income of 
INFONAVIT affiliated workers also varies widely, as do the mortgage terms of different 
homebuyers (INFONAVIT 2013). Even within the private sector it has been recognized 
that  
“while many more mortgages were being granted, to activate the economy, perhaps 
this was an abuse, and an oversupply of mortgages entered into conflict with a 
lagging economy, insufficient employment growth, inflation, economic crisis, and 
people started having issues paying their mortgages (CADENA 2016: personal 
interview). 
While INFONAVIT created a strong incentive for affiliated workers to make use of 
their line of credit, on the supply side there have also been a number of issues (SHF 2014). 
Although this will be more fully discussed in the next chapter, the location of these housing 
developments, their limited access to infrastructure and services, and the quality of housing 
have been problematic (CONAVI official 2016: personal interview). Small and formerly 
rural municipalities, such as Huehuetoca in the State of Mexico, for instance, had a 
relatively stable demand in the last decade in terms of people who qualified for an 
INFONAVIT mortgage. Yet, many more mortgages have been granted in this municipality 
over the years (Figure 4.10). Huehuetoca has thus become a peri-urban municipality of 








Figure 4.10: INFONAVIT Credits: Potential Demand & Supply in Huehuetoca. 
Graphic by the author. Source: SNIIV. 
 
4.2.2 Boom and Boost of Housing Developers 
The six major housing developers in Mexico (ARA, GEO, HOGAR, HOMEX, SARE & 
URBI) rose through the production of low and middle-income housing (Table 4.2). During 
the 2000s, these companies had a presence in almost 80 percent of the country and 
produced around 50 percent of the new national housing stock (SHF 2007).55 Most of them 
reached their peak between 2007 and 2008, when they were each selling around 50 
thousand units a year (Valle 2015). “Investors and construction executives reaped 
                                                          
55 ARA, GEO, SARE & URBI had presence in Baja California and ARA, GEO, HOMEX, SARE & URBI in 



















enormous profits, hailing themselves as ‘nation builders’ as they joined the rank of 
Mexico’s richest citizens” (Marosi 2017). 
 
  ARA GEO HOMEX SARE URBI 
Low-income (%) 43 68.5 87.7 21.6 91.6 
Middle-income (%) 57 31.5 12.3 78.4 8.4 
Total units sold 3,647 13,555 8,738 85 6,984 
Table 4.2: Developers’ Income by Housing Type & Units Sold in 2012. 
Source: Bloomberg 2012. 
Since 2008, however, three of the major housing developers in the country 
(HOMEX, URBI & GEO) started to see significant reductions in their market values 
(Figure 4.11 & Table 4.3).56 They eventually had to cease operations in 2013 and file for 
bankruptcy between 2014 and 2015. These companies exhibited significant leverage issues 
and started defaulting on loan obligations which forced them to restructure their debt and 
issue many of their shares to creditors. Compared to their peak in 2007, their debt in 2014 
was in average 667 percent higher. It has also been noted that companies funded through 
capital markets and that resorted to securitization eventually became more vulnerable 
(Bloomberg/Financiero 2015).57 The bankruptcy of some of these companies halted 
development projects and some were left unfinished. Their default also affected big banks, 
some of which had to make use of their reserves, and generated uncertainty among 
investors and liquidity shortfalls (González 2013). 
                                                          
56 As can be seen on the table below “Developers' Income by Housing Type and Units Sold in 2012”, these 
three companies have specialized more heavily on the production of low-income, rather than middle-income 
housing. 
57 The two main sources of financing for Mexico’s major developers during the housing boom was their 






GEO was the first to declare bankruptcy, but it was quickly followed by HOMEX 
and URBI. These industry titans blamed housing and urban development policy shifts as 
the source of their failure. They argued that a shift in government policy toward 
densification policies, favoring central locations, devalued much of their peri-urban 
territorial reserves and that institutional support for the flow of mortgages dwindled with 
the new federal administration.58 Yet, ARA executives, for instance, have claimed that they 
survived the crisis because they recognized that the market was changing and they adjusted 
their products to enter new markets (Valle 2015). Smaller and regional developers seemed 
more willing to adapt to new conditions, and have eventually been able to enter the market 
in a more competitive fashion (Arteaga 2015). 
“The largest housing developers in the country, several of which went bankrupt, did 
not evolve like the Mexican housing market was evolving. They continued 
purchasing territorial reserves farther and farther away from the urban cores, they 
did not pay attention to the need to produce different and better products, and to 
compete by producing quality housing in better located places and with value added. 
They failed, but the market opened to other intermediate and regional developers, 
such as VINTEL, ARA, and others in the north of the country, that were better at 
adapting to the conditions of the new market and the new incentives of 
INFONAVIT, CONAVI and SEDATU, and before it was created, SEDESOL” 
(WRI 2016: personal interview).59 
 
                                                          
58 The policy shift in fact surprised many actors in the construction sector, particularly given their previous 
ties with EPN. Further strategies, such as fiscal reforms, also took away fiscal stimulus previously used to 
activate the real estate market. 
59 CONAVI: Comisión Nacional de Vivienda (National Housing Commission). 
SEDATU: Secretaría de Desarrollo Agrario, Territorial y Urbano (Urban and Regional Development 
Ministry). 







Figure 4.11: Mexican Pesos per Share of Major Housing Developers. 
Graphic by the author. Bloomberg 2012. 
 
 
  ARA GEO HOGAR HOMEX SARE URBI HABITA 
2006 13.1 42.6 35.5 68.9 12.3 29.3 653.0 
2007 16.3 54.6 59.0 104.0 17.6 42.7 907.0 
2008 8.9 29.3 31.5 86.1 10.4 30.7 608.9 
2009 6.3 25.8 13.2 62.9 3.7 21.0 439.2 
2010 8.1 37.2 10.1 63.4 3.6 27.1 537.7 
2011 5.7 27.1 6.3 45.6 2.4 23.5 403.3 
Annual Growth Rate (%) -15.3 -8.6 -29.2 -7.9 -27.8 -4.3 -9.2 
Table 4.3: MxP per Share and Average Annual Growth Rate of Major Developers. 
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The growth and practices of some companies deserve special mention. In 2002, 
HOMEX received $32 million USD from the Equity International Investment Fund I. This 
investment fund concentrated on Mexico and aimed for a 20 percent annual rate of return 
for its U.S. investors, which included the General Motors Investment Management 
Corporation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The fund raised 
$368 million USD, of which it used $32 million to purchase a stake in HOMEX worth 
about 26.5 percent of the company. This helped the company to expand from producing 
5,000 homes a year in 2002 to 13,000 a year later and 57,000 in 2008. HOMEX adopted 
U.S. accounting standards and went public in 2004 with a $100 million USD valuation, 
which eventually soared to $3 billion.  
Company executives went to the New York Stock Exchange as ambassadors for 
Mexican entrepreneurship and joined the ranks of North America’s largest homebuilders. 
HOMEX was actually able to expand production to other countries, such as Brazil, Egypt 
and India. Such housing investment and development was also advertised as “helping solve 
global housing shortages” (Marosi 2017). By 2009, an estimated 1 million people lived in 
HOMEX housing and Equity International boasted publicly of its success in Mexico; 
profits from HOMEX topped $500 million USD for the fund’s investors in 2009. Yet, since 
2006, Sam Zell, head of Equity International,  
“started selling off big chunks of the fund’s holdings, and by 2008 Equity 
International had divested the last of its HOMEX shares… In 2010, two years after 
the fund divested from HOMEX, Zell wrote in a Mexican real estate magazine that 
he had brought U.S. standards of transparency to the Mexican company with his 
investment” (Marosi 2017).  
In 2006, however, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission inquired why “the 






(Marosi 2017). In 2008, the SEC asked for more information about the number of homes 
sold and questioned the company’s practice of including inter-company loans as cash flow. 
Furthermore, in 2011 HOMEX reported selling 52,486 homes, but the SEC said it had only 
sold 11,006 homes that year and asserted that  
“the company had inflated revenue by counting sales of homes that were never 
built… [The SEC] accused HOMEX of massive financial fraud, alleging that the 
company faked the sales of tens of thousands of homes. The company settled the 
charges without denying or admitting wrongdoing” (Marosi 2017).60  
Figures 4.12a-b show fragments of the case in mention that compare development plans 
containing units that HOMEX claimed to have built and sold from 2009 to 2011, with an 
actual satellite image in 2012 with only a small fraction of actually built units. Although 
perhaps investors were not aware of these investigations, in 2012 HOMEX secured a $75 
million credit line from the World Bank and raised $400 million on the U.S. bond market. 
Furthermore, Moody’s Investor Service gave the company’s bonds a stable rating outlook 
that same year and stated the following: “HOMEX’s capable management team executes 
strong internal controls, construction expertise and efficient practices”. 
 
 
                                                          
60 The SEC said the ruse was part of a massive fraud by HOMEX to inflate revenue by $3.3 billion from 2010 









Figure 4.12: SEC Complaint Fragments. 
 
In July 2014, HOMEX filed one of the largest corporate debt restructurings in 
Mexican history. Shortly thereafter, the company gave notice to several municipalities, 
such as Huehuetoca, about its bankruptcy status and its inability to pay a debt of half a 






thousand residents without services and infrastructure along the nine sections of the Santa 
Teresa development. Before its bankruptcy, HOMEX finished three of the nine sections and 
submitted the legal documentation that makes the municipality responsible for the services 
and infrastructure of housing developments. The rest remain in an irregular status and the 
municipality’s budget does not consider those areas for service provision. Thus, many 
streets remain unpaved and water access has become a significant issue.61 In general, 
HOMEX developments have been said to be “riddled with infrastructure and construction 
defects and residents abandoned them by the thousands, helping trigger the collapse of the 
housing industry” (Marosi 2017). Nonetheless, after emerging from bankruptcy protection 
in late 2015, HOMEX secured $240 million USD in new financing to build upscale homes 
for middle-class buyers (Chávez et al. 2015).  
Also significant, is the story of URBI. Rene Jaime Mungarro, a shareholder and 
legal representative of this company, was detained a few years back for his involvement in 
frauds related to the sale of thousands of low-income houses built on unstable lands and 
overpriced by up to 40 percent in several municipalities of the State of Mexico. His 
apprehension occurred after several years in which a group of residents of different 
developments filed lawsuits against URBI for building structurally deficient units. 
Similarly, and given the financial troubles faced by large real-estate companies (Figure 4.13 
& Table 4.4), several developments built by URBI and GEO, such as Valle de las Palmas, 
Valle San Pedro and Villas del Campo, stand in the middle of nowhere outside the city of 
Tijuana. They house thousands of residents, some of whom do not have access to basic 
services such as potable water, electricity, garbage collection, transportation, schools, fire 
                                                          
61 In Santa Teresa, most of the housing units are 30 square meters and were bought for around 166 thousand 






stations or clinics. In early 2014, Banamex, a private bank, also initiated a lawsuit against 
URBI for its failure to make a payment of 320 million MxP plus interests (Alcántara 2014; 
Gómez 2014; Méndez 2015). 
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2004 21,791  6,575  19.5   27.1 25.0 16.8  
2005 24,865  8,194  20.6   25.9 26.2 14.1  
2006 29,283  10,057  18.0   20.6 26.9 13.8  
2007 37,231  12,779  22.5     24.4 27.2 13.7   
2009 42,144  13,057   30.3 21.5  29.4 10.7 4,393 
2010 33,567  14,977   28.4 19.4  27.2 11.2 6,155 
2011 34,515  16,328   27.8 19.4  26.7 14.8 5,529 
2012 27,646  12,912   28.4 10.7  21.6 4.1 2,477 
2013 1,054  1,976   27.4 -61.0  -33.9 -299.6  
2014 497  1,099   50.2 -71.4  -64.3 -574.7  
2015 727  357    54.0 18.0   28.0 -125.2   
*They switched their nomenclature from 'Sold Units' to 'Deeded Homes' in 2009, along with their use of other 
indicators. 
 
The EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization) margin is a measurement of a 
company's operating profitability as a percentage of its total revenue (EBITDA/Total Revenue) and can provide 
an investor with a clear view of a company's operating profitability and cash flow. 
Table 4.4: URBI’s Operating Indicators. 
 
4.3 CONCLUSION  
The housing development model outlined in this chapter has had critical implications that 
will be discussed further in the next chapter. While credit and mortgage expansion was 
promoted, other housing strategies, such as rehabilitation, which often serve very low-
income, informal and rural populations, took a back seat. Thus, arguably, more than 
attempting to reduce Mexico’s housing shortage, housing production has primarily been 
valued as an important engine of the country’s economy. INFONAVIT, as well as other 
government institutions at different levels, therefore, made an extraordinary effort to 






the mass and quick production of housing with little to no financial risk to developers and 
financiers. Financial and regulatory institutional support to the private sector played a 
pivotal role. At the local level, governments had very limited capacity and incentives to 
regulate housing production and the public virtually no say in development matters. In 
comparison, developers had considerable leverage and influence. Conflicts of interest, 
distortions in development processes and legal transgressions became commonplace, as did 
the formation of public-private power monopolies.  
During the 2000s housing boom, a number of developers therefore grew 
significantly. About six companies monopolized the production of low and middle-income 
housing, but a number of issues emerged rapidly. Arguably, developers regarded 
INFONAVIT as their client and guided their production according to its potential demand – 
the mortgages the institute would grant in a given year. This, again, promoted housing 
construction not where there was the greatest need, but where formal workers are generally 
concentrated, urban and industrial areas. Yet, to maximize profits, development generally 
occurred in peripheral areas with cheap land. Market distortions that promoted an 
oversupply of housing, fraudulent practices, the inability of many low-income households 
to sustain their mortgages, and the inadequate location and quality of many new 
developments, eventually rendered the housing production model unsustainable. The 
increasing debt issues faced by developers also prevented them from growing as their 
investors expected and with their bankruptcy the issues posed by their developments 
became increasingly evident. 
The two housing issues that this research is concerned with are those of vacancy and 
access, particularly as they relate to policy decisions at different levels. Thus, this chapter 






carrying out Mexico’s housing development model, born out of reforms in the 1990s, and 
implemented most forcefully in the 2000s. Although many of the shortcomings of this 
development model were outlined above, the following chapter will focus on the analysis of 
some of the issues that resulted from it. On the one hand, even when mortgage access was 
expanded, it would be hard to argue that housing policies were directed towards those with 
the most need. Furthermore, the lower and middle-income residents that were benefited by 
such mortgage expansion, were quickly confronted with multiple issues, such as an 
increasing mortgage debt, low-quality housing, and the isolation of living in remote 

















Chapter 5: Emerging Issues of Housing Inaccessibility and Vacancy 
The development and credit expansion model outlined in chapter 4 was promoted, in 
theory, to reduce housing shortages, officially defined as the number of people living in 
overcrowded or poor housing conditions.62 Yet, other strategies, such as rehabilitation, 
which often serve very low-income, informal, and rural populations with the most pressing 
housing needs, took a back seat.63 As a result, the shift in the housing shortage was 
marginal, and the shortfall actually increased in absolute terms. The reliance on a market 
logic, rather than social goals and housing rights, is seen in the resulting exclusion of a very 
large segment of the population, which cannot access credit and adequate housing to this 
day.64 Furthermore, lending models, rooted in financialization and securitization 
contributed to the development of housing in inaccessible locations and offering 
unsustainable credit terms, both of which have contributed to an increase in vacant housing. 
In parallel, lack of local oversight of adequate housing and infrastructure construction 
standards also contributed to the reproduction of both poor housing conditions and vacancy, 
particularly in peripheral urban areas.  
In extreme but not uncommon instances across the country, developers facing 
financial problems left partially built housing developments in which neither municipalities 
nor developers have been held responsible for finishing infrastructure projects or providing 
                                                          
62 Officially, housing shortages are defined as the number and/or percentage of households living in 
overcrowded conditions or on very poor quality housing. Overcrowding is defined as more than 2.5 
inhabitants per room. Poor quality housing includes that which does not have sewage, or is built with 
precarious materials: waste, cardboard, perishable/untreated wood, palm leaves, mud, metal sheets, asbestos, 
or dirt floors.  
63 The Mexican housing finance system has directed most of its funds to manufacturing centers and cities that 
concentrate the country’s formal employment, rather than to the areas with the most pressing housing needs 
(Soederberg 2015). 
64 In 2014, over half of Mexican households could not access or purchase a 200 thousand MxP home, which 






adequate services to the thousands of affected residents. Arguably, therefore, rather than 
addressing housing needs, this development model defined the housing shortage as one of 
aggregate supply and allowed market actors to set the standards attached to development 
and lending, thus effectively furthering the commodification of housing. As households in 
inaccessible peripheral areas have started to face significant challenges sustaining their 
mortgages, and have struggled to live in poorly constructed, inadequate homes, the result 
has often been rising housing vacancy and abandonment. Thus, whether the country’s 
housing boom – the largest in Latin American history – has improved living conditions in 
Mexico is hotly debated.  
 Many of the mortgages granted to lower income residents provided security to 
investors but onerous loan terms for prospective homeowners, pushing many of them to 
default and foreclosure as banks and bondholders have begun to seize homes. These so-
called “social interest”65 loans were created as a means of extending homeownership more 
broadly and analysts assumed that loans would be given to credit-worthy borrowers whose 
salaries would keep up with inflation, and that housing values would increase. Yet, many 
loans were made to people who could not afford them, wages remained stagnant, and 
housing values dropped or stayed flat. Lax lending oversight allowed salespeople to assure 
buyers that mortgage payments would remain stable, and to promise them fixed interest 
rates for up to 30 years, while in fact loans were granted in investment units (UDIS) or 
minimum salaries indexed to inflation. Thus, some homeowners will end up repaying as 
much as seven times the amount of the original loan. 
In addition, although these new housing units do not fit within the official definition 
of poor quality housing (e.g. built with precarious materials such as waste, cardboard, 
                                                          






perishable or untreated wood, palm leaves, mud, or metal sheets), many homes were poorly 
constructed and have leaking roofs, cracked walls, electrical short circuits, and are 
susceptible to fires. Developers also built about 1 million one-bedroom units as small as 
325 square feet, which are often occupied by large families. Their access to adequate 
services and infrastructure has also been limited and at times characterized by water and 
energy shortages, burst sewage pipes, sunken or unfinished streets, crumbling sidewalks, 
pitch-black streets at night, no trash collection or policing, and promised parks and schools 
that never materialized. Builders have “abandoned hundreds of developments without 
completing infrastructure, resulting in a patchwork of public services” (Marosi 2017). 
Many developments were also built far from employment and economic centers. 
INFONAVIT has recently acknowledged that housing location, and access to 
infrastructure, services, employment and social networks, has played an important role in 
the decision of households to abandon their homes. Yet, the topic, definition and even the 
measurement of housing vacancy in Mexico has become increasingly contentious.66 
Mexico’s 14.2 percent vacancy rate is well above the international average and signals 
important deficiencies in the housing market. While many factors may influence housing 
vacancy, 60 percent of the 5 million vacant units in Mexico are in urban areas. 
Furthermore, in 2010, 20 percent of INFONAVIT financed houses were vacant, and some 
new housing developments have reached vacancy rates of almost fifty percent (SHF 2012, 
2013, 2014 & 2015; Torres 2013; INFONAVIT 2016). While this clustering of vacant or 
                                                          
66 The Mexican Census only distinguishes between vacant and temporary housing and INFONAVIT only has 
a count of its delinquent portfolio, rather than its financed vacant units. This research makes the distinction 
between vacant and abandoned housing, the latter being that which shows a significant degree of deterioration 
besides being vacant. Furthermore, it will discuss the different typologies of vacant housing, such as 






abandoned housing has mostly affected lower-income areas, some middle-income 
developments have also been affected.67  
While high concentrations of vacant or abandoned housing have affected people 
across the country, clustering is most common in peri-urban areas, which then deteriorate 
and depreciate considerably.68 Real-estate company bankruptcies have exacerbated 
conditions in some areas by leaving entire developments unfinished. These partially built 
developments typically have a small fraction of units sold and even inhabited, but because 
the developments were never officially incorporated into the municipality, residents are left 
in a limbo where no one is responsible for the provision of services and infrastructure. 
Furthermore, residents in these scantily populated areas often face high crime rates and live 
in fear of having their own or neighboring houses robbed, vandalized, or invaded. Such 
conditions have, in turn, spurred more households to leave.  
Homeowners that abandon their housing and/or default on their mortgages face 
significant economic hardship as a result: they face the loss of the resources invested in a 
lost mortgage, and the difficulty of affording the rent of an alternative home. Some people 
have resorted to living with extended family members in more consolidated and central 
locations, likely contributing to overcrowding. In addition to the impacts that vacancy and 
                                                          
67 A reform was passed in 2015 to define abandoned housing as that which is vacant and with an owner who 
cannot be located, or which conditions pose risks to its habitability or its appraisal. This definition was created 
to strengthen mortgage collection, particularly for INFONAVIT. The previous foreclosure system took about 
nine months with the assistance of local governments or even longer if a judicial process had to take place 
(SHF 2014). 
68 Several of the municipalities in Mexico with the highest vacancy rates in the country are in Mexico City’s 
metropolitan region in the State of Mexico. Tijuana is a very big and extended municipality, but its most 
peripheral census tracts also experience the same phenomenon, as do other Mexican cities. At lower rates, 
some central city locations are also experiencing a varying degree of housing vacancy, but generally not as 
concentrated. Very elevated land and housing prices and speculation in central locations may partially explain 
some of these vacancies. Generally, in a well-functioning and tight market, the opposite would occur, but 






abandonment bring for residents and homeowners, local governments and INFONAVIT 
face serious problems as well. The latter has had to deal with the deterioration and 
depreciation of its delinquent portfolio. Local governments have struggled to provide 
adequate services in remote and dislocated areas and are likely to continue to do so for 
many years.  
 
5.1 ISSUES OF ACCESS 
Officially, the National Housing Commission defines the housing shortage as the number 
or percentage of households living in overcrowded conditions or on very poor quality 
housing.69 Over the last couple of decades, in relative terms and at the national level, the 
housing shortage thus defined has been reduced, but significant unevenness remains in 
conditions across regions, and in some areas shortages have increased in absolute terms. 
This chapter looks beyond this official metric and documents some of the ways in which 
access to adequate housing has been hindered. For example, access is precluded when 
households are offered unsustainable mortgages. Similarly, even when newly built housing 
meets basic and official standards, it is often poorly constructed and in locations without 
adequate access to infrastructure and services, resulting in inadequate housing and 
detrimental living conditions for its residents. Such factors have helped produce rising 
housing vacancy and abandonment, with consequences for an array of actors – particularly 
financing institutions such as INFONAVIT, local governments, and households. Thus, the 
                                                          
69 Overcrowding is defined as more than 2.5 inhabitants per room. Poor quality housing includes that which 
does not have sewage, or is built with precarious materials: waste, cardboard, perishable/untreated wood, 






following sections seek to problematize the extent to which Mexico’s recent housing boom 
has improved the quality of life of residents 
 
5.1.1 El Rezago Habitacional and the Right to Adequate Housing 
 
“Market housing production is for those who can afford it, housing rights are for 
everyone” (Habitat International Coalition-América Latina 2016: personal interview). 
Arguably, over the last couple of decades, housing production in Mexico has transitioned 
from being primarily through informal practices to a formal system, and it has done so, in 
theory, to address the country’s significant shortage of adequate housing.  
“Prior to the creation of INFONAVIT, most homes were built through an 
incremental, informal process using household resources to acquire the land and 
construct the house. By 2005, however, a majority of Mexican households bought 
homes built by private developers with mortgages financed – for the majority, and 
at least in part – by government agencies with tight restrictions on both the borrower 
and the type of housing eligible to receive financing. Mexico’s housing transition 
also hinged on the complete transformation of the country’s construction industry: 
prior to the 1990s, most construction companies were small-scale operations, but by 
2004, nine of the country’s largest developers controlled a quarter of the market 
share. INFONAVIT, for its part, played a pivotal role in the country’s housing 
transition, thanks to its market dominance in mortgage lending and, in the early 
years, a close relationship with large-scale developers” (OECD 2015).  
Yet, new housing production – the focus of policy over the last couple of decades – 
has not adequately addressed the needs of those too poor to access formal housing finance 
systems or who thus may require assistance addressing conditions in their current housing, 
requiring rehabilitation or other resources. Recent Mexican housing policy also contains an 






formal employment, and it is these workers who have access to housing credits. Thus, 
housing funds are not necessarily going to the poorest regions or to the households with the 
most urgent housing needs. In other words, the liberalization of credit linked to new 
housing production, coupled with speculative and unregulated development practices, is not 
responding to the actual housing needs and demands of the Mexican population. In 2014, 
for instance, over half of Mexican households did not have the financial means to acquire a 
200 thousand MxP home, the average price of a low-income housing unit in urban areas 
(SHF 2014; Soederberg 2015). 
 Officially, the number of households living in poor housing conditions in Mexico 
has remained relatively stable since the year 2000 at above 9 million, or approximately 30 
percent of all households. Regional variations are notable, however, ranging across states 
from 8 percent in Aguascalientes to 72 percent in Chiapas. Such dramatic extremes may 
reflect differences in urban settlement patterns: while the former state is very small and 
urban, the latter is larger, in both population terms and territory, and has an extensive and 
scattered rural population. Between these two extremes but above the national average is 
Baja California, in which more than half of the population lived in poor or overcrowded 
conditions in 2010. Furthermore, although in relative terms the housing shortage decreased 
in this state in the 2000s, in absolute numbers it increased from 405,927 in 2000 to 448,256 
in 2010. In the city of Tijuana, the housing shortage is slightly lower in relative terms, 43 
percent, but also rose slightly in the 2000s in absolute terms from 183,627 to 184,171.  
Almost 280,000 housing units were built in the state during the 2000s, almost half 
of which were built in Tijuana (an increase of 47 percent). Although Baja California is not 
a small state in terms of population or territory, it contains only five municipalities with 






Mexican border. As we can see in the graph below (Figure 5.1), the core and most urban 
municipalities in the state – Tijuana and Mexicali – had relatively smaller shortages in 
2000. In this case, it is interesting to note that most of the state experienced significant 
housing growth rates in the 2000s, likely because Tijuana has started to absorb Tecate and 
Playas de Rosarito as part of its metropolitan region. In the case of Ensenada, it is probable 
that its location near the sea has also rendered it an attractive location for development. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Housing Shortages (2000) and Housing Growth (2000-2010) in Baja California. 
Graphic by the author.  
Source: Sistema Nacional de Información e Indicadores de Vivienda (SNIIV). 
 
 Below the national average but notable for the size of its shortage in absolute terms 
is the state of Mexico. The state’s housing shortage fell in absolute terms in the 2000s, from 












950,992 to 840,786. Its relative housing shortage was therefore at 23 percent of all units in 
2010. At the same time, the state’s housing stock grew by 859,530 units – a growth rate of 
30 percent for the decade. The pace of housing construction is important to understanding 
conditions in small municipalities, like Huehuetoca, where the share of inadequate housing 
fell from 27 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2010, according to official counts. This, 
however, has much to do with the impressive amount of units built in the 2000s, over 15 
thousand, which almost tripled its housing stock. Furthermore, the number of households 
enduring a housing shortage increased from 2,193 to 3,544. Thus, while the housing 
shortage has been contained in relative terms, the efficiency in achieving this is 
questionable. 
 Compared to Baja California, the state of Mexico has a larger rural population. 
Perhaps for this reason in more than a quarter of its 125 municipalities over 65 percent of 
households lived in poor or overcrowded housing conditions in 2000. Almost all of these 
municipalities are rural and small, and housing finance programs and other public resources 
generally did not reach them in the 2000s. Previously rural municipalities did experience 
very notable housing growth rates, however, when located in close proximity to large urban 
areas, such as Mexico City and Toluca. Twenty such municipalities experienced a housing 
growth rate of over 50 percent in the 2000s. Many of these are now experiencing vacancy 
rates well above the national average. Hueheutoca (to the north of the map below) is one of 
such municipalities, which we will continue to discuss throughout this chapter and research 








Deficit > 65% (2000)     Growth > 50% (2000s)     Vacancy Rate > 14% (2010) 
 
Figure 5.2: Municipalities with High Housing Deficits, Growth and Vacancy in the State of 
Mexico. 
Illustration by the author. Source: SNIIV. 
 At the end of the day, over 50 percent of the Mexican population employed in the 
informal economy cannot access any type of credit or social security. This simple fact calls 
into question the feasibility of effectively addressing the housing shortage through credit 
expansion, Mexico’s main strategy since the 2000s, and of making the constitutional right 
to adequate housing a reality. In Mexico, the right to housing is thus predicated on formal 
employment, and even then, the quality of housing for low-income households is 
questionable. Together, these factors suggest that housing is a good rather than a right in 







 While new housing developments were not built with precarious materials, many of 
these housing units have fostered overcrowding given their very small sizes (Figure 5.3). 
About 1 million units have only one room and are smaller than 30 square meters (around 
300 square feet). Thus, often  
“living rooms double as bedrooms. Dining tables are shoved against walls to make 
way for bunk beds. Couples sleep in nooks meant for washing machines. At 
mealtime, children stand or take turns at tiny dining tables… Cars parked on the dirt 
driveways out front often serve as second bedrooms or recreation rooms for 
teenagers seeking privacy. They take naps, play cellphone videos and hang out with 
friends… The hallway is a storage area, jammed with boxes of clothing. The living 
room, dominated by a queen-size bed, serves as Jose and Julia’s bedroom. Jose’s 
ironworker tools are stored on the roof. The front yard doubles as the laundry room; 
that’s where they’ve put the washing machine. Across town at El Laurel tract, Saira 
Reyes, her husband and two daughters sleep on side-by-side mattresses in the 
bedroom of their mini-casa.” Enrique Cruz, who lives at Villa del Alamo in Tijuana 
said “we live like birds in a cage, flying around crashing into each other” (Marosi 
2017).  
Housing units were built fast and cheap and profits appear to have been more of a concern 
than residents’ quality of life. The small size of units was justified as a way to provide 
housing to low-income groups who could not afford much else, but the units being 
produced did not necessarily provide habitable conditions. A member of El Barzón Baja 
California argues:  
“Those real estate companies did not build houses, they built pichoneras 
(pigeonholes)…people live in hallways, if you go to the houses that are by San 
Pedro, you can only fit a small twin-size bed in the bedroom, dining rooms do not 
fit a family to eat and gather, those are not homes… the worker is the one that loses 
on every side of it, the person, the Baja Californian, the Mexican seeking to create a 






In 2013, the government stopped granting credits and subsidies to such small units. Yet, 
those who bought these homes remain locked in 30-year mortgages. Similarly, although 
harder to track, it is likely that people who have been evicted or who have decided to 
abandon their homes, may now be living with relatives, often in overcrowding conditions 
(Fundacion Tú+Yo 2016; TECHO México 2016: personal interviews).  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Teenagers Resting in a Car Parked in front of a One-bedroom Home in Tijuana 
Source: Los Angeles Times 2017. 
 
 The quality of construction of new developments is also an important concern. 
Quick construction and the minimal development regulation and oversight under which 
many of these housing developments were built, often yielded substandard construction 
(SHF 2007).70 In Vista de Palmillas, Tijuana, residents live in homes tagged with signs 
                                                          
70 Around 2012, over half of the almost 4 thousand housing units in El Barreal, a housing complex in Ciudad 
Juárez, Chihuahua, were abandoned because they were built on muddy grounds that flood regularly. The 






declaring them at high-risk of landslides and floods because of unstable soil conditions. A 
member of Fundación Tú+Yo in Tijuana narrates:  
“Some developments were built on unsafe slopes that were improperly filled. 
During the rainy season, they overflow and retaining walls are too weak to sustain 
the weight. We have cases in Hacienda las Delicias, for instance, where it has rained 
and landslides have literally covered peoples’ houses… In Cañadas, many neighbors 
left because of the infrastructure. Retaining walls were tilting and so were houses… 
One of the neighbors also discovered his foundations were not strong enough when 
a hole started forming in his floor... In the last couple of years, 3 houses have fallen, 
by themselves, two-story houses, and in different socioeconomic areas, because 
construction practices are not adequate, particularly those of big developers” 
(Fundación Tú+Yo 2016). 
In Huehuetoca, which experienced very rapid housing growth but had few local 
officials to monitor these processes, developers were required to build streets and 
sidewalks, among other infrastructure. However, they frequently skimped on asphalt when 
they paved roads, leading them to pound into dust after a few months (Figures 5.4 - 5.6). 
Faulty storm drains also contributed to the washing away of curbs and sidewalks after 
heavy rains and the flooding of streets and even houses. This has been commonplace in 
poorly graded developments throughout the country, leading to frequent floods. These 
issues have been exacerbated in instances in which developments were left unfinished by 
developers and never formally incorporated into the municipality, which would then be 
responsible for infrastructure upkeep. In Zumpango, State of Mexico, a city official 
compares the flooding season to natural disasters: “We have emergency plans for 
                                                          
hydrological studies advised against construction of this development, it was approved. Some homeowners 
continue to pay their abandoned units while others have defaulted on their mortgages but a group of residents 
decided to begin a lawsuit against the developers, despite the fact that they built with government approval 






hurricanes, but we also need an emergency plan for dealing with all the housing failures” 
(Marosi 2017).  
 Homex, one of the developers with the poorest track record, argued that it was 
merely following local zoning laws that permitted development in high-risk zones, and that 
it was the responsibility of homeowners and local governments to maintain their homes and 
streets. In reality, however, the company had federal and state backing in the 2000s and was 
able to steamroll municipal regulators (Marosi 2017). This allowed such conditions and 
those described earlier to flourish in developments across the country. Problems were 
extreme in a number of cases, such as the intense flooding experienced by one of their 
developments in Veracruz, and the collapse of some of their units in Baja California Sur 




Figure 5.4: Santa Teresa Housing Development in Huehuetoca.71 
Source: Los Angeles Times 2017. 
                                                          







Figure 5.5: El Dorado Housing Development in Huehuetoca. 
Source: Picture taken by the author in 2016. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Cañadas del Florido Housing Development in Tijuana, Baja California. 







Figure 5.7: Colinas de Santa Fe in Veracruz Developed by Homex.72 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Colapsed Homex Development in Cabo San Lucas, Baja California Sur. 
Source: Los Angeles Times 2017. 
                                                          
72 This development was partially built on a wetlands area on the northern outskirts of Veracruz. Its 
underground drainage system and water treatment plant collapsed. Thus, rainwater and sewage back up into 
streets and homes during the rainy season and giant craters have formed in the streets. During the dry season, 
sewage that spills into the roads dries into a fine dust that winds kick as swirls of filth into the air. This 
development is 10 years old but has among the most decayed infrastructure and homes in the city. In Cabo 
San Lucas, two buildings constructed in creek beds collapsed (shown in the following image).  Homex also 
developed housing in dry lakebeds and wetlands prone to flooding in Ciudad Juárez and Acapulco. In 
Monterrey, it failed to properly grade the land, causing soil erosion and instability; “walls cracked, concrete 






5.1.2 Location and Issues of Access to Infrastructure and Services  
 
“The right to housing cannot be promoted by building millions of houses in the periphery” 
(Habitat International Coalition-América Latina 2016: personal interview). 
Recent housing production and urban growth trends in Mexico and other Latin-American 
regions have exacerbated socioeconomic segregation through the financing and production 
of homogeneous and peripheral housing developments. In Mexico, housing developments 
that speculatively leapfrog over vacant land became the norm in the 2000s, imposing severe 
fiscal burdens on municipalities required to provide adequate infrastructure and services, 
and significantly deteriorating residents’ quality of life by isolating them in areas with 
limited access to job opportunities and amenities. Such isolated areas are also generally 
more vulnerable to crime, violence and other social ills that tend to reproduce and intensify 
social inequality (Esquivel Hernández, 2006; Eibenschutz and Goya Escobedo, 2009; 
Ward, 2009; Isunza Vizuet and Méndez Bahena, 2011; Ponce Sernicharo, 2011; 
Monkkonen, 2011b; Bouillon, 2012; González Hernández, 2013; Fuentes and Hernández, 
2014; Soederberg, 2015).  
While Mexico’s urban population doubled from 1980 to 2010, the territory covered 
by Mexican cities grew seven times. Furthermore, housing production has concentrated in a 
number of states, municipalities and peripheral metropolitan regions. Peripheral 
municipalities and census tracts have absorbed housing production and the mortgages of 
workers who are generally employed in inner-cities or urban and economic centers. Mexico 
City, for instance, has the most notable divergence between INFONAVIT affiliated 
workers and the number of mortgages absorbed by the city; while it employs 20 percent of 
the workers in the country who qualify for an INFONAVIT credit, only 3 percent of the 






prohibitively expensive to live in the city. Conversely, if we look at a municipality like 
Huehuetoca, in the State of Mexico and in the peri-urban fringe of Mexico City’s 
metropolitan region, between 2006 and 2013, it absorbed 39,466 INFONAVIT mortgages 
while having only 6,895 INFONAVIT affiliated workers already living – and working – 
there. This has made this and other similar municipalities grow considerably over the last 
couple of decades, and has also left cities like Huehuetoca with some of the highest 
vacancy rates in the country (SHF 2012; INFONAVIT 2014; Rosas 2017b). 
These development patterns have significantly raised infrastructure and service 
costs related to transportation, water provision, electricity and drainage. Urban sprawl has 
also made Mexican urban residents increasingly reliant on the automobile, and has 
promoted the transformation of agricultural or even environmentally sensitive areas into 
residential zones. In 2011, the average Mexican household spent 30 percent of its income 
on transportation. Yet, this was significantly higher in certain parts of the country. In the 
State of Mexico, for instance, household transportation expenses rise to over 52 percent on 
average (SHF 2012 & 2014).  
Not only do infrastructure and services represent a considerable expense for 
residents of peri-urban developments, they also are often inadequate. Mass transportation 
systems, for instance, generally take time to establish in new developments, and in low-
density areas, they often run infrequently and only during the day. Similarly, road 
infrastructure projects, designed to serve newly developed areas have not been completed. 
Such has been the case of the Boulevard Machado in Tijuana, originally proposed to 
connect Urbi Villa del Prado to the city. In the State of Mexico, a light rail project was 






INFONAVIT delegate 2016; IMEVIS Toluca 2016; SEDATU 2016; Urban Development 
Ministry of the State of Mexico 2016: personal interviews). 
To better understand conditions in areas with concentrations of vacancy, this 
chapter reports on research in selected areas in both Huehuetoca, State of Mexico and 
Tijuana, Baja California  (Figures 5.9 & 5.10). These areas have also experienced a 
significant lag in the arrival and establishment of commercial, health and educational 
services, among others, generally until and if these new developments consolidate with 
enough population. Clinics and schools generally take the longest time to establish. Figures 
5.11 and 5.12 show the density of clinics, schools, convenience stores and transportation 
services in both municipalities, and when compared to the previous vacancy figures, we can 
quickly see that these peripheral high vacancy areas have the lowest density of services. 
 
 








Figure 5.10: Concentrations of Census Tracts with Vacancy Rates above 40 Percent in 
Tijuana (2010). 
Illustration by the author. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). 
In the case of Huehuetoca, all of the red census tracts on Figure 5.9 are 
developments built after the year 2000. The municipality itself is peripheral to Mexico 
City’s metropolitan region, but given that it used to be a rural municipality, its original 
municipal center, to the southeast, does not present a severe issue of vacancy, and has a 
higher density of services. In the case of Tijuana, Figure 5.10 shows a belt of census tracts 
with high vacancy rates. Tijuana is a very large municipality and city in itself, which makes 
its analysis significantly distinct from that of Huehuetoca. While vacancies in the whole 
municipality are not as high, they tend to be in certain areas, and they are particularly 
concentrated in the periphery. Only about half of these areas are new developments, 
however, some of them are informal settlements. Yet, both types of housing are often very 






fairly scattered. Turning to density of services, we do see a similar trend to that of 
Huehuetoca, less accessibility in peripheral and high vacancy areas (Figure 5.12).  
Either because of lack of municipal resources, or in instances in which 
developments were not completed by developers and incorporated into corresponding 
municipalities, several new developments also lack adequate services and infrastructure 
such as garbage collection, policing, paved streets or public lighting, and the maintenance 
of public spaces, among others. As can be seen on Figures 5.13 and 5.14, housing 
developments in Huehuetoca, Villa del Rey and Santa Teresa, built by URBI and HOMEX, 
respectively, only have partially paved street and public lighting coverage. The same is true 
of Santa Fe and Quinta del Cedro built by URBI in Tijuana (Figures 5.15 & 5.16).   
 
 
Figure 5.11: Density of Clinics, Schools, Convenience Stores and Transportation Services 








Figure 5.12: Density of Clinics, Schools and Convenience Stores in Tijuana and a Zoom-in 
to the Santa Fe Developments to the Southwest (2015). 








Figure 5.13: Paved Street Coverage in Villa del Rey and Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca (2016). 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Street Lighting Coverage in Villa del Rey and Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca. 







Figure 5.15: Paved Street Coverage in Santa Fe and Urbi Quinta del Cedro, Tijuana. 
 
 






Another matter that has exacerbated the above issues is that housing developments 
in many states were built in stages and while residents bought or moved into housing built 
in the first stages once it was completed, some infrastructure and services were not 
completed or provided until the entire development was finished. Thus, when they are able 
to afford them, residents have had to resort to hiring private and more expensive services, 
most notably private security and garbage collection. A realtor in Tijuana narrates: “If you 
go there at night, you will not find a single light post, there is no transportation, only in the 
morning, so if you have an emergency, you are stuck if you do not have a car” (API Tijuana 
2016: personal interview). 
Basic and vital services, such as water, are inadequate in developments like Santa 
Teresa in Huehuetoca. The development company Homex built more homes than the zone 
could sustain, overwhelming this areas’ well capacity. Thus, much of Santa Teresa has not 
had running water since 2016. In the neighboring municipality of Zumpango in the same 
state, “residents of a Homex project called La Esmeralda rely on diesel generators for 
electricity because the company didn’t connect large parts of the development to the 
electrical grid” (Marosi 2017). 
As previously mentioned, unfinished developments across the country have 
exacerbated such problems. An estimated 300,000 people live in more than 40 incomplete 
tracts in Baja California as do between 200,000 and 500,000 in the State of Mexico. 
Although these developments were formally approved, many of them have now fallen into 
an informal status because they were not completed and thus were never incorporated into 
the municipality and have no service access. Yet, they are partially occupied, either by their 






2017b). Meanwhile “tens of millions of dollars’ worth of construction bonds intended to 
make repairs and finish infrastructure remain unused or unaccounted for” (Marosi 2017). 
In the selected neighborhoods that were ‘formally’ developed in Tijuana (with a 
population of approximately 29,000), about a third of housing units did not have access to 
all basic services (water, electricity and drainage). The lines between formal and informal 
development have blurred. The city of Tijuana has identified informal areas in the city and 
included formally developed housing that developers have failed to finish and that the 
municipality has not formally incorporated into its jurisdiction – a condition that generally 
leads to service inaccessibility (Figure 5.17). This is the case of a portion of Tijuana’s Santa 
Fe development showed on the map below. It is also interesting to note that informal 
settlements surround this supposedly ‘formal’ development. In many instances, squatters 
have also occupied this vacant housing (Figure 5.18). In Huehuetoca, of the selected 
formally developed areas (with a population of around 25,000), the proportion of housing 
units without access to all basic services was lower but still significant, at about 13 percent. 
Moreover, close to five percent of households in these areas live in overcrowded 
conditions. Thus, although the 2000s saw a housing boom, the extent to which this led to an 
improvement in the quality of living conditions is questionable given the inadequate design 
and location of new housing (SHF 2007; IMCO 2011).73 
                                                          
73 In 2013 and 2014, when a residential satisfaction survey was administered in housing complexes across the 
nation to assess the physical, spatial, functional, and environmental characteristics of housing, the index came 







Figure 5.17: Informal Developments and Settlements in Tijuana.74 
 
 
Figure 5.18: Informal Occupation of Vacant Developments in Tijuana. 
Source: Los Angeles Times 2017. 
                                                          
74 At the center of this image is an example of formally developed housing in Santa Fe, Tijuana currently 
categorized as informal, most likely because it was not finished and handed to the municipalities, and thus 







5.1.3 Finance and Foreclosures 
During the federal administration of Vicente Fox Quezada (2000 - 2006) Mexico’s 
mortgage portfolio practically doubled and in 2006 it represented close to 10 percent of the 
national GDP, considered high for a developing country, although considerably below the 
rates found in countries like the U.S. Yet, only an extremely small portion of INFONAVIT 
loans – 13 percent – went to the purchase or rehabilitation of used housing, compared to 85 
percent in the U.S. (SHF 2007). Although INFONAVIT certainly led mortgage growth in 
the 2000s, other private financial institutions quickly entered the market. From 2004 to 
2015, BBVA Bancomer increased its mortgage financing from 40.6 million MxP to 163.6, 
Banorte/IXE from 15.7 to 90.2 and Banamex from 25.9 to 78 (numbers adjusted to 
inflation). Thus, by 2015, these three banking institutions had financed around sixty percent 
of the total mortgage market. This was also possible because in the late 2000s INFONAVIT 
entered an alliance with some private financing institutions to launch a program to support 
the construction and commercialization of housing developments. These institutions 
initially provided financial support in the form of bridge loans to fifteen developers, largely 
to build housing worth less than half a million MxP and complete projects in less than four 
years (Colin 2010; SHF 2015). 
 In addition, many Sofoles (for their acronym in Spanish), financial institutions with 
limited scope (non-depository banks), specialized in mortgage lending to serve 
INFONAVIT or FOVISSSTE (mortgage institutions for government employees) affiliated 
workers and other individuals who could verify their incomes. They offered long-term 
loans of up to 30-years with as little as 0 percent down payment for lower-income 






they experienced in the 1990s. Sofoles could also finance development and became 
particularly important funders in the early 2000s; at their peak some became larger than 
many banks. In 2006 they were substantially deregulated, allowing the creation of 120 
Sofoles with assets of more than 210 billion MxP. Yet, soon thereafter, with the advent of 
the U.S. mortgage crisis in 2008, private and public funding was cut off to most of these 
institutions, particularly those actively investing in stock markets. This accelerated the 
decline of Sofoles, particularly those that specialized on providing bridge loans to 
developers and securitized mortgages. Many declared bankruptcy, merged or disappeared. 
By 2012, there were only 18 Sofoles left with a value of around 32 million MxP and they 
went extinct in 2013. There are still unregulated Sofomes, which are similar institutions but 
with multiple lending scopes, meaning that they do not only specialize on mortgage 
lending, for instance (Juárez 2013; SHF 2015).  
 One of the most prolific Sofoles in the 2000s was Su Casita, which with others, 
received funding from the International Finance Corp., an arm of the World Bank. The 
Inter-American Development Bank also provided about 3 billion USD to Mexico’s Federal 
Mortgage Society to promote this type of loan. Other US-based companies that played a 
role in America’s mortgage crisis also backed other Sofoles. Yet, while the subprime loans 
that led to the U.S. housing market collapse, had some precautions against skyrocketing 
payments, such as lifetime caps on interest rate increases, many Mexican loans had none. 
Yet, pamphlets from Su Casita read, “The social interest loan is provided on very 
accessible terms. In the long run it represents an important saving and a magnificent 
investment” (Marosi 2017).  
Credit Suisse won an award in 2007 for underwriting UDI loans created by Su 






Loans were later pooled into mortgage-backed securities by Wall Street investment banks 
and sold to bondholders. Income from the bonds came from the mortgage payments made 
by homebuyers until they started to fall behind on their payments and the bondholders 
started launching foreclosure actions. By 2016, the default rate on Credit Suisse and Su 
Casita’s UDI loan portfolio had reached a default rate of 80 percent. Patrimonio, another 
prominent Mexican mortgage company, advertised their approach at a finance conference 
in Miami in 2011 through a presentation titled “The region’s high yield, stressed and 
distressed deals: Turning ticking time bombs into opportunity” (Marosi 2017).  
With mortgage expansion in the 2000s, a significant issue was the granting of 
credits to individuals with very limited or no debt capacity.75 Realtors were in charge of 
profiling potential homebuyers but were also interested in selling as many units as quickly 
as possible (Certified Housing Credit Adviser 2016; personal interview). Thus, during 
Felipe Calderón Hinojosa’s federal administration (2006-2012), the mortgage delinquent 
portfolio increased by 181 percent (Banco de México 2012). One of the products of the 
relaxation of Sofoles was the granting of credits in investment units (UDIs for its acronym 
in Spanish). UDIs were introduced in the late 1990s to protect lenders while offering 
mortgages to people that previously were not creditworthy. The value of UDIs’ rise are 
adjusted with inflation; initially 1 UDI was equivalent to 1 MxP but in 2016 1 UDI was 
worth 5.4 MxP, which led mortgages granted in UDIs to have the highest delinquency rates 
in 2015. Credits granted in pesos had a default rate of 13.5 percent and those granted in 
                                                          
75 Although each financial entity has different mortgage requirements, in general, individuals have to be 
employed and have a minimum household income of around 2.5 minimum salaries and be between the ages 
of 18 and 50 to qualify. Nowadays, having enough savings for a down payment and a positive credit history is 
also important. Thus, of the 31.5 million households in Mexico, only 6.4, around 20 percent, possesses  all of 






UDIs had a rate of 42.1 percent.76 Similarly, Sofol mortgages had a delinquency rate of 
53.5 percent, compared to INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE’s 8.4 percent. These latter 
institutions have had lower delinquency levels than banks and Sofoles, largely because they 
deduct mortgage payments directly from workers payrolls. Yet, if workers lose their 
employment, they must wait two years before contemplating the possibility of restructuring 
their loans.  
Yet, frequently INFONAVIT financing was insufficient to purchase housing, 
particularly in big cities. Thus, INFONAVIT introduced co-financing schemes with private 
institutions, where second liens were often granted in UDIs. Furthermore, housing 
institutes’ desire to ensure the liquidity of their loan portfolio also drove them to use 
onerous mortgage and securitization schemes that allowed mortgages to be easily sold off 
to investors. INFONAVIT credits in the 2000s were largely granted in minimum salaries 
that rose through the years, pushing up the mortgage debt of families. In 1995, the 
minimum salary was 15 MxP – it currently stands at 80 MxP. Thus, a household seeking to 
repay a debt taken out in 1995 would now be repaying a loan worth more than five times as 
much as the original loan. By the end of 2015, only slightly more than 10 percent of 
INFONAVIT’s portfolio was in pesos rather than minimum salaries. Furthermore, loans 
were often structured so that most workers paid mostly only interests for the first third or 
half of their mortgage term. As a result, those defaulting had not build any equity in their 
homes – on top of a debt that had grown tremendously. Although monthly payments 
generally started as a 25 percent paycheck deduction, they also rose in many instances, 
rendering workers increasingly unable to meet their mortgage payments (SHF 2007 & 
                                                          







2015; Reza 2013). INFONAVIT mortgage management also presented a number of 
opportunities for fraud in the 2000s, such as phishing, clientelism and sham mortgage 
contracts. Thus, of the authorized businesses operating in 2012, 41 percent – or almost 
31,000 – were closed due to irregularities (INFONAVIT 2013). 
The selling apparatus of large housing developers also grew very quickly and 
became very profitable. In the absence of regulatory and oversight mechanisms, home sale 
teams would routinely misinform buyers in order to secure a sale and minimize financial 
perils. Realtors were usually very aggressive in their selling pitches; a common practice 
was to tell potential buyers that they would lose their INFONAVIT line of credit if they did 
not use it soon. Other known practices were to promise subsidies or other false benefits. 
Potential buyers were ultimately seen as ‘walking commissions’ – a slang term used by 
sellers. Large construction companies like Homex were making sales without regard to 
borrowers’ long-term ability to pay, and even allegedly through fraudulent loan 
applications. The current director of the Federal Mortgage Society said in an interview: 
“The only thing construction companies cared about was getting people into houses. They 
didn’t care if borrowers could pay or not” (Marosi 2017). Later, collection practices also 
had little oversight and both INFONAVIT and private institutions outsourced to collection 
companies the recovery of their past-due or delinquent portfolios. This often resulted in 
very aggressive practices towards debtors, although civic organizations have tried to halt 
this in recent years (Certified Housing Credit Adviser 2016; El Barzón BC 2016; Former 
IMPLAN official 2016: personal interview). 
 The combined effect of these issues was to ensure that many owners ended up with 
a debt larger than the value of their home. The problem of growing debts was made worse 






and services, or the abandonment of nearby homes. As many homeowners started to miss 
payments, some sought to restructure their debt, a task that proved to be particularly hard 
with INFONAVIT. While INFONAVIT grants grace periods of up to 24 months to 
affiliates who lose their employment, interests and the value of the debt (if in minimum 
salaries or UDIs) continues to accumulate during such periods. Ultimately, the institute has 
a legal obligation to reclaim its delinquent portfolio to ensure its financial stability.77 
Furthermore, since 2005 INFONAVIT sold 55,000 credits, at 20 percent of face value, to 
Capmark, a subsidiary of General Motors. Controversially, the sons of then-first lady, 
Martha Sahagún, also bought a portion of the delinquent portfolio that year. While some 
charged that this was influence peddling, it ended up having no legal implications. The 
following years saw a rise in foreclosures and evictions and in 2013, INFONAVIT 
outsourced mortgage collection to 21 legal offices (Muñoz 2012; Reza 2013; Esparza 2014; 
Muñoz 2017a). 
 As previously mentioned, in the aggregate, INFONAVIT’s delinquent portfolio has 
been contained when compared to that of Sofoles. Yet, it has increased slightly – 
particularly since the late 2000s – and more notably when combined with its past due 
portfolio (Figure 5.19). Furthermore, there are also some important regional variations, and 
our case study regions exhibit a higher default rate (and increasing) than that for the nation 
as a whole (Figures 5.20 & 5.21). Several different factors may be influencing this, 
including local economic conditions and repossession policies, which vary from one place 
to another. But they are not unique: several of the states that experienced significant 
production booms in the 2000s are now exhibiting higher delinquency rates.  
                                                          
77 One of the most notable and recent foreclosure cases occurred in 2017 when INFONAVIT foreclosed 10 








Figure 5.19: Fluctuation of INFONAVIT’s Delinquent and Past Due Portfolio. 
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Figure 5.21: INFONAVIT’s Delinquent Portfolio in Case Studies. 
Graphic by the author. Source: SNIIV. 
 Private lenders facing numerous defaults (from both developers and homeowners) 
have arguably offered more loan restructuring possibilities. A reason for this may be that 
they have feared complications related to entering unfamiliar, long, or bureaucratic legal 
battles. Nonetheless, in some instances lenders have chosen to sue or go to trial to repossess 
properties, a process that generally now takes from 3 to 5 years – after a 2003 reform 
increased lender protections. An important change (for lenders) was the simplification of 
the foreclosure notification process. The lender can publicize the notification in newspapers 
of wide circulation and official gazettes of the state where the debtor is being sued, which 
often is not the same in which they live, which evidently makes the process more complex 


















private institution if real estate investment or guaranty trusts are used by the lender. These 
trusts are thus widely used, particularly by cross-border lenders, and yield a foreclosure 
process that generally takes six months to three years, the latter if the borrower refuses to 
vacate the premise, in which case the matter must be settled in court (Alcocer Chauvet 
2009). The recent use of oral proceedings has also allowed foreclosures to move very 
quickly in some states. 
 On the side of borrowers,  
“one of the tactics most commonly employed by borrowers wishing to stall or avoid 
administrative foreclosure involves filing a lawsuit to enjoin the trustee from 
transferring title without a court order… The legal argument of the borrower in 
these cases is often that the trustee transferring the property to a third party without 
the judge’s intervention is tantamount to depriving the borrower of property rights 
without due process of law and is therefore unconstitutional. These arguments, 
however, are not always successful… In the end, then, borrowers choosing to fight 
foreclosure are doing so only with the goal of improving their negotiating position 
with the creditor, often with an eye towards forcing the lender to consider 
restructuring the debt or granting an extension or forbearance” (Rosen and Alcocer 
Chauvet 2010). 
In other instances, the debtor who has lost his property will file a federal injunction called 
an ‘amparo indirecto’. The debtor may allege, for instance, that he was not properly served, 
thereby nullifying the trial and requiring the creditor to begin the process anew. This 
amparo is typically filed when the creditor/new owner attempts to take possession. Thus, in 
practice, the time and expense involved in foreclosure in Mexico will vary significantly 
from case to case and from debtor to debtor (Rosen and Alcocer Chauvet 2010). 
 Lastly, as noted earlier, while low-income families in particular have faced 






depreciate. Figure 5.22 shows that very clearly in the case of Tijuana. The city as a whole 
saw housing prices increase until about 2010 when the local economy and construction 
sector began to face significant challenges. Only in the last couple of years, has the city 
started to see a rise in housing investment, particularly for higher-income housing. Yet, 
lower-income housing (vivienda económica and social) has depreciated since the mid-
2000s. In the case of Huehuetoca, although lower-income housing rose in value around the 
mid-2000s, it has depreciated since then and it is at a similar value to what it was ten years 
ago (Figure 5.23). There are also abrupt fluctuations in the value of middle-income 
housing, which might indicate the manipulation of this market segment and the expectation 
that more residents from the metropolitan region might arrive to this peri-urban location, 
but housing prices in general have stagnated since the late 2000s. 
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Figure 5.23: Housing Prices in Huehuetoca (2015 MxP). 
Graphic by the author. Source: SNIIV. 
 
5.2 HOUSING VACANCY AND ABANDONMENT 
Mexico’s 14.2 percent vacancy rate in 2010 was the highest among current OECD 
countries and is probably indicative of important deficiencies within its housing market.78 
Furthermore, 60 percent of the 5 million uninhabited housing units counted in the 2010 
Mexican census are in urban areas and in that year, it was calculated that around 20 percent 
of INFONAVIT financed housing units were vacant (Torres 2013). INFONAVIT has 
recently acknowledged that individuals have been forced to make mortgage decisions 
without adequate information and that this has lead many households to lose their homes. 
An INFONAVIT study published in 2016 also indicates that abandoned housing is 
                                                          
78 Only the aggregate vacancy rate was reported for 2000, when there around 3 million vacant housing units in 
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particularly concentrated in municipalities with low levels of urban integration and 
consolidation, largely peri-urban areas of large cities in central and northern Mexico. 
Distance to employment is strongly related to housing abandonment; an increase in the 
distance to employment centers of one kilometer correlates to the abandonment of an 
additional 500 units. Vacancy, in the percentages experienced in many Mexican regions, 
generally produces important externalities, such as increased service, infrastructure and 
commuting costs, lower property values, while undermining social cohesion and economic 
productivity, among other factors (SHF 2012, 2013, 2014 & 2015; INFONAVIT 2016). 
 Based on the limited vacancy data and on field research, this section will focus on 
analyzing housing vacancy and abandonment and its implications in areas where it has 
clustered in both Huehuetoca and Tijuana. As shown in Figure 5.24, Huehuetoca in 
particular, experienced exponential housing growth in the 2000s, along with a rise in 
housing vacancy during the second half of the decade, according to official metrics 
available. Tijuana also experienced significant, although more linear growth in the 2000s, 







Figure 5.24: Housing Units in Huehuetoca, State of Mexico. 
 
 
Figure 5.25: Housing Units in Tijuana, Baja California. 






















5.2.2 Vacancy Clusters in Peri-Urban Areas 
Although there is some variation across Mexican regions and some urban core areas have 
also experienced relatively elevated vacancy rates, on average, vacancy rates tend to be 
higher in peri-urban areas (SHF 2014). Moreover, in these areas they tend to be fairly 
concentrated and thus more problematic.79 Several of the municipalities with the highest 
vacancy rates in the country are in the State of Mexico and form part of Mexico City’s 
metropolitan region. No Mexican metropolitan area, however, is as large and fragmented as 
that of the country’s capital, which incorporates the 16 districts of Mexico City and 60 
municipalities in 2 other states. If we take a city like Tijuana, on the other hand, while it is a 
fairly large municipality and is beginning to expand into neighboring municipalities, some 
of the most significant vacancy concentrations are located in its own peripheral census 
tracts.80 
 The last disaggregated official information on vacancy was gathered during the 
2010 Mexican census. Although housing development has slowed down considerably in 
recent years, it has certainly continued after 2010. Field research was especially useful for 
assessing current vacancy conditions and areas that have developed since 2010. 
Furthermore, urban census tracts in Mexico include only areas that cross a 2,500-
inhabitant/population threshold, thus, ‘rural’ localities routinely fall outside of statistical 
analyses. This can easily be seen by comparing Figures 5.26 (below) and 5.10 (in the 
previous section of this chapter). Figure 5.26 shows four major vacancy concentrations, 
while Figure 5.10 includes localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants and shows more of a 
belt surrounding the urbanized area of Tijuana. On Figure 5.10, 32 more localities were 
added with vacancy rates ranging from 21 to 85 percent. Together, they gather a population 
                                                          
79 Urban core vacancy may be linked to speculative practices and the high price of living in these areas.  






of almost 17,000 residents.81 Of these 32 localities, 14 are real estate developments like the 
ones we have been discussing, and 14 are informal settlements, and both categories often 
exist right next or very close to each other in this peripheral belt.82 I also outlined to the 
south of the map above (Figure 5.10), the Natura development, built after 2010 but known 
to have important vacancy issues.  
 
 
Figure 5.26: Tijuana’s Most Significant Vacancy Concentrations (Hot Spot Analysis). 
Source: INEGI. 
 Huehuetoca requires a different analysis. This municipality is located at the far peri-
urban fringe of Mexico City’s metropolitan region, adjacent to the state of Hidalgo and as a 
                                                          
81 Their age distribution is as follows: 36 percent are 0 to 14 years old, 25 percent are 15 to 29 years old, 36 
percent are 30 to 59 years old, and 2 percent are over 60 years of age.     
82 In the pilot study of Zacatecas three major housing typologies were identified in these high vacancy areas: 
INFONAVIT financed housing, incremental housing financed by the state government and somewhat 






whole has one of the highest vacancy rates in the nation. Yet, its newest developments are 
the ones experiencing particularly high concentrations of vacant and abandoned homes, as 
was shown in the map at the beginning of this chapter. The municipal center, which used to 
be a rural town, provides better access to infrastructure and services. Yet, most of 
Huehuetoca’s new housing developments and high vacancy areas are urban census tracts, 
except for three localities with a combined population of only 627 inhabitants – almost 86 
percent of which are vacant. The combined population of these tracts and new localities in 
2010 was 25,467 inhabitants, with a vacancy rate of 71.4 percent.83  
 I visited selected neighborhoods in both contexts to update this information, 
document current conditions, and estimate vacancy rates through a windshield survey. My 
estimates, however, are very conservative, since I did survey every unit, but only counted 
the houses that were visibly vacant or appeared abandoned from the outside. Thus, this 
count cannot be directly compared to figures produced for the 2010 census, but it does 
provide a sense of present conditions in these areas. In Huehuetoca, I visited Santa Teresa, 
Urbi Villa del Rey and El Dorado. As shown in Figure 5.27, these developments began to 
be built when Peña Nieto was governor of the state (2005-2011), but construction continued 
into the following administration. In 2010, these neighborhoods had a population of 24,213 
inhabitants and a vacancy rate of 66.6 percent. In 2016, I counted 32,252 units, of which 
20.5 percent were clearly vacant or abandoned. The area with the highest 
vacancy/abandonment rate was El Dorado, to the north of Huehuetoca, with a vacancy rate 
of 36.8 percent, while Santa Teresa had the lowest vacancy rate at 15.7 percent. Urbi Villa 
del Rey had a 29 percent vacancy rate. These numbers highlight the still high vacancy rates 
                                                          
83 Their age distribution is astoundingly similar to that of similar areas in Tijuana: 37 percent are 0 to 14 years 






in these newly constructed areas – well above the 2010 national average – and the issue of 
housing abandonment.  
2007                                                                                             2010 
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Figure 5.27: Housing Development in Huehuetoca. 







 In Tijuana, I visited Villa Santa Fe, a development to the west of the city that broke 
ground in 2001 and developed gradually during the decade; Residencial del Bosque, a 
development to the east of Tijuana that broke ground in 2003 and was completed in 2005, 
and which borders the informal settlement Valle Imperial;84 and Hacienda los Venados, a 
small locality developed in the late 2000s to the south of the city (Figures 5.28-5.29). In 
2010, these areas had a combined population of 23,335 and a vacancy rate of 48.6 percent. 
In 2016, I visited/counted 11,630 housing units, of which 13.2 percent were visibly vacant 
or abandoned. The area with the highest vacancy/abandonment rate was Residencial del 
Bosque with 17.2 percent, and Santa Fe had the lowest with 12.2 percent. Hacienda los 
Venados had a 15.8 percent vacancy rate. Figures in Tijuana are clearly lower than in 
Huehuetoca, although they were also lower to start with in 2010. It is worth noting that in 
both cases my metric was about a third of the official vacancy rate in 2010, and as 
previously mentioned, the discussion below will help clarify the housing vacancy and 
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Figure 5.28: Valle Imperial and Residencial del Bosque, Tijuana. 
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Figure 5.29: Housing Development in Villa Santa Fe, Tijuana. 






 In Tijuana I was also able to access data from the water commission. Again, these 
data are not comparable to census data, since they rely on collection methodologies and 
data definitions that reflect their own purposes. Furthermore, the water commission does 
not include figures on un-serviced areas. Yet, these data allowed me to see a downward 
trend in the number and percentage of what the water commission considers vacant 
housing. In 2010, Tijuana’s vacancy rate was 20.3 percent according to the census and 
between 12.6 (in March) and 10.5 (in September) according to the water commission. The 
water commission’s estimates remained somewhat stable until late 2014, when it fell to 9.3 
percent in June and 8.3 percent in December. In 2015 and 2016, it continued to drop about 
1 percentage point per year, cutting the rate in half over those 6 years. Yet, the 2015 Census 
population count provides a much more conservative estimate of the fall in vacancy in Baja 
California. The only estimated vacancy data for 2015 placed temporary and vacant housing 
in the same category and only provided information at the state level. Baja California’s 
percentage of these types of housing was 22.2 percent, compared to 23.8 percent in 2010, 
which may indicate only a very slight relative decrease (and absolute increase), although 
this is a very coarse approximation.  
 
5.2.2 Typologies and Degrees of Abandonment and Deterioration 
Housing vacancy is an increasingly contentious topic in Mexico, and there is much 
disagreement as to how to define and address this issue. Institutions like INFONAVIT 
argue that the only or most significant issue is with abandoned units, but this too is a term 
that is difficult to define and measure. Evidently, INFONAVIT’s major concern is with its 
portfolio, particularly its delinquent mortgages, which grew steadily from 2005 to 2015 






mortgages were attachede to vacant housing. Since then, INFONAVIT has started 
recovering and auctioning these housing units to contain its growth. According to 
INFONAVIT, when households default on their mortgage they often abandon their homes 
so they have often conflated these two issues. Yet, other actors challenge this claim.85 
In 2017, the Ciudad Juárez government claimed that in that city alone there were 
around 100 thousand abandoned units, and that a majority of these were recently reclaimed 
by INFONAVIT after evicting delinquent residents. Although it is difficult to track and 
quantify them, both processes have occurred: households have abandoned their dwellings 
and their mortgage payments, and have been evicted from their foreclosed housing, leading 
to the deterioration of such property. In 2015, a reform was passed to strengthen and 
shorten mortgage collection practices, particularly for INFONAVIT, by defining 
abandoned housing as that which is vacant and whose owner cannot be located, or where 
conditions pose risks to its habitability or appraisal (SHF 2014; Martínez 2017; Villalpando 
2017).86  
 Beyond this definition, during field research, I documented a wide variety of vacant 
housing with different degrees of deterioration, differences that are important to highlight 
to address through different policies or strategies. The first several images correspond to 
housing that was built in Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca for low-income households that 
qualified for an INFONAVIT mortgage but had very limited or no savings and very low 
wages (Figures 5.30-5.32). These units are very small one-bedroom houses of around 30 
square meters in size. Nonetheless, they often house families, leading to issues of 
                                                          
85 El Barzón Popular, organization that has provided legal assistance to workers facing the possibility of 
foreclosure or eviction, last year assured that there are more than 250,000 abandoned INFONAVIT financed 
dwellings in the country.  
86 Previously the process took almost a year with the assistance of local governments or more if a judicial 






overcrowding. These conditions and the difficulty of sustaining a mortgage for these 
income groups seem to have promoted their widespread abandonment. Broken windows, no 
doors, graffiti, tall grass and weeds often characterize the streets in which these homes were 
built. Yet, one often also finds doors and windows covered with brick and mortar or steel 
bars, which probably indicates that owners are still paying their mortgage, and are seeking 
to avoid the occupation of their homes by squatters. 
 
 
Figure 5.30: Interior of Abandoned House in Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca. 







Figure 5.31: Abandoned Low-Income Housing in Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca. 








Figure 5.32: Low-Income Vacant Housing in Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca. 






In some instances, housing units are better kept (e.g. painted, have windows and 
doors) but clearly vacant (e.g. have no curtains and no furniture). Yet, another common 
occurrence is to see inhabited dwellings with no water or electricity meter, which may 
indicate squatting or informal occupation. When this happens in a whole development tract, 
however, it may indicate service-provision issues (Figure 5.33). Figures 5.34-5.35, again 
from Santa Teresa, likely correspond to households with slightly higher incomes, due to the 
size and appearance of the housing units, but they also exhibit very distinct degrees of 
deterioration. The first appears to be unoccupied but it is not evident that units have been 
abandoned (e.g. covered windows and up kept paint and grass), while the latter have clearly 
been abandoned (e.g. long grass, no windows or doors, graffiti).  
 
 
Figure 5.33: Multi-family Housing with No Electricity Meters in Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca. 







Figure 5.34: Vacant Lower-middle Income Housing in Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca. 
Source: Google Earth (Imagery date: 2013). 
Urbi Villa del Rey, on the other hand, while close to Santa Teresa, show less 
internal diversity in housing size and type. Yet, although several units were sold and are 
now inhabited, it is clear that the developer left rows of housing unfinished or unsold, likely 
due to its financial troubles earlier this decade (Figures 5.37-5.38). Finally, El Dorado 
(Figure 5.36), located on the northern fringe of Huehuetoca, and perhaps the most isolated 
section of the municipality, has a mix of apartment buildings and single-family units. This 
area, both in 2010 and 2016, had among the highest vacancy rates in the municipality, 
along with Urbi Villa del Rey. Furthermore, a completely new section of this development, 
built in 2015, had very few electricity meters, but appeared to be widely occupied, most 
likely through the occupation by a large group or organization.87 Although I did not visit 
Conjunto Huehuetoca del Maurel (Figure 5.39), it is worth mentioning because it is in a 
locality with less than 2,500 inhabitants and not incorporated as an urban census tract but it 
is a largely vacant housing development (only 29 of its 150 units were inhabited in 2010). 
                                                          
87 This assumption is based on my interaction with residents who were fairly guarded and did not respond 







Figure 5.35: Abandoned Lower-middle Income Housing in Santa Teresa, Huehuetoca. 








Figure 5.36: Abandoned House in El Dorado, Huehuetoca. 
Source: Pictures taken by the author in 2016. 
 
 
Figure 5.37: Abandoned Lower-middle Income Housing in Urbi Villa del Rey, Huehuetoca. 







Figure 5.38: Vacant Lower-middle Income Housing in Urbi Villa del Rey, Huehuetoca. 







Figure 5.39: Conjunto Huehuetoca del Maurel, a Largely Vacant Locality with less than 
2,500 Inhabitants. 
Source: Google Earth (Imagery date: 2013). 
In some sections of Santa Fe, to the west of Tijuana, similar patterns were found to 
those of Santa Teresa in Huehuetoca – rows of houses without windows and doors, graffiti, 
signs indicating foreclosure or home invasion (as it is officially defined by government 
authorities), and other signs of housing abandonment and deterioration (Figures 5.40 & 
5.41). Yet, as in Santa Teresa, this very large development has a mixture of housing types. 
Urbi Quinta del Cedro, exhibited patterns similar to Urbi Villa del Rey in Huehuetoca (both 
were developed by the company Urbi), rows of streets with unfinished or unsold housing 
units, likely for middle-income households (Figures 5.42 & 5.43). While many of these 
homes had for sale signs, many were fairly deteriorated (e.g. peeled paint, broken windows, 
no doors, un-kept yard). Residencial del Bosque and Villa del Campo, to the east of the city 
(Figure 5.44 & 5.45), and south of a very large informal settlement, is a low-income 
housing development with very small housing units and several vacant or abandoned 








Figure 5.40: Santa Fe Housing Development to the West of Tijuana. 







Figure 5.41: Invaded and Foreclosed Property Signs on House in Santa Fe. 
 
 
Figure 5.42: Interior of Abandoned House in Urbi Quinta del Cedro to the West of Tijuana. 







Figure 5.43: Abandoned Middle-Income Housing in Urbi Quinta del Cedro. 







Figure 5.44: Residencial del Bosque Housing Development to the East of Tijuana. 
Source: Pictures taken by the author in 2016. 
 
 
Figure 5.45: Villa del Campo Housing Development to the East of Tijuana. 






Housing vacancy and abandonment in Mexico has brought consequences at multiple 
levels. Abandoned housing, particularly in areas with very high vacancy rates, has 
deteriorated quickly and experienced recurrent vandalism and been stripped of parts (e.g. 
doors, windows, pipelines, bathroom appliances, etc.), leading their value to depreciate 
considerably. For INFONAVIT and other financial institutions recovering depreciated, 
abandoned, defaulted or invaded units has been financially draining. These vacant units, 
moreover, continue to accumulate property tax and on occasion even debt service charges. 
Although INFONAVIT’s share of delinquent and past due mortgages decreased in the early 
2000s, it has increased since the latter part of that decade.88 In recent years, the institute has 
become increasingly aggressive in collecting payments. Local governments have also 
struggled to provide adequate services in remote and dislocated areas, which are not 
generating promised revenue through property taxes (Hernández 2016, Martínez 2017, 
Muñoz Ríos 2017). 
 The issue of housing vacancy and abandonment has evidently also hit residents all 
around the country, although some cases are particularly illustrative. In the State of Mexico, 
a prominent real estate company, DeMet, developed a housing complex in the mid-2000s 
called Rancho la Capilla. Due to financial troubles, however, DeMet left the development 
unfinished and sold only 120 of the 1,500 built units. In 2011, 600 unsold units were 
invaded and current residents live without access to potable water, street lighting, schools, 
and other urban infrastructure. The local government is not obligated to provide public 
services because the developer did not complete and hand the development to the 
municipality. Households at one point sought the aid of INFONAVIT but the financial 
institution argued that it was a matter outside their jurisdiction. As many other 
                                                          






developments with high vacancy rates, Rancho la Capilla has also experienced significantly 
high crime rates, prompting many original residents to leave their homes. Residents sharing 
a street only with one or two other families live in constant fear of leaving their homes for 
work to return to a robbed or vandalized house (Marina 2013; Reyes and Cabrera 2013; 
Villalpando 2017).  
 Squatting in areas with high vacancy rates has become fairly common. This has 
been particularly problematic in cases in which units are invaded by criminal groups. This 
and other issues, such as the dispersed layout of housing developments, has put distance, 
both physical and social, between residents and affected the social fabric and cohesion of 
these communities. Although there have been notable exceptions, civic engagement and 
trust is relatively weak in these areas. Squatting households, for instance, are said to be a lot 
less prone to participate in neighborhood meetings or contribute with communal fees to 
facilitate infrastructure maintenance or service provision, which are things that residents 
often have to do in these developments. A certified mortgage adviser in Tijuana (2016) 
claims that  
“In the city, housing vacancy has created spaces of social anarchy. Residents 
survive in many cases surrounded by severe insecurity. They also often live without 
the construction of planned and promised infrastructure. That marginalizes them and 
strips them of access to employment and education centers, either by private or 
public transportation, which is often inadequate and expensive”. 
 Residents who decide to abandon their homes, on the other hand, are likely to face 
financial instability, either for defaulting on their mortgage or for continuing to pay it in 
addition to other living accommodations. An alternative may be to set living arrangements 
with their extended families. Yet, this may also lead to issues of overcrowding or 








Throughout this chapter, I have discussed and juxtaposed the main problems generated by 
the new housing model: inaccessibility and housing vacancy. As worrisome as the elevated 
official housing shortage continues to be, this metric does not convey important dimensions 
of current housing needs, such as access to infrastructure and services and financial access 
and stability. Furthermore, the official definition of poor quality housing – that built with 
precarious or non-durable materials – leaves out newly constructed housing units with 
important structural and livability issues. The massive scale and fast pace of affordable 
housing production, touted as a means to increase housing access, often led to the 
construction of significantly deficient units. Meanwhile, many of the households with the 
most severe and pressing housing needs were unable to access housing finance because of 
their very low-incomes, participation in the informal economy, or due to the urban bias 
promoted by Mexico’s housing finance policy. In other words, the constitutional right to 
adequate housing has been predicated on having a well-paid formal job. As a result, policy 
has made housing a commodity or investment rather than a right – even for those included 
in the INFONAVIT system. This is a fundamental critique of recent housing strategies – 
that they are not serving the needs and housing demands of the Mexican population but 
instead the requirements of private-market lenders and investors.  
 Although the official housing shortage has been contained or has decreased in 
relative terms in some states and cities, this reflects the dramatic growth in new housing 
rather than an absolute decrease in adequate housing. This begs the question of whether 
financing new housing construction has been the most efficient way to effectively reduce 






Furthermore, one outcome of this approach has been to exacerbate one aspect of the current 
housing shortage: overcrowding. In order to make housing accessible to an additional 
income group, 25 to 30 square-meter houses were built at the peri-urban fringe across the 
country. These one-bedroom units often house entire families. Given the lax development 
regulations and oversight of construction during the 2000s, new construction has brought 
additional housing quality problems. Structural issues, floods, landslides, decaying or 
inexistent infrastructure, and even collapsed houses have been documented in these new 
housing. In other words, production is reproducing inadequate living conditions. 
 Beyond problems with housing quality, the location of these developments has 
contributed to the socioeconomic segregation of cities, imposed severe fiscal burdens on 
local governments that must provide adequate infrastructure and services, and limited the 
access of residents to economic opportunities and urban amenities. Peri-urban 
municipalities and census tracts in Mexico absorbed much of the housing produced in the 
2000s. These development patterns have significantly raised infrastructure and service 
costs, for both governments and users. Transportation costs have risen, particularly in large 
metropolitan regions where commuting times and distances have grown considerably. 
Furthermore, despite their elevated costs, infrastructure and services are often inadequate, 
insufficient, and take considerable time to establish, particularly in distant and low-
populated areas. This has been especially true of health and educational services. Other 
municipal services, such as policing, trash collection, public lighting and public space 
maintenance are often altogether absent. But even basic services, such as water, electricity 
and drainage, have been deficient or absent in many of these new developments. Besides 






developments throughout the country that were not incorporated into existing 
municipalities and thus stand in limbo.  
 The model extended access to credit for some yet was oddly detached from attention 
to financial stability and housing adequacy for buyers. Although a very significant segment 
of the Mexican population still has no access to housing finance, mortgage access was 
indeed expanded in the 2000s to incorporate lower income populations in the formal 
economy. Longer-term loans with minimal down payments were provided to promote the 
construction of lower-income housing. Deregulation and mortgage securitization led to the 
growth of the financial and construction sectors, although arguably also contributed to their 
precipitous decline in later years. The World Bank, Inter-American Development bank and 
other US-based companies helped fuel much of the mortgage and housing construction 
growth in Mexico. Yet, another important source of capital was the 5 percent compulsory 
contribution of formal workers to institutions like INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE. 
Furthermore, mortgage conditions were rarely fully understood by homebuyers. Mortgages 
in UDIs or minimum salaries indexed to inflation were granted to people who previously 
were not credit worthy and have grown over five times since the late 1990s when they were 
introduced, making many of them unpayable. Again, given the absence of regulation or 
oversight, realtors, interested in selling as many units as possible, routinely misinformed 
buyers and minimized financial perils. This has put residents in a very precarious and 
vulnerable financial situation. As the debt of lower-income households has increased, their 
property values have stagnated or depreciated. Ultimately, this has led to a recent increase 
in mortgage default, foreclosures and evictions, particularly in some regions.  
While housing construction grew exponentially, particularly in metropolitan 






pressures. This also contributed to the elevated vacancy rates described in this chapter. 
Such imbalances were also related to other access issues previously discussed, such to 
urban infrastructure, services, economic opportunities, and even quality housing. Arguably, 
the supply of housing produced, when all its aspects were considered was altogether 
inadequate, and promoted housing abandonment. Vacancy clusters or concentrations have 
been particularly problematic in peri-urban areas of large metropolitan regions.  
In Tijuana, one can see a type of belt surrounding the city with areas of high 
vacancy rates. In the case of Huehuetoca, the municipality itself is part of a larger and 
similar belt that surrounds Mexico City. Particularly in the case of Tijuana, it was also 
interesting to note the adjacency of peripheral formal developments and informal 
settlements, both of which exhibit high vacancy rates. Similarly, although perhaps the 
lowest-income housing developments have experienced higher levels of abandonment and 
vacancy, this has also occurred in middle-income areas. Housing vacancy and abandonment 
has had implications at multiple scales. Although they have sought different ways to 
address the issue, mortgage institutions have seen their finances shaken by an increase in 
their delinquent portfolios. On the other side of the spectrum, homebuyers have also been 
significantly affected, both those that have stayed and those that have left. The former has 
endured heightened issues of insecurity and crime, while the latter is likely struggling with 









Chapter 6: Financial versus Civic Responses to the Housing Paradox 
 
“To solve the housing issues that we currently face, Mexico’s housing policy would need to 
change and recognize the social value of housing rather than the returns it can provide to 
the oligopoly of housing developers through the Stock Exchange, this in no way helps solve 
the housing problem” (Humbertus Pérez 2018). 
 
The problems emerging from Mexico’s new housing model have prompted contrasting 
responses from residents of this new housing, from INFONAVIT and partnering institutions, 
and from the federal government. These contrasts highlight the tensions between the use and 
exchange value of housing. Although there is some regional variation, residents have 
developed different coping strategies at the neighborhood level aimed primarily at 1) 
accessing residential services, often through private companies; 2) creating economic and 
commercial opportunities, often through informal means; and 3) preventing home 
occupations or the incursion of criminal activity into a neighborhood. At a larger level, social 
organizations have also started to provide legal services to people facing the possibility of 
foreclosure or eviction and organized protests against government policies or inaction. In 
contrast, the priority of INFONAVIT and other financing institutions has been to ensure their 
own financial stability. An important INFONAVIT strategy to do so has been to auction a 
portion of its delinquent and foreclosed portfolio to the private sector to rehabilitate and 
resell. In addition, the new federal administration has shifted its urban and housing policy to 
promote the densification of Mexican cities, thru, among other strategies, the creation of 
urban growth boundaries. Yet, these efforts continue to allow the transfer of land and housing 
subsidies to landowners and speculators. This has in turn led to the production of more 






 The degree of civic organization in Mexico varies greatly across regions. There are, 
for instance, significant differences between Tijuana, Baja California, and Huehuetoca and 
other municipalities in State of Mexico. Arguably, organizing in Tijuana has been weaker 
and, when successful, has mostly consisted of neighbors organizing to finance the hiring of 
private and more expensive services to serve their neighborhoods, such as garbage collection 
and security, among others. Conversely, in some areas of the State of Mexico, particularly 
those that are more urban and form part of the metropolitan area of Mexico City, there is a 
stronger history of social organizing. In extreme, yet relatively common instances, vigilante 
type groups have formed to confront crime.  Furthermore, in recent years, civic groups have 
formed to protest the poor quality of their new homes and developments, as well as their 
unpayable mortgages.  
At the other side of the spectrum, repossessions by INFONAVIT more than doubled 
in 2012, reaching almost 44 thousand (Eulich 2013). INFONAVIT then began reselling its 
vacant units in 2013.89 The first year, it could only sell about 18 percent of the 39 thousand 
it intended to sell. Many of its ‘vacant’ units were invaded, making the recovery process very 
cumbersome (SHF 2014). Currently its auction program consists of selling housing packages 
of 10 to 200 units, some in more than one state, to Mexican companies with experience in 
promoting and developing housing.90 In 2016, INFONAVIT recovered around 60 thousand 
units of its delinquent portfolio. By auctioning it to the private sector, it obtained close to 2.2 
billion MxP and 1.8 billion MxP in 2015. Social organizations like el Barzón, however, have 
pointed out that these houses are auctioned at discounted prices that could be offered to their 
                                                          
89 In parallel, and conscious of the issue of housing vacancy, INFONAVIT has undertaken a number of 
measures, such as courses and certifications to guide affiliates into taking more informed decisions when 
buying a house. 
90 INFONAVIT remains responsible for any accumulated debt on the properties, such as utility or tax debt, as 






residents instead (Hernández 2016; Martínez 2017; Muñoz Ríos 2017; Rosas 2017; 
INFONAVIT 2017).  
In parallel, INFONAVIT and the federal government have announced a policy shift 
towards densification. To contain urban sprawl, in 2012 the CONAVI (National Housing 
Commission) created the concept of urban growth boundaries, where U1 refers to the 
intraurban areas that have services and infrastructure and concentrate economic activities. U2 
refers to zones where at least 75 percent of housing units have water and drainage access 
among other services and infrastructure, and U3 surrounds U1 and U2 as a virtual border to 
contain urban expansion. CONAVI and INFONAVIT only grant housing subsidies and 
credits within these growth boundaries in accordance with the 2013-2018 National 
Development Plan. This plan was drafted by SEDATU, the federal Urban and Regional 
Development Ministry, to promote sustainable urban development, compact cities, mobility, 
sustainable housing, inter-institutional and intergovernmental coordination, and a national 
unification of land use policy. Densification would arguably also ensure that infrastructure 
investments and service costs remain financially viable for the public sector and – of 
particular relevance here – that housing investment remains profitable.  
Yet, although urban growth boundaries mean to prevent the continuous sprawl of 
Mexican cities, critics have noted that construction has continued in peri-urban areas and that 
such boundaries have been hollowly drawn and modified in constant negotiation with 
developers, particularly those that have good political relationships. Furthermore, 
densification in the first perimeter, U1, has proven difficult given the high land prices in these 
areas and the low purchasing power of the average Mexican household. It seems, therefore, 
that new financing schemes will only be able to promote the production of more expensive 






The main purpose of the following sections is to highlight the very different, and 
arguably contrasting, reactions to the issues brought on by rampant and sprawling housing 
development in the 2000s. Discursively, housing and urban development policies in Mexico 
have continued to evolve over the last decade. Yet, financial and private interests continue to 
heavily influence them. Openly promoting suburban housing development in areas with poor 
accessibility and high vacancy rates is evidently untenable but local political regime issues 
and the intent of stimulating housing investment continue to overshadow housing rights and 
needs. The roadblocks encountered by neighborhood and civic organizations in the pursuit 
of better living conditions, as well as INFONAVIT’s repossession efforts are clear proof of 
this. Effectively a financing agency, INFONAVIT is arguably no longer guided by the 
mandate upon which it was founded in 1972 to ensure the constitutional right to adequate 
housing for Mexican workers. In turn, this very fact may help explain the coexistence of high 
housing vacancy rates and a shortage of adequate housing for lower-income households. 
 
6.1 COPING STRATEGIES AT THE NEIGHBORHOOD LEVEL 
Although varying greatly from one context to another, neighborhood organizing has been a 
frequent response to the multitude of issues that some new communities face on a daily basis. 
Given the remote locations and high vacancy rates in some neighborhoods, which provide 
them with limited access to services, neighbors have had to organize to hire private security, 
garbage collection, among other services when they are able to afford them. They also often 
have to buy potable water or rely on diesel generators for electricity (Figure 6.1). Similarly, 
they fence their dead end streets due to security concerns, or seal the doors and windows of 






“Such do-it-yourself efforts have become commonplace in abandoned developments. 
Residents say it’s their only option” (Marosi 2017).  
 
Figure 6.1: Santa Teresa Housing Development in Huehuetoca.91 
Source: Los Angeles Times 2017. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Santa Fe Housing Development in Tijuana, Baja California. 
Source: Picture taken by the author in 2016. 
                                                          






These strategies may be regarded as relatively passive or reactive, and have been 
more common in places with a weaker history of civic organizing, such as Tijuana, Baja 
California. In the state of Mexico, on the other hand, residents have arguably reacted more 
forcefully to cope with their living conditions. The formation of vigilante type neighborhood 
watches to confront crime, for instance, has been common in this state, where you frequently 
see posters such as the one shown below hanging from windows and fences with the caption: 
“Thief, if we catch you, we’ll lynch you” signed by “united neighbors” (Figure 6.3).  
Furthermore, in the absence of adequate commercial services and employment opportunities 
in these peripheral developments, informal mixed uses and small business are often 
established in some housing units, particularly along the main or access streets of these 
housing developments (Figure 6.4). 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Neighborhood Poster in El Dorado, Huehuetoca. 








Figure 6.4: Informal Commercial Establishments in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon. 
Source: Alejandro Cartagena 2016. 
 Particularly in the state of Mexico, residents of blighted developments have also held 
larger, and at times antagonistic, demonstrations to protest the poor construction of their 
homes or unfinished infrastructure. “Once, in 2014, they handcuffed HOMEX employees to 
a light post” (Marosi 2017). However, demonstrators have been unable to hold major 
government or industry figures accountable for the various and common development 
problems that have arisen. In fact, homeowners’ efforts to get problems fixed have been 
blocked all around the country. At least half a dozen neighborhood leaders have been arrested 
or bribed after leading protests. Attorneys have also claimed to receive offers of bribes to 
stop representing homeowners demanding developers to finish pending infrastructure 






 Despite the difficulties of achieving results, a couple of notable organizing efforts 
have emerged over the years in the state of Mexico. The financial troubles of some 
development companies left multiple housing developments around Mexico unfinished, 
leading residents to live in areas without completed infrastructure projects or access to basic 
services. Perhaps the strongest case of civic organizing around these recent housing concerns 
originated in Tecámac, State of Mexico. In this municipality, residents of multiple 
developments experienced very significant hardships that led them to organize at higher 
levels to push developers to finish infrastructure projects and the local government to 
rehabilitate public infrastructure, among some other demands. Around the late 2000s, 
neighbors from Racho La Capilla in Tecámac, state of Mexico, started to organize to discuss 
the lack of public lighting, police presence, green spaces, schools, and even electricity and 
drainage in their neighborhoods. Eventually, they were able to enter into negotiations with 
the local government and the private developer to ask for public lighting and the 
rehabilitation of nearby schools. They also signed agreements with transportation unions to 
ensure the provision of safe and adequate mass transit and organized to hire private security 
(Conjunto Urbano Rancho la Capilla 2017). 
Tecámac has become fertile ground for neighborhood organizing. Residents in Villa 
del Real also struggled with continuous water shortages. URBI, the developer, had provided 
too few wells and pumping stations to serve all residents; the overburdened system caused 
pipes to burst and pumping stations to malfunction. Such infrastructure problems have 
appeared in developments across the country but neighbors in Villa del Real decided to 
organize and take legal action. They also had a determined leader, Humbertus Pérez. A 






found evidence of collusion between builders and the government officials who 
approved developments despite inadequate water supplies. Of million-dollar 
infrastructure bonds disappearing. Of government officials ignoring reports warning 
of large-scale mortgage fraud… crony capitalism run amok: Mexico’s biggest 
builders constructed flimsy homes with faulty public infrastructure, then sold the 
homes at inflated prices. Government officials, instead of acting on the problems, 
approved even more projects. Foreign investors and bondholders reaped enormous 
returns (Marosi 2017). 
In 2007, the neighbors of Villa del Real brought a lawsuit against the then minister of 
urban development at the state level, Marcela Velasco González, aunt of the then governor 
and now president of the country, Enrique Peña Nieto. The lawsuit accused her of protecting 
the real estate development company URBI after it had failed to deliver purchased housing 
units in Tecámac, comply with building codes and construction standards, and complete 
required infrastructure projects. In 2009, they also asked the federal attorney general’s office 
to conduct a criminal investigation of housing industry figures and government agencies that 
had been complicit in the construction of faulty infrastructure and houses that were 
systematically sold at inflated prices. While the investigations remained stalled, water 
shortages and electricity outages frustrated an increasing number of residents at other 
developments in the state of Mexico. Thus, a grassroots movement was born, the Frente 
Mexiquense en Defensa para una Vivienda Digna (Mexican Front in Defense of a Dignified 
Home), which would then expand across the country.92  
Residents held marches, occupied government and developers’ offices, blocked 
roads, and started to block evictions and collect dues from members to defray legal costs. 
This movement, based initially in the State of Mexico, subsequently spurred protests and 
eviction blockages in other states, such as Querétaro and Chihuahua. Pérez eventually 
managed to get two housing industry figures indicted for building defect-riddled 
                                                          






infrastructure and systematically overvaluing substandard homes, although his lawsuit 
against the then State Minister of Urban development, Marcela Velasco González, did not 
have the same success (Villamil 2010; Marosi 2017).  
Along with other social organizations, Pérez also started to help residents avoid 
foreclosure and restructure their debt with private banks. A very important finding from Pérez 
was that the State of Mexico had no law that allowed the foreclosure of homes: “lenders 
seeking evictions had been citing a law typically used to repossess cars and furniture, Pérez 
objected to the tactic and judges sided with him” (Marosi 2017).  This saved thousands of 
homeowners from foreclosure and revolutionized housing law defense in the state. Poorer 
residents, however, often could not afford legal representation. Yet, they sometimes 
organized in protest outside government buildings.  Two URBI executives were charged with 
fraud on August 2015 but did not spend time in prison due to a settlement agreement 
requiring URBI to complete the water system at Villa del Real, but the system was not 
completed. Pérez and some other organizations have also aided families who have had their 
houses invaded. At the same time, some social organizations also mobilize precisely to foster 
home occupations for which they typically charge squatter households (Villamil 2010; Núñez 
López 2016; El Barzón BC 2016).  
Members of the Frente Mexiquense, however, were arrested in August 2015 for 
blocking an eviction in Cuautitlán Izcalli. In November 2015 Pérez was also arrested after 
accusing the mayor and police chief of Tecámac of conspiring to destroy his movement at a 
news conference.  
Authorities charged him with robbing two neighbors at gunpoint of a cellphone, a 
laptop and paint buckets because they owed membership dues to his Mexican Front. 
Three sets of judges threw out the charges and ordered Pérez’s immediate release, 






state attorney general’s office persuaded other judges to keep Pérez behind bars 
without bail (Marosi 2017). 
Pérez has spent over two years in prison without a trial for allegedly breaking into three 
homes to take several items from residents and for threatening and pointing a gun at a 
women’s chest. Although he could afford bail, prosecutors argued against it, saying he was 
dangerous. Yet, “several judges who reviewed the case expressed serious doubts” (Marosi 
2017), saying there was no evidence that Pérez had a gun. One judge even suggested the 
claim was fabricated. The attorney general’s office, however, has continued filing appeals, 
even after another federal judge in January ordered his immediate release.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Supporters of Housing Activist, Humbertus Pérez, Demanding his Release. 
Source: Los Angeles Times 2017. 
 
6.2 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND LEGAL AID TO PREVENT EVICTIONS 
The Frente Mexiquense usually starts by analyzing individual mortgage contracts and the 
clauses they should contain, such as housing appraisals and construction risk insurance, 
among others, since lack of insurance and overvalued mortgages have been among the most 






housing units up to 40 percent above of their real value. Any irregularity arguably protects 
homeowners against foreclosure, which is when this organization typically provides legal 
defense to residents (Humbertus Pérez 2018)    
The Frente Mexiquense has not been the only organization to help residents avoid 
foreclosures. Organizations like El Barzón, which began offering legal aid to indebted 
farmers several decades ago, have started to provide legal support to some residents who 
have fallen behind on their mortgage payments and face the possibility of eviction. A number 
of organizations have helped homeowners restructure their debt with private banks and 
mortgage lenders. Many of them claim that INFONAVIT has been the toughest negotiator. 
“Every worker has the right to housing, which is granted through the monster that 
INFONAVIT represents, a real monster, abusive, profiteer, the worst there is, there are better 
[private] mortgage lenders and banks, and with greater sensitivity, incredible” (El Barzón BC 
2016: personal interview). They have also taken up the strategy of lengthening foreclosure 
trials to halt evictions and allow people to come up with the resources to repay their debt in 
the meantime (El Barzón BC 2016). It is important to note, however, that these organizations 
are generally only able to aid lower-middle income and middle-income homeowners, who 
have the resources to pay membership fees, legal representation, and eventually their 
restructured debt.   
 Pérez and the Frente Mexiquense have also charged INFONAVIT and other mortgage 
companies, with steering borrowers to problem developments, and some banks of charging 
fees for insurance policies they never provided to borrowers. One of their biggest discoveries, 
however, was to find that the state of Mexico had no law on the books allowing the 
foreclosure of homes. Although several members were allegedly bribed to disband their 






enterprise that meant to enrich government and industry players at the expense of first-time 
homeowners. They also accused Enrique Peña Nieto of mismanaging the building spree as 
governor of the state of Mexico. In a radio interview, Pérez said, “the story of Mexico is the 
story of a criminal economy because in Mexico the rule of law was never established. What 
was established was a criminal economy that works only for whoever has power” (Marosi 
2017). Mortgage companies came to regard Pérez and his movement as a latent risk to the 
enforcement of defaulted loans across the country. 
  Yet, they had another important win in 2013, when the federal judge Carlos Martínez 
Hernández ordered a fraud case to be resolved. Two years earlier, two prosecutors in the state 
of Mexico attorney general’s office had been fired for failing to pursue cases filed by Pérez. 
He had made public a government report showing evidence of mortgage fraud dating to 2008. 
In spring 2014, investigators showed up at Villa del Real to visit the pump station and  
…see ruptured pipes and listened as a local water district official confirmed that the 
builder had never turned over the infrastructure to the agency. Loeza [lead 
investigator] likened the system’s defects to an embolism in a human body, which 
causes blood pressure to build. In the development of 6,000 homes, the failure to 
finish the water flow network was putting too much stress on the existing system, 
causing the pipes to burst and pumps to break down. In his report, Loeza confirmed 
what Pérez had said all along: URBI had failed to complete a well, pipes and a 
water treatment system, yet city officials gave $2 million of the construction bond 
back to the developer. Prosecutors returned a 320-page indictment charging two 
URBI executives with a type of fraud specific to developers who sell houses that 
fail to meet the terms of the contract. On Aug. 15, 2015, one of the men, Rene Jaime 
Mungarro, was detained by U.S. customs agents as he tried to cross the border into 
Texas (Marosi 2017). 
 Another battle taken up by the Frente Mexiquense has been that of aiding families 
who have had their houses occupied by squatters. In 2015, members began posting signs in 
Villa del Real indicating that units had been seized under a court order and gave notices to 






conflict between neighbors, as other organizations have mobilized precisely to foster home 
occupations (Núñez López 2016). Squatting in developments with high vacancy rates has 
become a widely common practice, but it has taken different forms and spurred many 
different reactions. Individual occupations by families are usually not regarded as negatively 
as those performed by large groups. Nonetheless, neighboring homeowners do sometimes 
complain that squatters tend to not be as involved in neighborhood matters including upkeep. 
They are also often concerned about the occupation of units by organized crime, which is 
also common in the most isolated areas. Furthermore, conflict does evidently also arise if the 
owners of the squatted units are still paying their mortgages and realize their homes have 
been invaded. 
 
6.3 CUTTING ITS LOSSES: INFONAVIT’S HOUSING AUCTIONS & RECYCLING EFFORTS 
In contrast to the concerns of residents, INFONAVIT’s focus has been on ensuring its own 
financial stability in the face of rising vacancy and abandonment. While some of its strategies 
are aimed at helping residents be more informed buyers, or to respond to conditions in 
declining communities, the primary emphasis has been on developing and implementing 
strategies to remove delinquent properties from its portfolio.93  
 In 2012, INFONAVIT began to strengthen its efforts to repossess delinquent 
properties, increasing repossessions more than twofold that year to 44,000. Since many of its 
foreclosed units were occupied by squatters, this process was often protracted. INFONAVIT 
started reselling these units in 2013. The first year the institute sold only slightly more than 
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7,000 housing units, less than 18 percent of the 39,000 it had intended. Nonetheless, in later 
years INFONAVIT was able to improve its selling tactics by auctioning homes. In 2016 
INFONAVIT repossessed around 60,000 housing units and auctioned most of them to the 
private sector, for which it obtained close to 2.2 billion MxP; the previous year the institute 
had obtained 1.8 billion MxP from its housing auctions. Social organizations, however, have 
called noted that houses are auctioned at discounted prices which, they claim, could be 
offered to residents instead (Eulich 2013; SHF 2014; Hernández 2016; Martínez 2017; Muñoz 
Ríos 2017; Rosas 2017).94 
 The focus on the institute’s balance sheet is also seen in its approach to sales. In 
particular, the terms and process used to re-sell repossessed properties makes clear that the 
intended market is investors rather than owner-occupants. INFONAVIT auctions housing 
packages of 10 to 200 units, some of which may be in more than one state, to Mexican 
companies with experience in promoting and developing housing. The auction process 
unfolds over seven business days. INFONAVIT starts by announcing the general conditions 
of the upcoming housing auction for which eligible participants must register, specifying 
which packages they are interested in. Subsequently, participants are encouraged to visit the 
properties and submit questions or concerns before day seven, when participants must submit 
their offers. On that day, a contract is signed and the winner pays 10 percent of the final price, 
and then pays in full within the next 90 days. That same day, the new owner is free to start 
the rehabilitation or sale of its units (INFONAVIT 2017).95 
                                                          
94 In 2015, houses were sold on average at 128 thousand MxP, and in 2016 at an average of 208 thousand 
MxP. 
95 The INFONAVIT reserves the right to refuse all of the offers on any of the auctions if they are deemed 
unfavorable to the institution. The INFONAVIT, however, is responsible for any accumulated debt of the 






 At the same time, some states and companies are indeed shifting their business models 
away from construction and toward investment in existing communities. Baja California is a 
good example of this. Although the state’s housing market continues to struggle, of the 
18,434 housing units sold in 2016, almost 55 percent were existing homes/units. Because 
used housing units are sometimes fairly deteriorated, the most successful companies have 
arguably been those that specialize in this market and who have bought houses in somewhat 
consolidated areas (SHF 2015; Hernández 2017).96  
In the private sector, we are looking to buy houses in developments that are not as 
isolated, where there are schools, public transportation, certain infrastructure and 
urban amenities that allow families to live there. We are also profiling families a lot 
better, so I think that this vacancy is going to be absorbed through private sector 
efforts (Paladin 2016: personal interview). 
 In parallel, in 2010 INFONAVIT also provided modest seed funding for the formation 
of Fundación Hogares, an organization created to promote community rehabilitation, self-
management and social cohesion, and avoid recurrent abandonment on areas with very high 
concentrations of vacant housing. Fundación Hogares recognized that  
these housing developments do not promote social cohesion, people work and 
allocate a lot of time in their day to commuting, this makes it hard for them to know 
their neighbors and complicates the formation of a social fabric and community 
participation (Fundación Hogares 2016: personal interview).  
INFONAVIT identified 36 priority areas in the country and selected eight to implement 
community rehabilitation pilot projects. Some areas were not considered due to severe issues 
of insecurity, such as the presence of drug cartels and safe houses, situations that need to be 
addressed through other crime prevention initiatives. Furthermore, only areas with vacancy 
                                                          







rates below 30 percent were considered to provide viable grounds for community 
participation. 
 The three lines of action for these pilot projects have been community development, 
physical rehabilitation and program evaluation. Community development strategies have 
been designed to train communities to diagnose issues, form collaborations with the public 
and private sectors, and propose solutions and projects to address their problems. The practice 
has been to form advisory tables by theme (e.g. health, education, recreation, public space, 
youth, etc.) or locational cluster (if the layout of the development is too dispersed). 
Fundación Hogares remains involved with each community for only around two years, and 
its ultimate goal has been to form an official neighborhood council, association or 
cooperative that can continue to draft and execute projects and community action plans with 
clear priorities, objectives, team leaders and timelines.  
 The largest pilot project to date has taken place in Tijuana, Baja California, in 
partnership with the private sector. In 2011, PROVIVE, a company that rehabilitates and 
resells housing began purchasing housing in the neighborhood Cañadas del Florido, which 
had 1,200 abandoned housing units (Figure 6.6). PROVIVE created a very similar NGO of 
its own, Fundación Tú+Yo, with the aim of having a greater presence in the community. 
Because PROVIVE directly funds its NGO, it has the added benefit of having its 
contributions be tax deductible and of promoting a more positive image for the company. 
Yet, Fundación Tú+Yo claims that its purpose is to promote non-partisan community leaders 
that have the ability to draft and execute their own community projects and modify and 
improve their relationships with government institutions. This symbiotic relationship has 
allowed PROVIVE to rehabilitate and sell around 2,500 housing units in Tijuana alone. In 






has gone down from 22 percent in 2010, to 16 percent in 2014 and 5 percent in 2016, although 
they estimate that around 3 percent of the housing units are occupied by squatters.97 In 2013 
a neighborhood associations was formed in Cañadas del Florido and in 2015 INFONAVIT 
helped finance a rehabilitation project which included the construction of a community center 
(PROVIVE 2016: personal interview). 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Abandoned House in Cañadas del Florido, Tijuana, Baja California. 
Source: Los Angeles Times 2017. 
                                                          
97 Similarly, in another area in which PROVIVE intervened, Hacienda las Delicias, their surveys estimate that 
the vacancy rate went down from 35 percent in 2010, to 26 percent in 2014 and 5 percent in 2016, also with 






 Fundación Hogares has also promoted smaller scale efforts, lasting around 5 months, 
to identify a major issue in a community, rehabilitate a particular space, and encourage 
neighbors to continue longer-term community initiatives and projects, such as the painting 
of murals, cleaning days, and similar activities that require few resources and little 
coordination. Between 2015 and 2016, a new initiative was also implemented in the 
development Manuel M. Ponce in Fresnillo, Zacatecas. This initiative was thought of as a 
preventative measure to avoid future abandonment through a small rehabilitation project. 
Neighbors participated in the rehabilitation of a parking lot in which they planted trees, 
painted murals and built sitting spaces (Zepeda 2016). In addition, Fundación Hogares uses 
a series of indicators to evaluate its efforts, such as amount of rehabilitated space, number of 
urban amenities built, coverage of painted walls, number of neighbors involved, time 
invested by residents in community projects, donated and collected resources, among other 
indicators. They have also constructed a social cohesion indicator measuring aspects such as 








Figure 6.7: Unidad Manuel M. Ponce in Fresnillo, Zacatecas. 
 While these efforts seem to be pointed in the right direction, they remain at a pilot 
stage and it is not yet clear if they will have the scale and resources to aid all of the troubled 
communities around the country. If repossessions and resales are not accompanied by 
community projects, and better infrastructure and service provision, residents will continue 
to struggle and to abandon their dwellings. Furthermore, given the poor initial construction 
standards of many of these housing units, community projects will be insufficient if they are 
not accompanied by adequate housing rehabilitation.  
 
6.4 FEDERAL DENSIFICATION POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
Federal urban policy has also shifted in reaction to the problems generated by past policies. 
Given some of the issues that previous development patterns had contributed to, such as high 






Housing Commission, CONAVI, created the concept of urban growth boundaries in 2012. 
The first ring or U1 refers to the intra-urban areas that have services and infrastructure and 
that concentrate economic activities. U2 encompasses the zones where at least 75 percent of 
housing units have water and drainage access, among other essential services and 
infrastructure. Lastly, U3 acts as a virtual border to contain urban expansion. In parallel, as 
part of its 2013-2018 National Development Plan, the federal Urban and Regional 
Development Ministry, SEDATU, was created. The new agency was intended to establish 
the importance of promoting compact cities, mobility, sustainable housing, a unification of 
land use policy, and inter-institutional and intergovernmental coordination (SHF 2013 & 
2014).  
INFONAVIT no longer finances housing outside the U3 boundaries, arguably to 
contain the continuous sprawl of Mexican cities and to promote housing production in more 
accessible locations that promote better living conditions. Yet, critics have noted that 
INFONAVIT-financed construction continues in peri-urban areas because such boundaries 
have been drawn and modified in constant negotiation with developers, particularly those 
that have good political relationships. Even Fundación Hogares, an organization created with 
INFONAVIT seed funds, recognizes that  
there are places where there is abandoned housing and [housing] development is 
still going on, policies are falling short, regulations are not that clear, strong or 
efficient; while densification is being promoted, construction is still permitted in 
problematic areas (Fundación Hogares 2016: personal interview).  
Furthermore, densification in the first perimeter, U1, has been largely unsuccessful given the 
high land prices and the limited reach of land and housing subsidies to promote 
homeownership at the urban core, issues which also threaten to promote gentrification (Del 






housing production is in fact occurring along the fringes of Mexican cities. The chart below 
shows that most housing development is occurring on U3, which are peripheral areas that 
started to be developed about a decade ago.  
 
 
Figure 6.8: Percentage of Housing Units Built by Growth Boundary in Mexico. 
Graphic by the author. Source: SNIIV/CONAVI. 
 
 In 2013, when SEDATU was created, partly to support densification and urban 
revitalization strategies, INFONAVIT also opened a research institute to promote sustainable 
housing development. Urban growth boundaries have undoubtedly been the most tangible 
strategy that was drafted based on these broad revitalization goals. INFONAVIT now only 
grants credits and SEDATU only grants small housing and land subsidies within these growth 
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access to infrastructure and services (e.g. transportation, schools, clinics, parks, commerce), 
size, layout and density (multi-family vs. single-family), and use of eco-technologies.  
Yet, these subsidies are generally insufficient to promote low-income housing 
production in most inner-city areas, where land is most expensive. While some developers 
have adapted to these new policy shifts, it seems that their production has also shifted to 
middle and higher-income housing, and that landowners and speculators are absorbing the 
subsidies. Furthermore, some states and development companies have shown resistance to 
densification strategies and argued that there is no market demand for multi-family housing, 
that regulations are affecting housing production, and that they have already purchased land 
outside of the urban growth boundaries (CONAVI 2016; SEDATU 2016; Fundación Hogares 
2016; Habitat International Coalition-AL 2016: personal interviews). 
 Tijuana, Baja California provides an illustrative example. Un-serviced peripheral land 
is on average around 25 USD per square meter, whereas in the city land costs include basic 
services and range from 120 to 1,000 USD. This makes housing in the city unaffordable for 
most residents. Thus, many private developers have complained about the local alignment to 
federal development policies, which has recently led to the limiting of licensing and 
construction permits in the periphery, and also to regulations such as the increase of minimum 
lot sizes to 120 square meters (1,300 square feet), arguably to avoid issues of overcrowding. 
The private sector has argued that this has led to a deceleration in the construction industry 
given the limited credit capacity of most households.  
The state of Mexico is also trying to adapt to federal guidelines through state laws 
that foster mixed land uses, as opposed to previous zoning schemes that separated them. This 






in the past, as long as they are compatible with the existing infrastructure and service capacity 
(e.g. convenience stores, barber shops and beauty salons). In parallel, the state government 
plans to promote densification through higher floor to area ratios, multi-family housing and 
an environmental restitution guideline for developments with over 60 housing units that 
would provide amenities such as schools, and libraries. There seems to be less tension 
between the public and private sectors in this context, perhaps because housing construction 
did not come to so much of a complete halt as had occurred in Baja California. Furthermore, 
political alignment between the state and federal governments may also be helping in the 
drafting and implementation of development policies in this state. 
As we can see on the figures below (6.9 - 6.12), which provide the distribution of 
housing production at the state and municipal levels in our two cases, development patterns 
have shifted across regions. In comparison to the notable national increase in the share of 
housing production in zone U3, we can see that this has not occurred as sharply in Baja 
California nor in Tijuana, likely due to the limiting of licensing and construction permits in 
peripheral areas as indicated above. The state of Mexico, on the other hand, does exhibit a 
more similar distribution to that of the national level, despite their alleged efforts to adapt to 
federal densification strategies. This is even more notable in Huehuetoca, a peripheral 








Figure 6.9: Percentage of Housing Built by Growth Boundary in Baja California. 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Percentage of Housing Built by Growth Boundary in Tijuana, Baja California. 
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Figure 6.11: Percentage of Housing Built by Growth Boundary in the State of Mexico. 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Percentage of Housing Built by Growth Boundary in Huehuetoca. 
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 There is a general recognition that in most contexts planning programs and 
regulations are insufficient to successfully promote affordable housing in urban centers. 
There are no normative, legal and urban planning conditions to apply the guidelines 
outlined on the National Development Plan… The necessary conditions do not exist 
for a low-income housing development model to be successful… Land use, local 
and state policies are generally not aligned with the National Development Plan and, 
therefore, in the state of Mexico it is very complicated to build well-located and 
adequate housing accessible to low-income households (INFONAVIT delegate 
2016: personal interview). 
Similarly, the SEDATU acknowledges that  
in metropolitan regions such as Monterrey and Guadalajara, not even the highest 
allowable subsidies can compete with the exorbitant land prices, not even those that 
are granted to build in urban centers or historical areas in the first urban growth 
boundary… Middle-income housing production can be feasible in some contexts, 
and so in some cities we are in fact seeing densification processes and housing 
construction because buyers are willing to pay a higher cost and understand the 
value of inhabiting an apartment instead of a house… But in the north, for instance, 
there is more resistance to multi-family housing. They think that there is enough 
land but cities in the north are also growing in a haphazard and sprawling manner, 
imitating perhaps North American cities, but neither the municipalities nor the 
people have the resources or infrastructure to sustain that development and 
commuting model (SEDATU official 2016: personal interview). 
Planning experts also conclude that the National Development Plan  
has no ‘teeth’ nor clear incentives to achieve its implementation. The urban growth 
boundaries have not really incentivized developers to build in inner cities, and you 
can see that in CONAVI’s statistics, which show that only 7 or 8 percent of housing 
is being built inside the U1 growth boundaries… These strategies are not really 
changing the ways in which our cities grow, the same is true of the new Law of 
Human Settlements, is non-binding, and so they remain as discourses of good 
intentions and concepts that do not turn into actual legislation… Another issue is the 
budget, next year SEDATU will experience a 38 percent cut in its budget, planning 
and housing resources have cuts of over 40 percent, and so if we really want to open 
the possibility to a new development model, we are falling short in legal, 
management and fiscal mechanisms. We also should not forget that while 
municipalities should have all the capabilities to guide their development, the law 






housing policy and development are INFONAVIT and CONAVI, because they have 
the money… So while urban policy has moved forward in the last four years, it has 
also been very limited by the change every year and a half of SEDATU’s head, who 
generally also does not have the adequate professional experience, in INFONAVIT 
something very similar happens (WRI 2016: personal interview). 
 
In addition, while recently there has been a discursive emphasis at the federal level in 
the promotion of densification, both INFONAVIT and SEDATU have continued to heavily 
promote new housing construction. The federal government, for instance, has continued to 
increase access to bridge loans for housing construction (CONAVI 2016). In some parts of 
the country, some housing investment has gone to the purchase and resale of existing 
housing. Yet, housing rehabilitation and expansion, which tend to be important strategies to 
promote better living conditions for lower-income households, continue to receive very 
limited funding. Although the federal government has launched programs for housing 
rehabilitation and rent, the resources allocated to these are still marginal in comparison to 
those for new housing construction (Figure 6.13).  
 
Figure 6.13: Distribution of National Housing Finance (MxP). 
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 Here again, we see important variations among the case studies (Figures 6.14 – 6.17). 
The state of Mexico shares yet again a very similar housing finance distribution to that of the 
entire country, although notably, the municipality of Huehuetoca has experienced a much 
more modest increase in housing finance to purchase existing home units, and even more so, 
for home improvements. Tijuana and Baja California in general, have experienced a much 
more significant increase in the housing finance that has been used to purchase used housing, 
which may be related to the Cañadas del Florido pilot project carried out by PROVIVE 
(private) and Fundación Hogares (INFONAVIT) and described in the previous section. 
Nonetheless, that trend may not continue if similar projects are not continuously 
implemented.  
 
Figure 6.14: Distribution of Housing Finance in the State of Mexico (MxP). 
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Figure 6.15: Distribution of Housing Finance in Huehuetoca, State of Mexico (MxP). 
 
 
Figure 6.16: Distribution of Housing Finance in Baja California (MxP). 
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Figure 6.17: Distribution of Housing Finance in Tijuana, Baja California (MxP). 
Graphic by the author. Source: SNIIV. 
 
Lastly, a very important consideration is that, particularly in recent years, middle and 
upper income housing construction in Mexico has become an increasingly attractive 
investment for developers (Figure 6.18). The number of middle-income units built between 
2015 and 2016 in the country grew by almost 20 percent and upper-income units by almost 
8 percent. In some states, the growth has been particularly significant. Baja California, for 
instance, saw an increase in upper-income housing sales in this period by 75 percent 
(Gutierrez 2017), and similar trends are evident in the state of Mexico (Figure 6.19). 
INFONAVIT has followed this shift by increasing its credit cap from 900 thousand to 1.5 
million MxP in 2017, a 68 percent increase. It also increased its interest rate to 12 percent. 
Furthermore, it is also now offering a second credit to affiliates who have finished paying 
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that with these shifts the institute is sending a message of reassurance to the housing industry 
(Muñoz Ríos 2016b, Rosas 2016).  
 
 
Figure 6.18: National Housing Finance per Income Bracket. 
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Figure 6.19: Housing Finance per Income Bracket in the State of Mexico. 
 
 
Figure 6.20: Housing Finance per Income Bracket in Baja California. 
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The housing development boom that took place during the 2000s and its problematic effects 
eventually prompted responses at different levels and from different sectors. Residents have 
managed their hardships, individually and collectively, in diverse ways. The most timid 
efforts have involved the hiring of private services and do-it-yourself fixes to their deficient 
home and infrastructure construction. When residents have been able to organize at a larger 
level their wins have been neither quick nor straightforward. Yet, particularly in the state of 
Mexico, some neighborhood groups have been able to improve their living situation through 
negotiations with both the public and private sectors to finish infrastructure projects and 
provide a higher level of services.  
Notably, civic efforts also led to the formation of the Frente Mexiquense, which has 
undergone important legal battles against public and private figures responsible for the 
construction of deficient housing and development projects, as well as to prevent housing 
foreclosures and evictions. Alongside it, other social organizations have offered similar legal 
aid to residents. Another strategy has been to restructure the debt of homeowner groups with 
banks and mortgage lenders. While this has worked in some instances, some mortgage 
companies have seen these efforts as a risk to their economy, and arguably, INFONAVIT has 
been one of the toughest negotiators. 
INFONAVIT seed funding for modest community development projects in high 
vacancy areas arguably remains a fairly timid strategy on a trial basis rather than one that 
truly seeks to address issues in all and the most problematic developments. In contrast, 






deal with its delinquent portfolio; its own director described its role as that of a hedge fund 
(Escobar González 2017: personal interview). Thus, since 2012, it has strengthened its 
repossession efforts, and more recently, has been auctioning off these repossessed housing 
units. Since these houses are sold at discounted prices to the private sector to rehabilitate and 
resell, social organizations have protested and questioned the fairness of these processes. 
This tension between residents and mortgage institutions seems to reflect a long-standing 
tension in Mexican housing policy between the use and exchange value of housing, and 
possibly be at the center of the paradoxical coexistence of a housing oversupply and a 
shortage.  
New INFONAVIT and federal policies have arguably incentivized some companies 
and developers to shift their business models and to look at densification as an attractive 
investment that may limit the continuous sprawl of Mexican cities. A central strategy has 
been the creation of urban growth boundaries along Mexican metropolitan regions and cities, 
within which INFONAVIT grants housing credits and the federal government grants land 
and housing subsidies. Yet, critics have contested the drawing and effectiveness of such 
boundaries and highlighted the difficulty of producing affordable housing in most inner city 
areas were land is most expensive. Thus, recent policies seem to be promoting higher-income 
housing production and allowing private landowners and speculators to appropriate public 
subsidies. Furthermore, as in the past, at the local level there are only limited legal and fiscal 
planning mechanisms to follow and foster federal densification guidelines. The lack of fiscal 
commitment of federal institutions and of ‘teeth’ of most national regulations has thus 
severely limited recent objectives. Furthermore, financial institutions and federal policies 






and middle-income housing production are evidently not addressing the issues that peripheral 























Chapter 7: Discussion: The Marketization of Housing Rights in Mexico 
 
“Housing institutes lost their social focus since the 1990s but Fox’s administration 
propelled market production, and this has continued until this day with EPN, even after the 
disaster that represented the dismantling of regulation and urban planning, which started 
with Salinas’, although this was a global phenomenon… The result of leaving all in the 
hands of the market has been the unprecedented sprawl of Mexican cities at a rate that has 
far surpassed population growth… Low-income households do not want to be tied to debt 
for 30 years and pay three times the value of their homes, poverty has many contingencies, 
they need a different finance alternative” (Habitat International Coalition-América Latina 
2016: personal interview). 
This final chapter will synthesize and summarize the main takeaways of the dissertation 
and provide an assessment of current and future policy directions. Arguably, even within 
the recent recognition of past failures, Mexican housing policy continues to follow 
economic aims that are in direct conflict with the objective of securing the Constitutional 
right to adequate housing. Current densification efforts, for instance, continue to focus 
narrowly on new housing construction and have failed to incorporate the necessary fiscal 
and regulatory mechanisms that would more effectively promote affordable housing 
production. I will end by also discussing how strategies could be reframed at different 
levels, including federal, local and civic.   
It has been argued before (Schwartz & Seabrooke 2008), and here again, that 
housing finance systems are not politically neutral. Rather, and given the macro-economic 
centrality of residential property to economic development and stability around the world, 
they rely on sophisticated systems of governance that often favor corporate capital. 
Through the housing sector, for instance, the real estate market has absorbed a great deal of 
surplus capital, particularly since neoliberalism achieved hegemonic status before the turn 
of the millennium and became naturalized as the proper mode of governance in a variety of 






socioeconomic and political implications, especially as redistribution came to be regarded 
as an impediment to international competitiveness and as government failures became the 
central justification for the rollback of state intervention. Furthermore, besides the lack of 
attention placed on power relations and institutional conditions, the notion of market 
failures has increasingly disappeared from policy dialogues (Peck and Theodore 2007, 
Hackworth 2007, Harvey 2008). 
Under this influence, Mexican housing policy has arguably imposed profoundly 
localized costs on neighborhoods and local communities. ‘Social’ housing in Mexico has 
served to generate profits over the last couple of decades rather than to provide lower-
income households with adequate living standards. “Developers have taken advantage of 
the aspiration of lower-income sectors to own a home” (Arq. Felipe Leal 2018, El 
Universal newspaper interview). As lower-middle income formal workers gained access to 
the property market, advocates of this approach (e.g. the World Bank) assumed that formal 
property ownership would allow people to see housing not only as a place of refuge, and 
thus a dead asset, but also as productive capital that would ultimately empower them. Yet, 
these new owners have faced limited access to employment opportunities, and urban 
infrastructure and services. Furthermore, they are now in debt and have poured much of 
their life savings into mortgages for houses that offer them a very poor quality of life. A 
key outcome of this expansion of credit has thus been the concentration of vacant 
properties; the parallel increase in housing credit-driven production and vacancy should 
seem less paradoxical by now.  
In contrast to the US, the Mexican constitution establishes a right to housing and 
gives governments the power to impose limitations on private property if it is in the public 






good, and housing development has occurred with little regard to the socioeconomic and 
environmental externalities it has imposed. Despite recent shifts in Mexico’s federal 
housing policy, housing construction is still regarded as a pillar of the national economy 
that contributes a significant percentage to the country’s GDP. According to the National 
Chamber of Housing Development and Production (CANADEVI for its acronym in Spanish), 
on average, for every housing unit built 11 jobs are created and the local government receives 
27 thousand Mexican pesos for granting construction permits. Thus, institutions like 
INFONAVIT are largely concerned with delivering big numbers quickly, by increasing the 
number of credits granted every year in order to incentivize economic growth and 
accelerate the speed of el tren de vivienda. 
In 2014 INFONAVIT, the largest residential lender in the country with around 60 
percent of the mortgage market, entered a partnership to form a mortgage trust backed by the 
interests of its residential mortgage loans. Prominent Mexican entrepreneurs, and the founding 
partners of this trust, signed this agreement to acquire 55 percent of INFONAVIT’s portfolio. 
This arrangement was particularly attractive because INFONAVIT remained responsible for 
credit management and able to deduct mortgage payments from workers’ wages. Subsequently, 
various foreign investment banks, such as Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley, entered this 
business venture as well. Economic analysts envisioned this as a great opportunity to expand 
middle-income housing finance and construction (Huerta 2015). Similarly, in early 2017 a 
housing accord (El Pacto por la Vivienda) was signed between the federal government, 
developers and financing institutions to strengthen the housing construction, which had been 
debilitated after the global financial crisis of 2008. One of the main stipulations was to establish 






in decision-making processes regarding housing subsidies, urban growth boundaries, urban 
development plans, and local and state regulations (SHF 2015, Rosas 2017a). 
In other words, governance in Mexico has become synonymous with assisting 
private-sector housing development, rather than planning for or regulating it. With 
Mexico’s liberalization of the economy and the decentralization of government functions, 
local governments and the private sector were supposed to take control of urban 
development and housing production. Yet, local governments have generally lacked strong 
and stable institutional elements to adequately respond to neoliberal and decentralization 
schemes. High levels of urban poverty, informality, and now vacancy, have created a 
vicious cycle by limiting municipal revenue generation and, in return, public investment 
and government responses.  Moreover, a decline in real wages and the roll-back of state 
programs have hindered the possibilities for Mexicans to improve their living conditions, 
particularly for isolated households with limited access to economic opportunities and 
urban services. Thus, structural reforms and the shift in the government’s role in housing 
matters – from being heavily involved in production to market facilitator – has not occurred 
without its hardships, such as increasing levels of inequality and segregation.  
The emphasis on market returns produced a particular spatial pattern of 
development: in the 2000s Mexico had the third highest rate of urban sprawl among OECD 
countries (OECD 2015). Large population centers and metropolitan areas have become a 
particular matter of concern given the multitude of lower level – and often completely 
disconnected –governments that they contain. This fragmentation is also a challenge for 
urban management and planning, and socioeconomic differences between jurisdictions 
have fostered important disparities in service provision (Roberts and Wilson 2009; Ward et 








Figure 7.1: Housing Developments in Querétaro and Escobedo (Monterrey, N.L.). 
Source: Arq. Jorge Taboada. 
 
7.1 MEXICO’S HOUSING PARADOX REVISITED 
Particularly around the turn of the millennium, Mexico’s urban development began to be 
characterized by the construction of massive housing developments along the urban fringes 
of major cities. This was largely achieved by expanding mortgage access for formal 
workers (about forty percent of the working population in Mexico – ILO 2014) who 
contribute five percent of their earnings to a national housing fund – INFONAVIT (Figure 
7.2).98 Paradoxically, however, despite this expansion around a third of Mexicans live in 
overcrowded or poor housing conditions. Arguably, this has partially occurred because 
most of these housing issues would have been better addressed through rehabilitation 
                                                          
98 A secondary market of mortgage-backed securities and a guarantee program operated by a second-tier 
development bank also gave the housing market a significant boost. By 2008, Mexico became the largest 






strategies, which usually serve the most marginalized households, such as people that work 
in the informal economy, earn very-low incomes, or live in rural areas (Figure 7.3). Yet, 
during the 2000s, over 90 percent of government credits went to the construction and 
purchasing of new housing that can only be accessed by lower-middle income formal 
workers, most of whom live in urban areas that concentrate formal employment. In other 
words, housing production has not been fostered in the areas with the most pressing 
housing needs and housing finance remains inaccessible to a majority of the population 
(Connoly 2006, Eibenschutz and Goya Escobedo 2009, SHF 2010, IDB 2011, Ponce 
Sernicharo 2011, Soederberg 2015, Ward et al. 2015). 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Number of Loans (in thousands) Financed by INFONAVIT from 1973 to 2011. 








Figure 7.3: Population Distribution by Income Level and Housing Access in 2002. 
Source: Connoly 2006. 
 
 Housing finance strategies were part of the country’s structural and neoliberal 
reforms in the 1990s.99 As such, they were promoted as technical and apolitical finance 
tools for the provision of affordable and low-income housing. It was also presumed that the 
market would be more efficient in providing decent housing for lower income households. 
Yet, housing finance systems are never politically neutral (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008), 
and Mexico is no exception. The construction and finance sectors have flourished 
economically with state support through favorable policies, legal framing and subsidies that 
                                                          
99 In 1992, el Programa para el Fomento y Desregulación de Vivienda was introduced to diminish the role  of 
the Mexican state in housing production.  
































have permitted private companies to speculate through mortgages guaranteed by the state 
(Monkkonen 2011a). Furthermore, the private sector has had considerable influence on 
development matters. Meanwhile, under some estimates, only 32 percent of Mexicans are 
mortgage eligible (UN-Habitat 2011) and the extent to which Mexican households saw an 
improvement in their living conditions is up to much heated debate.  
I argue, therefore, that housing inaccessibility is being recreated and normalized by 
the Mexican government and that neoliberal reforms have served as a politically guided 
intensification of market rule, rather than an apolitical and technocratic framework, as 
neoclassical advocates often argue (Peck and Theodore 2007). Contrary to the rhetoric of 
market-led efficiency, the Mexican government has played a key role in mitigating the risks 
for the construction and financial sectors, while not for Mexican households. The tight and 
dependent relationship between the Mexican government and private actors has thus 
yielded a significant concentration of market power and development influence while 
housing choices remain limited and inadequate (Soederberg 2015). 
Besides the inability of the liberalization of credit to adequately respond to the 
actual housing needs of the Mexican population, speculative and unregulated development 
also characterized the country’s housing boom, particularly in the 2000s. Most housing 
development has taken place in metropolitan areas and in large and medium urban centers 
despite relatively low population growth rates in many instances. Furthermore, it has 
occurred at urban peripheries were land is cheapest, frequently outside consolidated urban 
areas or even leapfrogging over vacant land. These mass housing estates have targeted 
working-class and lower middle-income families as an alternative to informal land 






access to city facilities and services, relative isolation, among other diseconomies, have led 
some to suggest that these experiments may become planning disasters (Ward et al. 2015).  
In parallel, Mexico has the highest vacancy rates among current OECD countries, 
even surpassing those that have recently emerged from a major housing bubble, such as 
Spain and the United States. The country’s vacancy rate increased from 11.6 percent in 
2000 to a bit over 14 percent in 2010 (OECD 2015). The nature and convergence of these 
issues is at the center of our discussion throughout this dissertation. In summary, however, 
the main problems of Mexico’s new development model have perhaps been the location 
and quality of the newly built housing, and its financial unsustainability. An 
overdependence on housing sector debt, among other problematic practices, led the housing 
sector to encounter severe financial problems to the point that a number of developers faced 
bankruptcy at the beginning of this decade. Households have also faced significant 
hardships in meeting their mortgage responsibilities, primarily given their poor economic 
situations and the ballooning of their debt through the years. Furthermore, houses in these 
isolated low-income areas often represent an unattractive investment (Ward 2009) and 
households have, in many instances, experienced a depreciation in the value of their homes, 
for which there might not be an effective market. 
 
7.2 CONTRASTING THE CASE STUDIES 
Rather than presenting the experiences of each case studies independently, I have tried to 
incorporate them within the larger arguments presented throughout the dissertation. 
Nonetheless, it is important to summarize the main takeaways, similarities and differences 






earlier, these cases were selected because of their vacancy issues, both at the local and state 
levels, but in particular, the role that federal housing finance policy (and INFONAVIT) 
played in their housing development and production during the 2000s. Nonetheless, 
although the two main case studies received very significant amounts of INFONAVIT 
financing during the last decade, private-sector financing is now converging with 
INFONAVIT’s, surpassing it in in the case of the State of Mexico (Figure 4.6).  
Similarly, the largest housing developers in the country had a very strong presence 
in both states and cities, particularly in the State of Mexico, perhaps given its centrality. In 
Tijuana and Baja California, regional housing developers have also played an important 
role. In any case, the private sector was very influential in both contexts and state 
governments were a strong source of support for them. In Baja California, since 1989, 
when the party in power shifted, the right-wing party PAN has taken a strong pro-
development and pro-private sector stance. In comparison, in the State of Mexico, which 
has always been governed by the PRI, the Ciudades Bicentenario initiative propelled 
housing development. Thus, despite their different political and institutional contexts, the 
private sector received a high level of state support in both cases. Even in the pilot case 
study of Zacatecas, where developers are generally much smaller local and regional 
companies, they have also received favorable treatment from different government 
administrations, again reinforcing the importance of public-private relations on the 
proliferation of the housing development patterns discussed throughout this research. 
Nonetheless, local needs and resources do play a role. Given the low economic 
productivity and high poverty rates in Zacatecas, for instance, the state government has had 
to intervene much more in terms of housing production. The state government has had a 






assistance, however, has occurred also in peripheral areas of the state’s capital and other 
major cities, most notably Fresnillo, leading also to high vacancy and abandonment, among 
other issues, such as severe insecurity and violence in these areas. Economic conditions – 
and political decisions – have also been influential in the other states.  
With many impoverished and previously agricultural municipalities, the State of 
Mexico decided to promote housing development precisely in these regions; not state-
financed, however, as in Zacatecas, but INFONAVIT-financed housing. Nonetheless, 
strong state-level intervention seems to have incentivized housing construction to continue 
well after 2012, when production had come to almost a complete halt in other parts of the 
country, including Baja California. Housing production is just starting to recover in 
Tijuana’s urban core, but mostly through the production of higher income housing, 
suggesting perhaps a more truly free-market operation. State-level housing programs in this 
context – that in other Mexican regions aid the lowest-income households or those in the 
informal economy not covered by INFONAVIT – are virtually non-existent.  
At the local level, it could be argued that Tijuana, particularly given its size, 
economic importance and low-level of fragmentation, has a relatively strong local 
government. Furthermore, Tijuana opened one of the first metropolitan agencies – 
IMPLANs – in the country. Yet, over the years, both local and metropolitan governance 
have proved to be relatively weak in this context, perhaps by choice and given the pro-
development ideologies at both the local and state levels (although there has been some 
alternation between the PRI and PAN at the local level). In the State of Mexico, both local 
and metropolitan governance are particularly weak – and problematic. The capital of the 
state, Toluca, is only one municipality, but the real urban challenge for the state are the 59 






local governments is somewhat contingent on their size and economic performance, but 
municipalities that form part of this large metropolitan region, particularly peripheral ones, 
are fairly small and weak. Metropolitan governance is highly fragmented and the regional 
plans drafted by the State of Mexico have not been coordinated with Mexico City’s 
government, perhaps in part due to political differences (since gaining political and 
administrative autonomy in 1997, Mexico City has been governed by the left-wing PRD). 
As discussed in previous chapters, mortgage defaults, in both Baja California and 
the State of Mexico are above the national average and on an upward trajectory. Similarly, 
in both cases, vacancy concentrations are found in peri-urban areas, where there are also 
high levels of housing abandonment and irregular home occupations. Yet, there seems to be 
more social control of housing developments in the State of Mexico, perhaps given higher 
historical levels of civic organizing. The same is true regarding home occupations, which 
have been both halted and promoted by different groups in the State of Mexico, leading 
some times to social conflict. Conversely, in Baja California squatting seems to be a 
widespread but more individualized practice. At a larger scale, in both contexts, social 
organizations (e.g. El Barzón and Movimiento Urbano Popular) have also emerged to 
provide legal aid to households seeking to refinance mortgages and avoid foreclosures and 
evictions.  
Finally, regional developers in Baja California, and Tijuana in particular, have 
arguably adjusted better to new markets and housing needs by entering more forcefully into 
the rehabilitation market. In doing so, however, they have worked closely with 
INFONAVIT through its auctioning program and the large pilot project incentivizing 
community revitalization in Cañadas del Florido, Tijuana. Nonetheless, it is not yet clear 







7.3 THE PERILS OF DENSIFICATION 
“If urban land continues to be inaccessible, we will continue to have marginalized 
populations living in peri-urban areas, and if real estate speculation is not controlled, no 
housing policy will ever work. The social function of land needs to be recognized, it is 
outrageous that we have idle land speculated over so that developers can profit while there 
are people without a place to live” (TECHO México 2016: personal interview). 
“If compact development is truly the objective, you have to think about lower-income 
households who comprise more than half of the population… If you think of land as a 
commodity that can only be bought by those with enough resources, you will only promote 
the construction of semi-vacant high rises that no one can afford” (Habitat International 
Coalition-América Latina 2016: personal interview). 
Federal housing policies continue to insist on and promote housing production, even within 
the new discourse of densification. Notably, such policies were put in effect already in 
Mexico City. Yet, within densification and urban infill policies, one of the main challenges 
is to produce or even maintain housing affordability. Furthermore, although much of the 
responsibility may fall on local governments to promote adequate zoning schemes, higher 
densities and land and fiscal controls, financing is likely to continue to play a very 
important role in affordable housing production (INFONAVIT delegate 2016: personal 
interview). Thus, the federal and state governments will probably have to diversify and 
strengthen their housing strategies as well. 
In the case of Mexico City, as the local government gained political and 
administrative autonomy during the 1990s with the formation of a Legislative Assembly 
and the establishment of mayoral elections in 1997, a set of institutions, norms and 






development patterns.100 With increasing resources, the second administration was able to 
ramp uup housing programs and densification strategies in the early 2000s. However, a 
sharp increase in land prices at the urban core, lack of collaboration with other levels of 
government, the deficient monitoring of programs and incentives, and the reduction in the 
allocation of resources to affordable housing programs by the subsequent administration in 
the late 2000s significantly hindered earlier efforts. 
 In the early 2000s, Mexico City’s housing institute (INVI) accounted for almost 15 
percent of the total housing investment in the city. This is by far the largest housing 
investment by a local or state institution in the country. In the State of Mexico, for instance, 
public housing investment peaked at 1.5 percent in 2004. These public housing investments 
are directed to the lowest income households that do not qualify for INFONAVIT 
mortgages. Notably, around 70 percent of INVI loans in Mexico City in the 2000s were 
used for rehabilitation. Furthermore, affordable housing projects were promoted in core 
areas with adequate services and urban infrastructure. On December 7, 2000, Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador, the then major of Mexico City, also implemented Bando 2, an 
urban growth boundary to address depopulation at the urban core, utilize existing 
infrastructure more efficiently, increase housing access, and restrict large real-estate 
development in the periphery and in conservation land. Bando 2 promoted infill 
development in four core districts,101 which were the destination of about half the trips 
made daily in Mexico City. It also restricted large-scale development in nine of the 
                                                          
100 Among the most notable, in 1997, the Growth Management Norm 26 was implemented to incentivize 
affordable housing production, in 1998 the local housing institute (INVI) was created and in 2000 a local 
housing bill was passed. 






remaining twelve districts to the southwest of the city (GDF 2003; PAOT 2006; CONAVI 
2012; INVI 2012). 
 The drastic cut in the availability of developable land, however, led to a rapid 
increase in land and housing prices.102 In the four central districts, land prices grew by 205 
percent just in the first half of the decade. Thus, even when considerable public financial 
investment was allocated to the production of low-income housing, the credits that the 
INVI could grant were eventually too low to cover land costs at the urban core. Thus, one 
of the main critiques of Bando 2 was that it did not incorporate the necessary regulatory or 
fiscal mechanisms to prevent or respond to such a sharp increase in land prices. 
Furthermore, lack of coordination with the federal and other state governments led to the 
proliferation of housing developments adjacent to Mexico City’s boundaries (Pradilla and 
Pino 2004; Lazcano 2005; Tamayo 2007).  In part due to these issues, the next mayor, 
Marcelo Ebrard Casaubón, repealed Bando 2 to promote densification along transit 
corridors, rather than only in the central districts, through property tax reductions and 
similar incentives. INVI’s credit cap was also increased under this administration and land 
banking strategies were significantly reduced.103 The expropriation of at-risk housing that 
had taken place during the former administration came to be regarded as a necessary first 
step toward addressing housing issues through rehabilitation and, when necessary, 
relocation (INVI 2012; Reyes 2013). 
 Another very significant issue related to local housing and densification efforts was 
the poor implementation and monitoring of local policies and laws. Perhaps the clearest 
                                                          
102 Bando 2 reduced suitable land for low income housing development from 20,324 to 6,478 hectares in the 
city. 
103 From 1997 to 2000, 119 properties were expropriated, 678 from 2001 to 2006, and 66 from 2007 to 2012. 
Similarly, 77 government properties were used from 2001 to 2006 to build affordable housing, compared to 4 






example of this was the de facto use of Growth Management Norm 26. This local law 
sought to incentivize low-income housing104 production by allowing higher densities and 
building heights and reduced parking and open space requirements.105 Yet, despite multiple 
reforms and suspensions, developers continuously misused the Norm and did not abide by 
its pricing caps. In 2005, Norm 26 was reformed to force developers to solicit a tax 
reduction to facilitate the verification of selling costs. On August 2010, the Norm was 
suspended and reformed once again to require developers to submit a financial analysis as 
proof of net capital flows and selling prices, yet on October 2012, it was suspended yet 
again because of its continuous misuse. Although these suspensions did not apply to 
projects financed by the INVI, they definitely represented a lost opportunity for affordable 
housing production (Ramírez 2005; Reyes 2013). 
 Some low-income residents were certainly able to access housing in the city’s 
central districts through local housing programs. Yet, much of the densification of Mexico 
City’s urban core ended up occuring through the production of higher income housing, 
particularly in districts like Benito Juárez and Miguel Hidalgo. Land and housing values 
have increased significantly in these areas and most low and middle-income residents are 
increasingly unable to access adequate housing in these locations. The INVI has provided 
significant but inconsistent support to low-income individuals and residents in the city. In 
contrast with INFONAVIT loans, the local government has provided zero-interest and 
subsidized housing alternatives that incorporated community input. Local actions, however, 
were clearly insufficient to counteract inequitable and unsustainable development patterns 
                                                          
104 The norm set an initial cap of 15 minimum annual wages for low-income housing and 25 for lower-middle 
income housing. In 2005 the cap was raised to 30. 
105 Norm 26 increased the allowed building heights for affordable housing production from 5 to 6 levels inside 
the first ring road (Circuito Interior), from 6 to 8 between the first ring and the beltway (Anillo Periférico), 






at the larger metropolitan level, and private interests significantly overshadowed public 
ones. The Mexico City case illustrates that densification and affordable housing efforts 
require the coordination of different policies and institutions, land and fiscal regulations 
and rigorous monitoring mechanisms as minimum prerequisites for success (Reyes 2013). 
 
7.4 RESPONSIBILITIES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
Mexico’s housing development model has yielded multiple problems, including a 
monopolistic construction sector and the multitude of negative externalities produced by 
housing developments around the country. Complacency towards real estate development 
has thus allowed private developers to capitalize, appropriate and internalize unmerited 
public resources. Furthermore, although many economists would not assign direct 
responsibility to the market, the clear inability of the private sector to generate adequate 
low-income housing arguably serves as a powerful social justification for a very different 
kind of state intervention in which private gains and social costs are more balanced. Such 
efforts would likely face many barriers and require an ideological shift. Unfortunately, 
market failures – and the need to address them – are very often eclipsed by the inefficiency 
and corruption of governments and their intervention (Hackworth 2007). Thus, it is 
paramount that the design and implementation of policies is done carefully and 
transparently to effectively improve housing and urban conditions moving forward. Such 
efforts should also recognize that multiple (public) interests have a legitimate right to be 







7.4.1 Federal and Financial 
Some steps have already been taken in the right direction. In 2015, INFONAVIT stopped 
granting loans in minimum salaries and started a pilot project to offer some beneficiaries 
the possibility of restructuring their mortgages with a fixed interest rate of 12 percent. 
However, applicants must have a credit that is between 5 and 10 years old and with no 
defaults or extensions. Furthermore, federal agencies such as the National Housing 
Commission (CONAVI) are promoting a more diverse array of loans to buy used housing, 
rehabilitate or expand housing, and for individual production or self-help. Yet, the 
resources poured into these different housing strategies continues to be very limited. A 
notable restriction on self-help programs, for instance, is that loans require applicants to 
build their housing in less than 5 months (Muñoz Ríos 2015, CONAVI 2017).  
Such efforts thus fail to recognize that low-income households require different 
strategies to improve their living conditions because they do not necessarily have the 
capacity to take out a mortgage. Increasing the scope and resources for technical assistance 
for self-construction, housing rehabilitation and community revitalization strategies and 
rental housing programs, could allow people to improve their living conditions in better-
located areas. Similarly, informal workers, who constitute an important share of Mexican 
workers, must be incorporated into housing strategies. Even the former INFONAVIT 
director, José Antonio Revah Lacouture, has argued that at least semi-informal workers 
(e.g. waiters and taxi drivers), should be included in INFONAVIT’s policies. 
The appropriate use of public resources continues to be a very important and 
sensitive matter. In 2012, a reform allowed INFONAVIT to diversify its investment 
through less conservative financial mechanisms that provide higher yields but also higher 






companies, a percentage that is expected to continue to rise. Yet, concerns have been raised 
about the lack of transparency in the fund’s management, which in 2015 reported 
significant losses. SEDATU’s behavior, however, has been arguably more worrisome. In 
Baja California in 2013, at least 5 million MxP worth of subsidies coming from SEDATU 
went missing. Hundreds of housing vouchers were given to low-income residents of 
Tijuana to purchase construction materials but such vouchers were void, although the 
construction company in charge of delivering these materials allegedly received payment. 
Furthermore, at least 250 recipients failed to complete their housing with the given subsidy, 
which puts them in a sort of default. In addition, almost 35 million MxP were transferred to 
Baja California’s SEDATU office without clear purpose or justification, besides that of 
holding public events to deliver such vouchers and subsidies.  
In 2016, it was also reported that a number of federal agencies exceeded their 
assigned advertising expenditures by significant amounts. Among them, SEDATU was 
second, with an increase of 9,342 percent. Its assigned advertising budget was around 5 
million MxP yet it spent over 405 million. Currently, SEDATU is also in the middle of a 
fraud scandal for diverting at least 653 million MxP106 of its budget between 2014 and 2016 
to eight shell companies with neither capital, employees or infrastructure to sustain their 
operations or provide any type of service. Much of this spending allegedly went to the 
promotion of and diffusion of government programs, but this outsourcing of services was 
made in a discretionary manner and the expenditure for subcontracted services surpassed 
the 49 percentage allowed by Mexican law (Mexicoelaks 2015; Montalvo 2017; Ureste and 
Roldán 2018). 
 
                                                          
106 Up to three times as much is estimated to have been diverted in conjunction with SEDESOL, Mexico’s 






7.4.2 Local and Regulatory 
Most experts agree that land use planning and local regulations, such as mixed uses and 
inclusionary zoning, are necessary to achieve a more sustainable and inclusive 
development. Yet, in very few instances have these mechanisms been used at the local level 
in Mexico. Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, a municipality in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, 
Jalisco, has been one of the very few local governments that has actually imposed 
important regulatory measures to contain urban sprawl, poor housing conditions and 
housing abandonment, among other issues. In 2016, this local government stopped granting 
construction permits for new housing developments, prohibited the construction of housing 
units smaller than 60 square meters, and changed the land use of 800 hectares from 
residential to commercial and industrial. This followed around a decade of rampant housing 
construction in which previous administrations authorized up to 25,000 housing units a year 
(Romo 2017). 
 In general, however, it is clear that planning agencies and coordination between 
different government levels and institutions have been extremely weak and inefficient. To 
begin addressing this issue it will be necessary to improve local finances and revenue 
streams. Only then, will municipal governments be able to adequately guide and oversee 
their growth and development, and provide adequate infrastructure and services. Thus, 
efficient policy drafting, implementation and monitoring should be at the center of local 
capacity building. An important challenge will also be the discussion and design of land use 
policies, such as land capture mechanisms and other speculation controls, which have been 
very difficult to implement in Mexico and beyond since important development interests 
oppose them. Yet, accounting for negative and positive externalities is a chief condition of 






boosting affordable housing production in well-located areas, for instance, can be supported 
through inclusionary zoning and land banking strategies. Similarly, stronger local 
governments would also be better equipped to promote some of the incipient community 
revitalization initiatives discussed in the previous chapter. Yet, as with the expansion and 
improvement to infrastructure and service provision, local governments will likely require 
state and federal financial support.  
Policies that regulate land markets and speculation, as well as urban planning and 
development in general, will be paramount to improve development patterns and access to 
land and housing. Successful local governments have not been mere market facilitators, but 
rather, have set clear guidelines and been active participants (Jiménez Huerta 2014). 
Throughout Latin America, there is increasing recognition of the need to strengthen local 
government finances to confront to urban planning challenges – and promote greater social 
equity in cities. Land value capture mechanisms, for instance, that recover a part or all of 
the land price increases that are a product of public investment, have been implemented in 
different forms throughout the region. Recently, Brazil and Colombia (and Cordoba, 
Argentina and Cuenca, Ecuador) have approved concrete legislation to implement such 
strategies. Beyond an additional stream of resources, land value capture is a way to address 
land market imperfections and even improve development patterns.  
Yet, powerful interest groups, such as property owners and real estate developers, 
have often hindered the adoption of these and similar strategies (as with Mexico City’s 
recent failed attempt to pass land value capture legislation). Generally, there is a substantial 
gap between rhetoric and practice or a very limited understanding of the basic operational 
aspects behind these mechanisms. Yet these types of strategies could bring fiscal benefits to 






serve. Effective implementation also continues to be one of the main challenges, as well as 
public support. Nonetheless, an important finding has been that such strategies have not 
halted real estate development, as opponents often argue. However, implementation 
requires flexibility and there will always be a learning curve and a trial-and-error phase. 
Furthermore, it is paramount to have updated land registries and ensure administrative 
continuity (Smolka 2013). This is something that is very often lacking in Mexican 
municipalities.  
A very notable exception in terms of implementation capacity is Mexicali, Baja 
California, which since 1989 has taxed land instead of property values. This has allowed it 
to have a particularly well updated cadaster. Arguably, one of the incentives to implement 
such strategy emerged from a government transition at the state level, from PRI to PAN. 
The same change did not occur at the local level, which may have forced the municipality 
to be more financially independent. The first year of tax was collection based on land 
values, collection increased 2.5 times in constant MxP compared to the previous year. This 
trend continued in the following two decades, during which time collection increased 
almost 6 times while the population and urban area of the city grew by only 1.5 times. 
Mexicali thus has the second highest collection rate per capita in the country, surpassed 
only by Hermosillo, Sonora. Besides what this has meant in terms of local fiscal capacity, 
Mexicali has one of the lowest rates of urban sprawl in north-central Mexico at 2 times the 
rate of population growth. This, at least in the Mexican context, is a moderate rate of urban 
expansion over the 1990s and 2000s (López and Gómez 2014). 
 There are a number of other promising policies that, albeit difficult, have been 
implemented in Mexico and abroad. Although land banking, for instance, requires 






production at the local level. This has been done with relative success in Mexico City and 
Aguascalientes in the past (Reyes 2013, Jiménez Huerta 2014). Well-located and serviced 
affordable land is the most important component to promote, in conjunction with state and 
the federal governments, which can provide different types of housing assistance, such as 
self-help, incremental construction and rehabilitation loans or rental housing. 
 
7.4.3 Beyond Institutional Responses: Social and Neighborhood Organizing 
Portes and Roberts (2006) argue that the weakening of the formal working class in Latin 
America, the fragmentation of class solidarity, and the avoidance of universalistic 
concessions, has led to social demobilization. In the best of circumstances, civic 
mobilizations are territorial and deal with the consequences (e.g. poor housing conditions) 
rather than the root causes of misdistribution and poverty, all due to a neoliberal ideology 
that preaches self-reliance to all but provides the necessary means to only a few. 
Furthermore, as Mexican housing policy continues to be used as an implicit construction 
and development policy, housing investment, that is to a large extent extracted from 
workers’ earnings, and housing development decisions are generally taken by the private 
real estate sector seeking to maximize profits. This has given Mexicans very weak civic 
platforms from which to seek and demand better living conditions.  
Yet, the need to access residential services and economic opportunities, as well as 
housing security, both to avoid evictions and prevent squatting or the incursion of criminal 
groups into their neighborhoods, has recently provided residents of new housing 
developments an impulse to organize in different ways and through different means. Their 
success to date has been limited but notable given the difficult circumstances that they face, 






varies greatly across regions, it has spread from one state to the next with relative ease. Yet 
organizing to hire private services in low-density areas, such as garbage collection or 
private security, require a considerable amount of effort and resources. The more 
aggressive strategies, undertaken by State of Mexico residents in particular to confront 
organized crime have been notable, and perhaps even successful. The state has one of the 
worst crime rates in the country, but neighbors have coalesced to at least keep their own 
neighborhoods safe, through whatever means necessary. Similarly, residents have been able 
to consolidate informal commerce opportunities to both provide them with an income, and 
their neighbors with more services.  
 Negotiations and dealings with the public and private entities, however, have 
encountered significant roadblocks. High levels of corruption have been widely 
documented and even the residents’ legal battles have been impeded by something as grave 
as the incarceration of a housing leader, rather than public figures or development industry 
titans. Here, it is important to note that although INFONAVIT has launched pilot projects 
for community revitalization that seem to be headed in the right direction, it is worrisome 
that other grassroots efforts and initiatives are not supported by different levels of 
government, but rather are criminalized. Past civic and housing movements that have been 
successful have generally confronted powerful political and economic forces at least partly 
responsible for their struggles. Mobilizations around detrimental housing conditions in the 
country have already provided support not only to low-income households, but have 
actually contributed to democratization processes. It is really only then, within more 
democratic institutions, that demands, housing and otherwise, can be sustainably 
consolidated and attained, and that civic power can be leveraged beyond the reach of 







7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The present research has implications for theories regarding how governing regimes 
operate to facilitate growth and offers theoretical explanations for the failure of the 
Mexican housing model. These theoretical contributions also bring implications for 
practice. First, this dissertation has meticulously illustrated the roles and interactions 
between different levels of government and private actors and interests since the 
implementation of a new housing finance and development model in Mexico. Such 
relationships have been significant enough to create elaborate power structures and a multi-
level regime and complex system of governance, distinct from that described by regime 
theorists whose focus has generally been on local governance (Stone 1989). Furthermore, 
this research also exemplifies the ways in which this multi-level regime has reproduced and 
intensified socioeconomic and political (decision-making) inequities, as well the ultimate 
fracture of the housing model itself.  
 Mexico’s new housing finance and development model has been described by its 
own proponents as a housing train that ought to produce great quantities of housing at 
record speeds, arguably to address the country’s significant housing deficit, but also a 
fitting exemplar of the ideal of efficiency, vehemently promoted throughout the years of 
restructuring into a neoliberal era. For such a production system to function, however, an 
elaborate institutional scaffolding was needed. INFONAVIT, at the federal level, led the 
way through mortgage expansion and its financial power, made possible largely by the five 
percent compulsory levy on workers’ earnings (and high-interest loan repayment). Such a 
great financial engine – along with the important support and incentives provided by pro-






fringes of Mexico’s urban and economic centers. A select handful of private housing 
developers were handed a front seat – an attractive risk-free business venture to develop 
cheap housing on cheap land that would allow them to maximize their profits and amass 
power while local governments took a back passenger seat. Their low fiscal and 
institutional capacity and short-term vision drove them to see construction permits as a 
great revenue stream, without foreseeing the great challenges future administrations would 
face in providing adequate services and infrastructure. This is yet another piece of evidence 
of the failure of the nation’s decentralization experiment. Meanwhile, prospective 
homeowners almost missed the train. They were left to adapt to the developers’ production 
systems, which were focused on producing more and more units to keep the engine running 
(while giving positive reports to their investors). 
 The second major contribution of this research is to explain the failure of Mexico’s 
housing production model. I argue that this failure is rooted in the tension between the 
constitutional right to adequate housing and its increasing commodification. This tension 
underlies the paradoxical coexistence of high housing vacancy rates and shortages in 
various Mexican regions. The neoliberal argument was that the free market is better 
equipped than the government to produce affordable housing. The marketization of housing 
rights, however, produced numerous imbalances. Not only was the new housing finance 
and development model unable (or uninterested) in catering to the Mexicans with the 
greatest housing needs, but it also fostered a mismatch between housing demand and 
supply. The impulse to produce housing at great quantities and speed, and the lack of 
competition and risk at the outset, led to the production of a lot of very poor quality 
housing that did not properly address housing shortages. Rather, this development model 






infrastructure, issues of access to services, and ultimately, concentrated vacancy and 
abandonment.  
Besides explaining the model’s failures, this research also analyzes its implications. 
Despite the scarce research on the financialization of housing, particularly in the global 
south, the implications of Mexico’s Housing Paradox are becoming increasingly relevant at 
a global level. Thus, this research adds to the conversations that aim to answer what 
constitutes adequate housing. In the Mexican context, the official definition centers on 
metrics of overcrowding and the durability of construction materials. Yet, this research 
highlights that housing location is a paramount consideration to foster adequate living 
standards because it tends to promote or hinder access to services, infrastructure and 
opportunity. The conditions under which access to housing finance has been promoted are 
also underscored by this research, particularly given the hardships that low-income 
households have experienced after acquiring subprime mortgages in Mexico.  
In parallel, this research expands and updates our understanding of housing vacancy 
and abandonment in the Mexican context. Vacancy and abandonment associated with the 
Mexican housing model is particularly problematic in peri-urban regions. Documenting 
these conditions also revealed other important characteristics of the conditions the model 
helped reproduced, including the blurring of formal and informal housing production, 
occurring, for instance, when ‘formally’ developed housing falls into informality given its 
lack of access to basic services, its irregular occupation or its non-residential use. These 
conditions and their relationship to the multi-level regime merit further exploration. 
 Finally, this research also documents the spatial and localized nature of the 






residents and communities. Each has responded in different and often divergent ways. Such 
tensions run parallel to those between the use and exchange values of housing. One of the 
most telling and recent examples of this tension is the clash between residents and housing 
organizations that are aiming to prevent foreclosures and evictions and INFONAVIT. This 
clash is rooted in INFONAVIT’s strategy for addressing housing vacancy – to foreclose 
and auction such housing in order to ensure ongoing fiscal stability for the agency. The 
civic organizing that has emerged in response to this and other issues discussed throughout 
this dissertation deserve much more careful analysis and consideration. This research has 
identified different and at times conflicting civic groups and goals. Some have merely 
reacted to the negative living conditions that they face, and tried to address them when 
possible. There are instances in which neighbors have organized to access private (and 
often more expensive) services, such as security, garbage collection, and water pipes. 
Others have organized to more actively demand public service provision, and 
accountability from government officials and private entities, most notably, developers. 
 These findings are extremely relevant to current policy discussions. Despite a more 
recent – and arguably discursive – policy shift to promote densification, for instance, 
housing policy and finance in Mexico continue to prioritize new housing construction 
(much of it still in peri-urban areas) above other housing strategies. Strategies such as 
providing smaller and more accessible loans for housing rehabilitation, such as those 
implemented in Mexico City in the 2000s, would aid lower-income residents improve their 
living situations without being displaced to newly developed peripheries. Yet, they 
continue to take a back seat, perhaps because they do not fuel the economic engine of the 
housing train model. The same may be said of land speculation controls, such as land value 






Mexican cities are already experiencing. Precisely due to their absence, we are therefore 
seeing a shift towards upper-middle income housing finance. While financing higher-
income housing might be more fiscally sustainable, it will not resolve the housing needs of 
a majority of Mexicans. It seems that this latter shift will keep the housing and economic 
trains going without increasing access to adequate housing.  
At the local level, there is incipient and rare evidence of governments that are 
strengthening their land use policies and development regulations in response to the 
hardships generated by previous development patterns. These cases, such as Tlajomulco de 
Zúñiga in Jalisco, will be very useful and stimulating for further analysis. It will be even 
more advantageous to compare and contrast different cases. It is interesting, and 
counterintuitive, that Mexicali, in Baja California has had one of the greatest fiscal and 
collection capacities in the country for several decades now. Yet, it also faced similar 
development patterns and challenges as the ones outlined throughout this dissertation. This 
may indicate that federal and state government actions have outweighed the power of even 
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Appendix B. Preliminary Interview Questions  
(Spanish and English versions) 
 
Funcionarios Públicos 
1. Nombre, afiliación y título profesional: 
2. ¿En comparación con otras problemáticas, qué tan importante considera que sean los altos 
niveles de desocupación habitacional en su entidad? 
3. ¿Por cuánto tiempo se han experimentado altos niveles de desocupación habitacional en su 
entidad? 
4. ¿Existen áreas en particular que sufren de altos niveles de desocupación? 
a. Si este es el caso, ¿por qué razón cree que esto sea? 
5. ¿Cuáles cree que sean algunas de las causas de los altos niveles de desocupación en su 
municipio? 
6. ¿Cuáles han sido las principales implicaciones de los altos niveles de desocupación (i.e. el 
debilitamiento de las finanzas públicas, problemas de seguridad, etc.)? 
7. ¿Han tratado de resolver esta problemática? 
a. ¿De qué manera? 
b. ¿Han trabajado con otras instituciones públicas o privadas en este asunto? 
8. ¿Han trabajado con otros niveles de gobierno, o recibido apoyo de niveles más altos de 
gobierno para solucionar esta problemática? 
9. ¿Qué cree que se requiera, y quienes serían los principales actores que tendrían que colaborar, 
para comenzar a resolver esta problemática? 
 
Public Officials 
1. Name, affiliation and professional title: 
2. In relation to other issues that your municipality may face, how important do you consider 
high housing vacancy rates to be?  
3. For how long have housing vacancies been significant in your municipality? 
4. Are some areas within your municipality particularly affected by high vacancy rates? 
a. If so, why do you think that is? 
5. What do you see as some of the causes of high vacancy rates in this municipality? 
6. What have been some of the main implications of relatively high vacancy rates (i.e. weakened 






7. Have you tried to address this issue?  
a. If so, how? 
b. Have you worked with other public or private entities on this matter? 
8. Have you worked with other government levels or received support from higher levels of 
government to address high housing vacancy rates? 
9. What do you think is required, and who are the stakeholders that should come together, to 
begin to address this issue?  
 
Desarrolladores/Constructores 
1. Nombre, afiliación y título profesional: 
2. ¿Es un constructor local? ¿Dónde se encuentran la mayor parte de sus proyectos? 
3. Si está familiarizado con el contexto local:  
a. ¿En comparación con otras problemáticas, qué tan importante considera que sean los 
altos niveles de desocupación habitacional en su entidad? 
4. ¿Cuáles cree que sean algunas de las causas de los altos niveles de desocupación en este y 
otros municipios? 
5. ¿Por qué cree que algunos desarrollos habitacionales o áreas de este municipio han 
experimentado particularmente altos niveles de desocupación? 
6. ¿Cómo describiría el proceso de construcción? ¿Cuáles fueron las restricciones e incentivos 
durante el desarrollo del proyecto? 
7. ¿Cuáles han sido las principales implicaciones de los altos niveles de desocupación (i.e. el 
debilitamiento de la industria de la construcción, la reducción de la producción habitacional, 
etc.)? 
8. ¿Ha trabajado con el sector público para hacer frente a algunas de estas problemáticas? 
9. ¿Cuál cree que es y debiera ser el papel del sector privado para hacer frente a estas 
problemáticas? 
 
Housing Developers/Construction Agents 
1. Name, affiliation and professional title: 
2. Are you a local housing developer? Where are most of your projects located? 
3. If familiar with the local context: 
a. In relation to other issues that this municipality may face, how important do you 
consider high housing vacancy rates to be?  







5. Why do you think certain housing developments and/or areas of the city/town have 
experienced particularly high vacancy rates? 
6. What was the development process like? What were the restrictions and requirements, as well 
as the incentives for you to build housing? 
7. What have been some of the main implications of relatively high vacancy rates at different 
levels (i.e. weakened the construction industry, slowed down housing production, etc.)? 
8. Have you worked with the public sector to address some of the implications of this issue? 
9. What do you think is and should be the role of the private sector in addressing this issue? 
 
 
Final Interview Questions (Spanish version) 
Cuestionario para Funcionarios Públicos 
Nombre, afiliación y título profesional: 
1. ¿Qué medidas se han tomado desde su institución para abatir el rezago habitacional? 
a. ¿Qué rol considera ha tenido la política de vivienda y su financiamiento a nivel 
federal en el desarrollo de vivienda a nivel local en las últimas décadas? 
b. ¿Cuál ha sido la colaboración entre distintos niveles de gobierno para abatir el rezago 
habitacional y promover el desarrollo de vivienda? 
c. ¿Cómo ha evolucionado en las últimas décadas el rol, la influencia y las prácticas del 
sector privado en los procesos de desarrollo y financiamiento de vivienda? 
2. ¿Considera que los patrones de desarrollo de las últimas décadas han contribuido en el 
incremento de la desocupación habitacional?  
a. ¿Cuáles considera su institución como las causas principales de los altos niveles de 
desocupación en algunas regiones del país? 
b. ¿Qué áreas han sido las más afectadas? 
c. ¿En comparación con otras problemáticas de vivienda, qué tan importante considera 
que sea el tema de desocupación habitacional? 
d. ¿Cuáles han sido las principales problemáticas surgidas a partir del incremento en 
los niveles de desocupación? ¿Y cómo han afectado a la población y el sector público 
y privado? 
3. ¿De qué manera se ha intentado resolver esta problemática? 
a. ¿Se ha trabajado con otras instituciones públicas o privadas en este asunto?  
4. ¿Qué cree que se requiera, y quienes serían los principales actores que tendrían que colaborar, 







Cuestionario para Desarrolladores/Constructores  
Nombre, afiliación y título profesional:  
1. ¿Es un constructor/desarrollador local, regional o nacional? ¿Dónde se encuentran la mayor parte 
de sus proyectos?  
2. ¿Qué rol considera que ha tenido la política de vivienda y su financiamiento (federal y estatal) en 
el desarrollo de vivienda a nivel local en las últimas décadas?  
a. ¿Cuál ha sido el papel, influencia y prácticas del sector privado en los procesos de desarrollo y 
financiamiento de vivienda?  
b. ¿Cómo describiría los procesos de desarrollo inmobiliario (ej. restricciones e incentivos)? ¿Y su 
relación con el sector público?  
3. ¿Considera que los patrones de desarrollo de las últimas décadas han contribuido en el incremento 
de la desocupación habitacional?  
4. ¿Cuáles cree que sean algunas de las causas principales de los altos niveles de desocupación en 
diversas regiones del país?  
5. ¿Por qué cree que algunos desarrollos habitacionales o áreas de este estado y municipios han 
experimentado particularmente altos niveles de desocupación?  
6. ¿En comparación con otras problemáticas, qué tan importante considera que sean los altos niveles 
de desocupación habitacional?  
7. ¿Cuáles han sido las principales problemáticas surgidas a partir de los altos niveles de desocupación 
(ej. el debilitamiento de la industria de la construcción, la reducción de la producción habitacional, 
etc.)?  
8. ¿Ha trabajado con el sector público para hacer frente a algunas de estas problemáticas?  
9. ¿Cuál cree que es y debiera ser el papel del sector privado para hacer frente a estas problemáticas?  
 
Cuestionario para Organizaciones Civiles 
Nombre de Organización y posición dentro de la organización: 
1. ¿Hace cuánto y con qué propósito se formó su organización? 
a. ¿Hace cuánto es usted miembro de esta organización y cuál fue su motivación para 
formar parte de ella?  
b. ¿Cómo puede afiliarse un individuo o familia a su organización? 
2. ¿Cuál es su opinión acerca de los programas de vivienda de distintos niveles de gobierno para 
combatir el rezago habitacional en las últimas décadas? 
3. ¿Cuál es su opinión acerca del papel e influencia del sector privado en procesos de producción 
y financiamiento de vivienda? 
4. ¿Qué tanto cree que las políticas gubernamentales y el desarrollo de vivienda de las últimas 






5. ¿Cuáles cree que sean algunas de las causas principales de los altos niveles de desocupación 
en diversas regiones del país? 
6. ¿Por qué cree que algunos desarrollos habitacionales o áreas de este estado y municipio han 
experimentado particularmente altos niveles de desocupación? 
7. ¿En comparación con otras problemáticas, qué tan importante considera que sean los altos 
niveles de desocupación habitacional? 
8. ¿Cuáles han sido las principales problemáticas surgidas a partir del incremento en los niveles 
de desocupación? ¿Y cómo han afectado a la población? 
9. ¿Ha trabajado con el sector público para hacer frente a algunas de estas problemáticas? 
10. ¿Qué cree que se requiera, y quienes serían los principales actores que tendrían que colaborar, 
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